Exploring social (in)-securities in Asia by Buechel, Romana et al.
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2005
Exploring social (in)-securities in Asia
Buechel, Romana; Derks, Annuska; Loosli, Susanne; Thueler, Sue
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-170521
Edited Scientific Work
Published Version
 
 
The following work is licensed under a Publisher License.
Originally published at:
Buechel, Romana; Derks, Annuska; Loosli, Susanne; Thueler, Sue Exploring social (in)-securities in Asia.
Edited by: Buechel, Romana; Derks, Annuska; Loosli, Susanne; Thueler, Sue (2005). Bern: Institut für
Sozialanthropologie/Ethnologie.
	



	

           



	 !	"
      
         
 
Arbeitsblätter des Instituts für Sozialanthropologie/Ethnologie der Universität Bern 
 
Herausgegeben von:  
Annuska Derks  
Ueli Hostettler  
Nathalie Peyer  
Saskia Walentowitz 
Corina Salis Gross  
Michael Toggweiler  
Christian Wymann  
Heinzpeter Znoj 
 
Institut für Sozialanthropologie/Ethnologie 
Länggass-Str. 49A, CH-3000 Bern 9 
Fax  +41 31 631 42 12 
 
 
ISBN-10: 3-906465-31-4 
ISBN-13: 978-3-906465-31-9 
 
© Romana Büchel, Annuska Derks, Susanne Loosli, Sue Thüler  
und Institut für Sozialanthropologie/Ethnologie der Universität Bern 
 
URL: http://www.ethno.unibe.ch/arbeitsblaetter/AB31_Bue.pdf 
 
This is the electronic edition of Romana Büchel, Annuska Derks, Susanne 
Loosli, Sue Thüler (eds.) " Exploring Social (In-)Securities in Asia", 
Arbeitsblatt Nr. 31, Institut für Ethnologie, Universität Bern, Bern 2005 
 
ISBN-10: 3-906465-31-4 
ISBN-13: 978-3-906465-31-9 
 
Electronically published  October 4, 2005 
 
© Romana Büchel, Annuska Derks, Susanne Loosli, Sue Thüler 
und Institut für Ethnologie der Universität Bern. All rights 
reserved.  
 
This text may be copied freely and distributed either electronically or in 
printed form under the following conditions. You may not copy or 
distribute it in any other fashion without express written permission from 
me or the Institut für Ethnologie. Otherwise I encourage you to share this 
work widely and to link freely to it.   
 
Conditions  
 
You keep this copyright notice and list of conditions with any copy you 
make of the text.   
 
You keep the preface and all chapters intact. 
 
You do not charge money for the text or for access to reading or copying 
it.   
 
That is, you may not include it in any collection, compendium, database, 
ftp site, CD ROM, etc. which requires payment or any world wide web 
site which requires payment or registration. You may not charge money 
for shipping the text or distributing it. If you give it away, these 
conditions must be intact. 
 
For permission to copy or distribute in any other fashion, contact: 
information@ethno.unibe.ch 
ARBEITSBLATT  Nr. 31 2005  
Romana Büchel, Annuska Derks, 
Susanne Loosli, Sue Thüler (eds.) 
Exploring Social (In-)Securities in Asia 
  
Contents 
 
Introduction               3 
Romana Büchel, Annuska Derks, Susanne Loosli, Sue Thüler 
Anthropological Perspectives on Social Security:       10 
Multiple Relations of Kinship and Citizenship 
Willemijn de Jong 
Styles of Social Security:            25 
Livelihood and Insecurity in the Uplands of East Java, Indonesia 
Gerben Nooteboom 
 
“Why should I get help?”           40 
Inter- and intra-household relations in the context of crisis of smallholders  
in two tribal villages of Orissa (India) 
Nadja Ottiger 
 
The Reemergence of Street Protests:          50 
State Workers Challenge the Chinese State 
Antoine Kernen 
 
Regulations of Abortion in Indonesia:          66 
Securing Whose Interest? 
Wening Udasmoro 
 
When Social Security Reaches its Limits.         74 
Long-Term Care of Elderly People in Urban Indonesia 
Peter van Eeuwijk 
 
“And I ended up in Switzerland”          91 
Biographies of Indonesian Migrant Women 
Anna Bally 
 
Migration and HIV Vulnerability in the Mekong Sub-Region    101 
Vasoontara Yiengprugsawan 
 
Securing a Livelihood in Hanoi        105 
Sandra Kürten 
 
Processes of Urbanisation and Transformation in Nam Dinh City, Vietnam  109 
Angelica Wehrli 
List of contributors          115 
 2 
 3
Introduction 
Romana Büchel, Annuska Derks, Susanne Loosli, Sue Thüler 
This working paper comprises a selection of revised papers originally presented at the Interna-
tional Workshop ‘Social Security in Southeast Asia’, held at the University of Berne in Novem-
ber 2004. The idea behind this workshop was twofold. Firstly, within the ‘Working Group 
Southeast Asia’, consisting of a group of students and assistants of the Institute of Social An-
thropology, we realized that even though we had all been working on different themes and in 
different countries of Southeast Asia, issues of social security and livelihood figured as a com-
mon denominator. These pressing issues therefore became the thematic focus of our discussions. 
Secondly, in order to gain a broader understanding of the diverse ways in which people in South-
east Asia go about securing their livelihoods, we aimed at bringing together young scholars from 
various academic institutes, representatives of development organisations, and interested stu-
dents working on related topics.  
The response to our call for papers was overwhelmingly positive. After a selection of the pro-
posed contributions, we divided the workshop into four panels in which a total of 12 participants 
presented their papers. The workshop lasted for two days and attracted between 40 and 50 per-
sons from academia as well as development organizations. The various contributions and discus-
sions showed not only the urgency of the topic of social security, but also the great variety of the 
practices and significances generated by actors in relation to their livelihood. The participants 
and organizers felt, therefore, that the papers warranted publication in order to exemplify the 
current directions in the research of social (in)securities. 
In Western Europe social security is commonly associated with a state-based welfare system. 
Since the end of the 19th century industrializing countries developed a system to ensure people's 
basic needs for housing, health, education, and income support in case of, for example, unem-
ployment and old age. These measures eventually evolved into what is often called a welfare 
state which takes care of its citizens ‘from the cradle to the grave’. Citizens of developing coun-
tries can rarely count on such elaborate state-based social security programs. Where these pro-
grams exist, they often have limited coverage, reaching only those working in the public sector. 
The majority of the population in developing countries, however, has no access to government 
support. They predominantly work in the rural or informal sector and are dependent on local 
self-help arrangements in case of need. For that reason, De Jong (this volume), instead of taking 
an institutional approach to security, proposes to start from a functional approach, taking into 
account the meanings and uses of the whole complex of social relationships. Most studies on 
social security in developing countries, also within this volume, focus on these local, informal or 
‘traditional’ forms of social security. We will therefore refer to social security as “all ways in 
which individual people, households, and communities protect their livelihood and are protected 
socially against the shocks and stresses that threaten its continuity and stability” (Nooteboom 
2003: 33). 
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The ‘shock and stresses’ caused by the financial crisis in Southeast Asia at the end of the 1990s 
brought issues of livelihood and social security into the spotlight of attention. The urgency of 
this topic is, however, not only related to economic uncertainties but also to a changing demo-
graphic situation (such as through migration and aging), and to political processes (such as the 
cutback of state-based social services, resource management, processes related to the transition 
from socialist systems to free market economies). We can observe how various changes in politi-
cal systems have broadly influenced the outlook of individual countries in regions, such as Indo-
nesia, Vietnam, China, and Cambodia. Although maybe less obvious, these political changes 
have a direct impact on the daily lives of the inhabitants of the respective countries.  
As a result of such political, economic, and demographic processes, not only livelihood prac-
tices, but also the elasticity and resilience of local safety nets are under stress. Mutual support 
networks are often thought to be based on family solidarity. However, recent research – also 
presented in this volume – calls this idea of family solidarity into question. Can the family under 
all circumstances guarantee social support in case of need? How do various demographic 
changes influence the family support and intra-familial cooperation?  
In this context, the household is often taken as the main unit of analysis. At first sight, analyzing 
the household seems to be the most suitable approach for comparing the different ways of secur-
ing a livelihood. Yet, on a closer look, concrete living arrangements may differ considerably and 
therefore the household may be hard to grasp. One has to be aware of the shortcomings of treat-
ing the household as an individual actor strategizing its resources to the benefit of all its mem-
bers. This perspective is prone to overlook intra-household differences. As some contributions 
show, gender and age differences cannot be ignored when studying social security arrangements. 
In the case of dealing with, and taking risks it can be observed that households cannot be seen as 
homogeneous units. Different household members may actually pursue different goals, invest 
differently in social relations and use their resources differently.  
This brings us to the question under what conditions and to what extent people can really rely on 
family-based networks for securing their daily needs? Are there people who cannot count on 
such safety nets? Are there people that can be considered to be more vulnerable than others? 
Although focusing on different countries, several authors within this volume reveal two identical 
categories of persons who are particularly vulnerable. The first group is the increasing percent-
age of persons of old age. How does the process of aging influence the ways in which people 
secure their livelihood? Examples from Indonesia, being the one Asian nation with the fastest 
growing elderly population, show that elderly people cannot necessarily count on support from 
their families. Especially aged persons without children are more dependent on intra-
generational and non-kin support. The second group of vulnerable people, namely widows, is 
equally falling through the often romantized kin-based safety nets. Various case studies pre-
sented here – be it in urban or in rural regions, be it in India or in Indonesia – show that the im-
portance of networks like those existing among peer groups or in neighbourhoods are often un-
derestimated. 
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Non-kin networks are not only relevant for the way in which these two particularly vulnerable 
groups try to secure their livelihood. In the case of sudden loss of income, for example, flexible 
reaction and creative solutions are asked for. Those people who lost their jobs may rely more on 
work units or labour unions than on their family for social and economic support.  
This means that the concept of ‘vulnerability’ – understood as the extent of exposure to crises 
and the capacity to cope with unforeseen events (Van Eeuwijk, this volume) – is related to the 
access to and embeddedness in efficacious social networks of various kinds. It seems evident that 
not everybody reacts to a difficult situation in the same way and to the same degree. Historical 
and structural inequalities as well as social capital determine the range and limits of individual 
strategies, or styles. In this context, one may ask to what extend individuals do have ‘room of 
manoeuvre’?  
This was one of the crucial questions that was taken up at the roundtable at the end of the work-
shop. The different presentations made apparent that the view of society as a shared place of 
living does not adequately mirror reality. Departing from an image of society as harmonious and 
solidary – often described as characteristic for Asian societies –, the participants suggested to 
rather conceptualize society as a place of competition for resources. Instead of the common view 
of society as well functioning, harmonious, and occasionally in stress, we should better depart 
from a concept of society as normally characterized by conflict-laden situations, full of insecuri-
ties. Does it make sense at all then to speak of ‘social security’ in the Asian context? Would con-
cepts such as ‘social insecurity’, ‘risk’, and ‘vulnerability’ not be a more appropriate point of 
departure for our research? Within this working paper new directions are explored through spe-
cific case studies focusing on various countries in Asia. 
Outline of the working paper 
Drawing upon recent social security studies in the field of anthropology of law, of kinship, and 
T.H. Marshall’s conceptualization of citizenship (1992), Willemijn de Jong proposes a functional 
approach to social security. In doing so, she departs from pre-existing perspectives focussing on 
the state or public organizations as the main agencies for providing support. She adopts, instead, 
an anthropological perspective that provides a more comprehensive or inclusive understanding of 
existing insecurities. In pursuing the proposed functional approach „all the social relationships of 
all kinds of socioeconomic groups that can be mobilized within the realm of both kinship and 
citizenship“ are considered. Extensive studies in India (urban and rural Kerala), Burkina Faso 
and Indonesia (Flores) conducted by de Jong and her research colleagues show that social secu-
rity conditions and mechanisms vary between individuals, particularly with regard to gender. 
Therefore, on the actor, the structural and the historical level, gender specific differences have to 
be considered. The research group stresses, furthermore, that social and physical support presup-
poses a minimum of economic resources, a fact that is highlighted by other contributors as well. 
One of them is Gerben Nooteboom. He finds that long-term social security depends on individual 
access to resources and investments in social networks. In order to bridge the gap between a 
structural (providing side) and an actor-oriented approach (achieving side), he introduces the 
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concept of social security style. Styles, according to Nooteboom, refer to “regular patterns of 
behaviour vis-à-vis adversities, threats, and insecurities which are not always necessarily the 
result of strategic action.” They differ from strategic action (clear strategic choices) in that they 
are usually the result of people’s acting according to “fixed customary, habitual everyday prac-
tices.” In the East Javanese village, where Nooteboom conducted field research, he discerned 
four different types of social security styles: orang duit (money people), orang lugu (traditional 
or village people), orang pelit (stingy people), and orang bisnis (entrepreneurial people). In addi-
tion to these four types, Nooteboom finds the orang nakal, individuals not oriented towards a 
sustainable livelihood or long-term social security. Their deliberate taking of risks is identified as 
a counter style. The names adopted for the styles are local terms villagers use to ascribe to each 
other. Interestingly enough, styles do not correspond to specific economic conditions, i.e. money 
people do not necessarily belong to the top economic layer. What becomes also clear in Noote-
boom’s contribution is that villagers do not randomly invest in reciprocal relationships but do so 
only after carefully assessing their individual orientations, capabilities, and resources. 
Looking for the reasons why households opt for different paths for securing a livelihood is one 
of questions addressed by Nadja Ottiger. In her long-term research on economic strategies of 
136 households in two villages of Orissa (northern India), she investigates why some local 
groups (i.e. tribals) sell, mortgage, or rent out their land more easily than other groups in times of 
crises. This question is based on the observation that in various regions of India autochthonous 
groups are loosing access to their land, a phenomenon well known in the literature as ‘tribal land 
alienation’. Ottiger uncovers that the reason for giving away land is neither found in weaker 
forms of intra-group solidarity nor in less extended social networks. Rather, she states, in all 
ethnic groups, households, as the main economic units, are very much self-centred. In the same 
vein as de Jong and Nooteboom, Ottiger argues that in times of crises, support is strictly received 
on the basis of reciprocity or of payment. The much propagated “kinship solidarity” turns out to 
be “at least on an economic level […] more a myth or wishful thinking […] than reality.” To 
explain differences in economic behaviour between various ethnic groups, aspects of social 
status and identity (caste and tribe) as well as of gender and household composition are crucial. It 
turns out that in some households the burden to compensate loss of land can be shifted to 
women: by selling firewood these women can earn money to buy paddy. Thus, the loss of land 
does not immediately threaten household (food) security. 
While the household is the point of departure in many studies, Antoine Kernen considers the role 
of the ‘labour unit’ (danwei) as a basic unit of solidarity in times of need. In his contribution the 
author focuses on the increase of workers demonstrations in urban China. These workers’ protest 
take place in a context characterized by the loss of social benefits won under socialism. In his 
analysis, based on field data from three Northeast Chinese cities, Kernen favours a political per-
spective to contextualize and interpret the workers’ demonstrations. He shows how “the nature 
of their demands (limited to their own enterprise), their vocabulary (which frequently refers to 
socialist discourse) as well as the modality of their protests (petitions deposit) insert their actions 
in a well established and tolerated ‘repertoire of contention’ (Tilly 1986).” Workers’ protests are 
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tolerated as long as they are confined to one enterprise, appear to be spontaneous and stress the 
urgency of the situation of laid-off workers. By using socialist vocabulary, demonstrations indi-
rectly point at the lost role of the state in guaranteeing material securities. This is most strategi-
cally done by old, retired people, because they are still strongly tied to their danwei and now 
have the time and the experience (from the period of the Cultural Revolution) to demonstrate. 
Furthermore, they are considered to be the ‘builders’ of the socialist state (and thence not easily 
criticized). Under these conditions, the Chinese government has until now succeeded in prevent-
ing the emergence of an organised labour movement. The author also wonders about the nature 
of the Chinese State and its ability to invent a new political control in a transitional society, par-
ticularly by analysing the new role played by the old ‘Office for Complaints and Petitions’.  
The impact of political transformations is also explored within the contribution of Wening 
Udasmoro. She focuses on the impact of political transitions on the regulation of abortion in 
Indonesia. She discerns three political eras: the Old Order Era of Soekarno (1945-1967), the 
New Order Era of Soeharto (1967-1998) and the Reformasi Era, from 1998 until present. During 
the period under study national regulation policies varied from pro-natal policy to state-ordered 
birth control and finally to family planning under a regime aiming at democracy. In the present 
Reformasi Era the pertinent question is less whether abortion is allowed or not but more so how 
abortion regulation can be useful for national interests. It becomes obvious that in each era the 
female body is instrumentalized by the state in order to achieve national objectives without con-
sidering either the rights or the health conditions of women. 
While the regulation of the reproductive power of women and the control of birth and new life is 
of major concern to the national Indonesian government, the care for citizens who face a decline 
of their vitality is of much less public interest. Nevertheless, for urban Indonesian families the 
growing number of elderly people who become dependent on care by others poses a new chal-
lenge. In his survey on three Northern Sulawesi towns, Peter van Eeuwijk identifies a ‘triangle of 
uncertainty’ – namely, social, economic, and health-related insecurities – troubling the genera-
tion of those over sixty years of age. Due to the inadequacy of support provided by the state or 
by private organizations care obligations are relegated to the household, family, and kinship. 
Since the care capabilities of urban households are easily exhausted, many chronically ill elderly 
people are neglected, awaiting “release” in bitter isolation. Recent developments show that long-
term care is being provided along the lines of intra-generational networks (elderly taking care of 
elderly), by growing solidarity between the first and the third generation (grandchildren taking 
care of their grandparents), and by the employment of non-kin (remuneration of professional 
care-givers). The most vulnerable group of people are old, female, not married, poor, and ill per-
sons – who most likely do not dispose of economic resources to invest in reciprocal relations. 
Whereas some groups of elderly people have difficulties sustaining relations of support on the 
local level, certain young people may actually expand their social relations at the transnational 
level in their pursuit to seek the fulfilment of their dreams abroad. In her Ph.D. thesis Anna Bally 
aims at unveiling these migrants’ individual constructions and interpretations of their migration 
experiences. Introducing her article with the statement of an Indonesian woman, “[a]nd I ended 
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up in Switzerland”, Bally shifts the focus onto the “emotional journeys” of so-called female 
“marriage migrants”. Pursuing an ethno-psychoanalytical approach, Bally argues that it is neces-
sary to take into account not only rational, economically motivated decision-making but also 
irrational, emotional decision-making. Only by following such a comprehensive approach can 
the “mysterious complexity of human strategies” be understood. The case illustrated in her arti-
cle, clearly demonstrates that one cannot identify one single motivation leading to the decision of 
marrying a foreigner and to follow him to his country. Rather, a bundle of motives is responsible 
for such a decision – including feelings of love, marriage expectations, economic considerations, 
security concerns, curiosity, Indonesian ideals (ikut suami) or other imaginary aims or identifica-
tions. Summing up her findings Bally states that “even if denied or unconscious, love is never 
free of instrumental aspects. Economic goals […] are always blended with emotional and sym-
bolic meaning. Making decisions to secure one's livelihood thus might at the same time cover 
other, namely phantasmagoric goal.” Psychic conscious and unconscious motives and identifica-
tions, then, structure these women’s strategies of physical survival and aspired economic secu-
rity. 
The last section of the working paper comprises three shorter contributions, which mostly do not 
base on the author’s generation of primary data. Rather, the first two of these papers are analyses 
of secondary data (Yiengprugsawan, Kuerten), while the third is an outline of a Ph.D. research 
project to be initiated in the year 2005 (Wehrli). 
Vasoontara Yiengprugsawan presents an analysis of quantitative data (UN statistics etc.) relating 
to HIV/AIDS infection and existing prevention measurements in the Mekong sub-region. Her 
main subject is the linkage between migration and HIV vulnerability in the mentioned region. 
Various studies have shown that the mobile population is particularly vulnerable to HIV-
infection. Yiengprugsawan emphasizes, however, that mobility in itself is not a risk factor for 
HIV infection. Rather, an increase in vulnerability and risk to HIV/AIDS is caused by the situa-
tions encountered by mobile people during migration. The non-existent integration of migrant 
workers into the planning and implementation of sustainable HIV infection prevention strategies 
and the lack of their involvement in the development of support networks and services are essen-
tial findings of the author’s investigations. 
Taking us from health to development concerns, Sandra Kürten examines the processes of ur-
banization since the Doi Moi policy (1986) in Vietnam. The emphasis of her comprehensive 
literature review lies on the urban development of Hanoi and on the impacts of the transition 
from planned to market economy in different areas in town. She describes the development in 
three different districts in Hanoi: the Ancient Quarter, the French Colonial Quarter and the squat-
ter area of Chuong Duong. While developing in different directions, processes of competition 
and displacement more and more influence the lives of residents within these three districts. 
Thus, diversified strategies for securing a livelihood are continually looked for. Kürten plans to 
explore this in more detail in less researched areas that have been influenced by urbanization 
processes, namely the rural villages surrounding Hanoi. 
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In the proposal for her Ph.D. thesis, Angelica Wehrli similarly explores the impact of processes 
of urbanisation and transformation on the livelihoods of the urban population. The author is es-
pecially interested in how social and cultural values are subject to change since the Doi Moi pol-
icy (1986). For her research project, which will take place in Nam Dinh City, Wehrli plans to 
focus on individual experiences of citizens as well as on the strategies which they employ to 
secure their livelihood. During an explorative visit to Vietnam, Wehrli found at least two areas 
that have been influenced by the recent process of urbanisation and transformation: the percep-
tions of trade and the presence of Confucians ideology in daily life. Both areas will be investi-
gated in depth by a thorough research in the field. 
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Anthropological Perspectives on Social Security: 
Multiple Relations of Kinship and Citizenship 
Willemijn de Jong 
Studies on social security often depart from a Euro-American institutional and policy oriented 
perspective, with a focus on the state and other public organisations as the main agencies for 
providing support to people in times of need and distress. However, with such an approach, large 
parts of social security systems remain blind spots. This paper addresses the question of how, 
from an anthropological perspective, the complexity of the issue of social security can fruitfully 
be analysed.  
The following reflections are based on the one hand on recent social security studies, mainly 
from India and Indonesia, and on the other, on our own research project on local social security 
and gender in India and Burkina Faso (cf. de Jong et al. 2005). My fieldwork experiences are 
from India and, prior to this project, from Indonesia.1 I will outline only main tendencies here.  
A functional approach to social security 
In a recent ILO publication, social security is defined as “benefits that society provides to indi-
viduals and households – through public and collective measures – to guarantee them a mini-
mum standard of living and to protect them against low or declining living standards arising out 
of a number of basic risks and needs” (van Ginneken 2003: 11). The World Bank circumscribes 
“social protection” in a similar vein (World Bank 2001: 9). With these institutional approaches, 
the large realm of support provided by kin and other more or less institutionalised personal rela-
tionships in the South and in the North remains invisible. Regarding countries in the South, the 
small realm of public support for people in the organised sector is unduly emphasised. Moreover, 
and even more problematic, efforts by the concerned actors to overcome insecurities as well as 
their notions of security and insecurity remain invisible as well. 
Next to the institutional approach we can distinguish the functional – not functionalist – ap-
proach with regard to social security of which Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen are well-known pro-
ponents. They focus on the “capability to perform certain basic functionings” (Drèze and Sen 
1991: 7) as they consider the quality of life in terms of valued activities and the ability to choose 
these activities as crucial. They particularly distinguish two aspects of social security: “Protec-
tion” and “promotion”. Protective social security tries to prevent “a decline in living standards in 
general and in the basic conditions of living in particular”. Promotional social security aims at 
“enhancing the normal living conditions and dealing with regular and often persistent depriva-
                                                 
1 The project, in which I did research in urban Kerala, India, and which I headed, was carried out together 
with three other scholars: Claudia Roth who conducted research in urban Burkina Faso, Fatoumata Ba-
dini-Kinda who worked in rural Burkina Faso and Seema Bhagyanath who made investigations in rural 
Kerala. This research was financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) and the Swiss 
Development Cooperation (SDC) from July 2000 until December 2003 and was part of the programme 
”Research Partnerships with Developing Countries”. In Indonesia I have conducted fieldwork since 1987 
in a rural area on the island of Flores. 
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tion” (ibid. 3). Both require different strategies. These definitions show that this approach is pol-
icy-oriented, but it fails to give detailed clues for the research of social security.  
The anthropologists Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann have developed a more research 
oriented approach to social security. Their work inspired us in the first place to conduct research 
on this topic. In the 1980s Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, specialists in the anthropol-
ogy of law, began to develop an “inclusive” approach to social security, based on their research 
about different groups of Indonesian people.2 They were again influenced by the work of the 
social welfare scholar James Midgley, particularly by his book “Social Security, Inequality and 
the Third World”, published in 1984. The term “inclusive” refers to research that not only fo-
cuses on institutions or organisations, the providers of public support, but also on the individuals 
and groups of individuals who both use and provide support in the non-public sphere. Franz and 
Keebet von Benda-Beckmann previously worked in the Netherlands but are now in Germany, 
and they stimulated scholars of different disciplines to follow their basic approach in studies on 
social security in Asia and Africa.3  
In “Coping with Insecurity”, their most programmatic publication on social security, these au-
thors also develop a functional model of social security. The functional approach, as they under-
stand it, is concerned with “what ideas, relations and institutions become relevant as social secu-
rity under different social, economic, political and cultural conditions” (von Benda-Beckmann 
2000: 14). Based on such an abstract concept of social security functions, they consider social 
security as a field of problems. Concerning the empirical dimension of social security, they for-
mulate the following definition: “Empirically, social security refers to the social phenomena with 
which the abstract domain of social security is filled: efforts of individuals, groups of individuals 
and organisations to overcome insecurities related to their existence, that is, concerning food and 
water, shelter, care and physical and mental health, education and income, to the extent that the 
contingencies are not considered a purely individual responsibility, as well as the intended and 
unintended consequences of these efforts” (ibid. 14). These efforts take place within fields of 
contested norms and values and can also consist of ambivalent, unsocial and illegal ways to cope 
with insecurity (cf. Vel 1994, Nooteboom 2003).  
The authors consider social security as an integral aspect of social and economic life and crucial 
to the understanding of social organisation and change. With this statement, the double-faced 
nature of social security as both a social and an economic phenomenon is taken into account, 
whereas in institutional approaches the economic aspects are often overemphasised. The conver-
sion of economic resources into fulfilment of social security needs, at any level of poverty or 
wealth is of great importance. 
                                                 
2 Cf. F. von Benda-Beckmann (1988), K. von Benda-Beckmann (1988), K. von Benda-Beckmann (1991), 
K. von Benda-Beckmann and F. Leatemia-Tomatala (1992), F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann (1998), and 
K. von Benda-Beckmann (2004). 
3 Cf. e.g. Vel (1994), Leliveld (1994), de Bruijn and van Dijk (1995), Hirtz (1995), Biezeveld (2002), 
Nooteboom (2003), Koning and Hüsken (n.d.). 
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When social security is achieved, it can be inferred that the related social relationships contain a 
security quality due to “security mechanisms” which enable natural, economic and social re-
sources to be converted into actual social security provisions. Franz and Keebet von Benda-
Beckmann stress that resources alone do not provide social security, but they are a precondition 
for it. With statements such as “One cannot eat rice land” and “Money does not cook”, an infor-
mant in Indonesia hinted to the importance of what the authors call “chains of conversions” 
(ibid. 22). 
Von Benda-Beckmanns’ approach concentrates principally on the social practices of individual 
and collective actors. These social practices are related to the symbolic order, in particular to the 
general cultural ideas, the individual notions of social security, and the institutionalised rights 
and obligations. And they are related to the actual social relationships of givers and receivers of 
social security. Finally, the consequences of the practices are of interest. With this model, the 
authors also try to overcome the usual dichotomies such as traditional and modern social secu-
rity, informal and formal social security, or private and public social security. The structural and 
historical contexts of the social security discourses and practices as well as their genderedness 
are not explicitly considered in their four-layer model. But in their analyses they refer to these 
dimensions, particularly the impact of the state. 
According to developments in social theories of difference during the last decades, gender is a 
category with a strong structuring potential with regard to inequality, and therefore cannot be 
excluded in social security studies. On the one hand, gender structures the societal fields of po-
litical economy and the symbolic order, as scholars such as Nancy Fraser, a philosopher and 
specialist in welfare issues, have shown (e.g. Fraser 1997, Kabeer 2000). On the other hand, 
gender imprints the interactions of individuals, which is known under the term of “doing gender” 
(West and Zimmerman 1987). Gender positionality has to be looked at in relation to ethnicity, 
race, class and age as well (cf. Moore 1994, Anthias 2002). For example, in our research (de 
Jong et al. 2005) we found that in Burkina Faso and India gender positionalities differ according 
to occupational or income class, and class is to some extent related to ethnicity. Gender is also 
related to age, but differently in the two research contexts. Due to the value of seniority, women 
in Burkina Faso generally achieve more authority and decision-making power with increasing 
age. This is less the case for women in India. 
The whole complex of security efforts or the social security mix of an individual, a group of 
individuals or an organisation can aptly be called a social security arrangement. We conceive of 
the social security arrangement of a certain group as consisting of a network of social relation-
ships which can be mobilised to get support. For example, social security arrangements of poor 
elderly people consist of those social ties that they are able to mobilise in situations of need. 
These can be relationships with certain family members, with certain members in the local com-
munity or with organisations. We call the social security arrangements of the different social 
groups together the “social security system” of a societal entity. 
As mentioned above, social security studies focus on the conversion of resources with the pur-
pose of diminishing insecurity and on the cultural and social dimensions of these resources and 
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their exchanges. Livelihood studies concentrate more on the economic aspects of subsistence of 
mostly poor populations. Poverty studies particularly analyse the income situation of the poor 
and the way they try to fulfil their basic needs. Studies about disasters, which have developed in 
recent years, concentrate on populations which are particularly vulnerable regarding ecological 
issues. All these different kinds of studies are concerned with efforts of individuals, groups of 
individuals and organisations to overcome insecurities, and are thus closely related to the field of 
social security studies, if not part of it. 
The concept of security 
Why is it useful, from an anthropological perspective, to put the term “security”, and eventually 
“insecurity”, at the centre? “Social security” in the sense of statutory social insurance emerged as 
a concept in the context of European industrialisation in the 19th century. It was a response to 
pressure from industrial workers who participated in mutual aid societies and was first estab-
lished in Germany in the 1880s. After the Great Depression around 1930, it was implemented in 
other Western countries (Midgley 1997). In developing countries, statutory social security has 
developed since the 1950s in various ways, depending on the colonial regime. 
The crisis of the world economy effected a breakdown of certainties. The philosopher John 
Dewey stated at that time a general “search for security by means of active control of the chang-
ing course of events” (Dewey 1929, quoted by Kaufmann 2003: 80). The term “security” became 
increasingly important in the West, and gradually the need for security came to be considered as 
a universal anthropological principle. In a declaration in 1944 the International Labour Organisa-
tion made “social security” an explicit goal that should be reached globally. As a result this term 
was established internationally with its specific meaning, namely as governmental income pro-
tection through social insurance (Kaufmann 2003). 
In addition to the discourse about social security which is informed by Western philosophical 
ideas about security, since the 1970s a discourse about risk has emerged. Although in everyday 
language risk is a synonym for danger, the current public discourse regarding risk is strongly 
related to insurance. Scholars pursuing a Foucaultian approach such as François Ewald consider 
risk as a neologism of insurance. Risk in this sense is characterised as collective, calculable and 
as economic capital (cf. Ewald 1991: 198). More precisely, risk is defined as “a specific mode of 
treatment of certain events capable of happening to a group of individuals – or, more exactly, to 
values or capitals possessed or represented by a collectivity of individuals” (ibid. 199). There-
fore, neither the adverse events nor the actual suffering of individuals are at stake here. Ulrich 
Beck, who has coined the term “risk society” and therewith strongly influenced academic dis-
course, argues from a similar point of view. He points to the fact that risks are culturally and 
socially created and that in the subsequent processes securities, and particularly insecurities, are 
produced. Thereby, power is exerted and profits are made (Beck 1986).  
As already mentioned, von Benda-Beckmanns’ conceptualisation of social security in a wider 
sense is not only empirically, but also epistemologically motivated. In accordance with the cur-
rently crucial human aim for security (cf. Kaufmann 2003), they do not consider conflict or dis-
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ruption as the pivot of social organisation, but security and insecurity. Based on this axiom of 
social organisation they construct their model of social security in relation to social theories by 
Antony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu (F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2000: 7). 
According to our view, local efforts in coping with adversities are, theoretically and empirically, 
fruitfully looked at starting from the concept of security or insecurity. If we adopt the definition 
of social security by Benda-Beckmanns, in the sense of efforts of individuals and collectivities to 
overcome insecurities, then the statutory concept of social security and the current concept of 
risk as contributory insurance are too restricted. They are only elements of social security in a 
wider sense. Departing from these insurance concepts, we cannot usefully analyse the social 
security conditions of the poor populations, for example in Burkina Faso or India with whom we 
have worked, because they hardly benefit from these kinds of provisions. Instead, they rely on 
other resources and social relations. The broader definition suits the conditions of large parts of 
the world population better, not only in developing countries. But we have to be aware that secu-
rity is a concept with a mainly Western genealogy. In the course of research in non-Western con-
texts, we should reflect whether the meanings of security in our research contexts correspond 
with those we departed from, and if not, we should adjust security as an analytic concept. In our 
study on the situation of poor people, we found that it makes more sense to put the concept of 
insecurity at the centre to be able to detect the limits of security. 
Uses of kinship 
Kin relations as well as kin-like relations with neighbours and friends are of the utmost impor-
tance for social security in societies that lack sufficient public provisions. In anthropology at the 
end of the 1980s Sylvia Yanagisako and Jane Collier developed a combined contextualised ap-
proach to the study of kinship and gender as these categories are often culturally constructed in a 
similar way (Yanagisako and Collier 1987). This approach has initiated a revival of studies on 
kinship and family issues, which earlier were at the core of anthropological concerns. Their 
model is based both on the cultural approach to kinship by David Schneider (1972) and on the 
practice theory of Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1990). Bourdieu pursued in his kinship studies a func-
tional approach as well and strongly promoted integrated actor and system-oriented studies (cf. 
also Schweitzer 2000). For our research we adopted the methodological procedure proposed by 
Yanagisako and Collier which is not restricted to the study of kinship and gender. This procedure 
relates the social world of actors, their ideas and actions, to societal structures of inequality and 
to historical developments. Related to the new kinship and gender studies and loosely linked to 
the work of von Benda-Beckmanns, studies on “shifting circles of support” in several countries 
in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa appeared (Palriwala and Risseeuw 1996, Risseeuw and 
Ganesh 1998). The authors of these studies criticise the often static ideological and policy con-
structs of the family, and underline the transformations of family and kinship relations and the 
negotiated character of networks of support.  
Kinship studies conducted in India show that idealised notions of the family prevail, although 
there are radical changes in its content due to governmental and market influences (Ganesh 
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1998). Two processes can be distinguished: on the one hand there is a widening of kin and com-
munity boundaries regarding help in situations of crises and with ceremonies; and on the other 
hand there is a “sharp defining of boundaries and limits of solidarity and support which can be 
claimed on a regular basis, through reducing the diffuseness of kinship responsibility and kinship 
support at the ‘family’ level [and] through emphasizing the patriliny and lineal as against lateral 
ties” (Palriwala 1994: 110). In other words, networks of recognition and prestige, especially of 
the upward mobile, are expanded, whereas networks of effective cooperation are restricted. Ad-
ditionally, conjugality becomes more and more important and the reversal of authority between 
generations has sharpened. These processes result in an increasing experience of neglect among 
the elderly. This particularly applies to women as they have less access to and control over assets 
(Dube 1998). 
According to the notions of the Indian nation-state, the family is “the most vital non-formal so-
cial security for the old” (Government of India 1999: 19). However, I found in my study on old 
age in urban Kerala that in practice the daily support by family members is limited and con-
tested, due to different interests related to gender and age or generation. In the case of the poor, 
the children of elderly parents often have only small seasonal incomes, whereas in the case of the 
middle class, the elderly mostly have personal savings, not-seldom pensions and they receive 
additional help from domestic workers or nurses. An impediment for old age security is the in-
creasing pressure to pay expensive dowries for daughters, also among the poor. These marriage 
payments, which mainly serve social status, are not reciprocated, contrary to other kinds of gifts, 
and they prevent the poor from saving. As the giving of support to elderly parents is less gen-
dered than expected, and generally imagined, the receiving of support in old age is gendered in 
that men are more supported than women. Particularly poor women without husbands may suffer 
from insecurity, meaning that their daily needs for food are not met. Despite comparatively well-
developed education and health facilities in Kerala, the poor elderly of the class of casual work-
ers generally live on the verge of insecurity, particularly in town (de Jong 2003, 2005, Bhagy-
anath 2005).  
Keebet von Benda-Beckmann (1991) finds that in rural Indonesia the circle of daily support has 
also narrowed. But the circle of support regarding ceremonies and situations of crisis has not 
been extended. Both these circles have changed towards individualism. For example, support 
relationships in the Moluccas exist mainly between parents, grandparents and children, but sib-
lings can refuse cooperation. This causes problems because of high child mortality, a rather low 
life expectancy and migration. According to the norms, the son and his wife should support the 
parents, as in Kerala, but practices can be different. Adult relatives living in the same household 
do not necessarily share resources. They often have separate cooking pots and their relationships 
may be tense, despite ideals of solidarity and mutual assistance among kin and an ideology of 
patrilineal descent (K. and F. von Benda-Beckmann 2000). Similar accounts exist with regard to 
co-residing sisters among the matrilineal Minangkabau (Biezeveld 2002). I therefore suggest that 
the personal history of sharing among kin is more important than co-residence.  
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In contrast to the ideal image of the supporting village community, von Benda-Beckmann sum-
marises social reality as: “Village life is harsh and has been harsh for generations. Family rela-
tionships are a basis for requesting support, but only very close relatives may be asked even 
where there is no additional basis, such as friendship. People might persist in asking favours, but 
they have also learned to say no to requests” (Benda-Beckmann 1991: 50-51 ). 
The author does not go into detail regarding the meaning and use of marriage payments. She just 
mentions that bridewealth can be quite substantial. In my research in Flores, I found that 
bridewealth is not an impediment for social security as dowries are in India because these presta-
tions are usually reciprocated (de Jong 1998a, 2000). A poor village woman in Flores, one of my 
key informants, once explicitly linked the giving of marriage prestations to social security in that 
she compared it with arisan, the rotating savings associations which are widespread in Indonesia. 
She was too poor to participate in one of the arisan groups in the village, but on a small scale she 
did participate in gift exchange in order to be able to rely on the help of kin in times of need. 
The giving of support to the elderly is often gendered. For example, elderly women in the 
Moluccas are less well cared for than elderly men. This is not the case in the area in Flores where 
I did my research. Due to economic and social reasons, a rather high degree of gender equality 
exists there. I only observed neglect, as we in the West would call it, in the case of the most im-
portant old midwife and healer of the area who had fallen mentally ill. She was isolated in a 
small shed outside the village with the idea that the spirits, which had brought her the knowledge 
of healing, could visit her there and make her healthy.  
Through migration further changes occur, as von Benda-Beckmann impressively shows. The 
“circle of primary responsibility” of Moluccans who have been living in the Netherlands since 
about 1950 is small and vulnerable, even though the third generation can make use of kinship 
networks for support which the first generation could not. Both in the Netherlands and in the 
Moluccas, support-giving is less enforced and more on an egalitarian base than earlier. Particu-
larly in the Netherlands, there is much room for negotiation and the circle of support is concen-
trated now on nearest kin (cf. von Benda-Beckmann 1991, von Benda-Beckmann and Leatemia-
Tomatala 1992). 
As far as migration within Indonesia is concerned, responsibilities of husbands and migrated 
children for their families in the village may decrease as new consumer interests are developed, 
whereby daughters often feel a stronger commitment (Koning 2000, Wolf 2000). Migration is 
also important in the village in Flores. At the end of the 1980s, almost thirty percent of the chil-
dren were migrated. Particularly males had access to wages or salaries in the service sector in 
town. Consequently, a large part of the parents in the village could reckon with some remittances 
from migrated children (de Jong 1998b). But, it could also be observed that migrated daughters 
maintained stronger ties with their parents than sons. Further research on migration and support 
relationships is needed to get a better understanding of the impacts of modernity on people’s 
conditions of security and insecurity in developing societies.  
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Unexpectedly, the studies in our project on social security show that it is not only members of 
the nuclear or the extended family who provide support, but the network of support extends to 
the neighbourhood. In India this especially applies to the poor (de Jong et al. 2005). For this sup-
port network we coined the term “extended neighbourhood” (de Jong 2005). Another important 
finding of our studies is that the poorer the people are, the lesser they are supported by kin and 
neighbours. The reason is that poor people are not able to reciprocate in cycles of exchange with 
kin and other close people. Thus, their support network shrinks.  
As in the Moluccas, in the village in Flores people of all levels of wealth strongly rely on spe-
cific neighbours with whom they maintain relations of friendship, meaning relations of support. 
One of the poorest women I know in the village is of high-ranking descent. Two of her three 
children died at a young age due to malnutrition, and her husband died early due to a lack of 
medical treatment. She is too destitute to participate in gift exchange at life cycle feasts, and thus 
has not been able to maintain kin and friendship relations which would support her in times of 
need. At the time of her husband’s death, a neighbour for whom she worked was almost the only 
person who supported her with the burial expenses. Apart from her migrated son, her labour 
power is one of her last resources. 
Uses of citizenship 
To reduce insecurity in non-Western contexts, not only kinship relations are used but also citi-
zenship relations. Regarding the concept of citizenship, we refer to the classical essay of T. H. 
Marshall (1992) on citizenship and social class. Marshall defines citizenship as a status bestowed 
on those who are full members of a community, including equal rights and duties. In contrast to 
the liberal tradition of citizenship, in this conceptualisation the citizen is not an individual mem-
ber of a state, but of a community. This allows a multi-tier concept of citizenship, which implies 
full membership of local, ethnic, national and transnational collectivities, and it allows to reflect 
the relationships between these collectivities and the state, a perspective which is pursued by 
several authors today (e.g. Hall and Held 1989, Yuval-Davis 1997). Moreover, citizenship ac-
cording to Marshall entails civil, political and social rights. The latter should lead to a minimum 
of economic well-being and security.  
The social scientist Nira Yuval-Davis considers citizenship collectivities as ideological and ma-
terial constructions, whose boundaries, structures and norms are a result of constant processes of 
struggles, negotiations and social developments. Her work is useful in clarifying issues of citi-
zenship and gender. Yuval-Davis claims that women’s citizenship should not only be considered 
in contrast to men’s, but also in relation to women’s affiliation to dominant and subordinate 
groups, to ethnicity, origin and urban or rural residence, as well as with regard to global and 
transnational issues. From an individual perspective, attributes such as gender, class position, 
religion, origin, ability and phase in the life-course determine one’s citizenship. These ap-
proaches to citizenship can be made fruitful for social security research.  
Recent studies on social security in developing countries show the importance of new public 
social security mechanisms regarding membership in informal and formal associations and 
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NGOs, in addition to being a citizen of a nation-state (e.g. von Benda-Beckmann, Gsänger and 
Midgley 1997). Some authors see most potential for social protection in cooperative voluntary 
organisations with membership on the basis of equality. They think that hierarchies of power that 
exist in other kinds of social relationships can be neutralised, if redistribution is depersonalised 
and altruistic aims are institutionalised (e.g. Vuarin 2004). Other authors think that their func-
tioning is less self-evident than mechanisms based on kinship, because membership in these vol-
untary organisations is more flexible, and whether and how they should function so that their 
members achieve social security has to be deliberately created and negotiated. Their future role 
regarding social security is therefore unclear (e.g. Leliveld 1994, Hospes 1996). 
Both in India and Indonesia, microfinance organisations have become important instruments for 
development, and at least since the beginning of the last century informal rotating savings asso-
ciations also emerged in local contexts, often with female participants (e. g. Mohini Seti 1995, 
Hospes 1995, Parker 2001). These savings associations are economically motivated, to enable 
the participants to dispose of money for productive purposes, consumption, and ceremonies. 
Parts of them also have a social security function in that the members support each other materi-
ally and morally in situations of crisis. But this is not necessarily the case. It is also debated 
whether they directly contribute to women’s empowerment because under certain conditions 
domestic violence may temporarily increase, as reported in cases in South Asia (cf. Locher 
2004). 
The work of Hospes (1995, 1996) on savings and credit practices in a small town in the Moluc-
cas in Indonesia gives interesting clues concerning the use of citizenship to achieve social secu-
rity. In contrast to many studies in this field, Hospes pursues a relational perspective and he takes 
into account the variety of these associations, as well as the different categories of female par-
ticipants and their agency. Savings associations are organised in occupational, political and reli-
gious contexts with different rules, regulations and more or less explicit other purposes. There 
are for example arisan groups of entrepreneurs of middle-class migrants who also use these 
groups to strengthen kinship and ethnic ties. The members of savings associations connected 
with the former governmental women’s groups (PKK) and of those connected with praying 
groups reinforce kinship as well as friendship ties. Market sellers of the lower-income class of 
indigenous people, however, try to protect their small daily earnings against the requests of rela-
tives. Accordingly, their savings groups give less importance to kin ties.  
An issue which is less debated in these studies, but which I came across in my fieldwork both in 
India and Indonesia, is that the poorest people are excluded from these group activities because 
participation requires a regular source of income to meet the contributions. Thus, to achieve so-
cial security poor people not only have difficulties to mobilise kin relationships, but also citizen 
relationships. With reference to Biezeveld (2002: 233) it is important to emphasise that 
“[p]articipating in a group is in itself not enough to create ‘entitlements’ to care or support, but it 
may help.” At least friendship and feelings of solidarity are created.  
As already mentioned, religious communities can be of importance both with regard to charity 
and with more formalised welfare. In urban Kerala, poor Hindu caste organisations can have 
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important social security functions, for example in that they mediate in issues of health care and 
housing between the people and the local government. Among Muslims and Christians, praying 
groups can serve certain supportive needs as well. In Indonesia, the Muslim institutions of alms-
giving and religious taxes, consisting of different types of provisions, have some significance for 
social security. This is reported in the case of the Moluccas (F. von Benda-Beckmann 1988) and 
among the Minangkabau (Biezeveld 2002). Here, wealthier people often prefer to provide gifts 
through the mosque than on an individual basis. Direct claims are thus prevented and the giver 
nevertheless achieves prestige. In general, however, the poor only benefit to a small degree from 
the alms.  
Projects by NGOs and governmental organisations are still hardly investigated as to how they 
can ensure social security. A study about NGOs in Flores comes to the conclusion that motiva-
tion and cooperation of individuals are more important as criteria for access to development pro-
jects than poverty (Zeuner 1996). This may also apply to other regions in Indonesia. Further-
more, there are governmental development projects at the village level, but again the poorest 
people are often excluded and thus hardly benefit from them. In this context it should also be 
emphasised that both in India and in Indonesia there is a strong norm that adult persons are in the 
first place responsible for their own well-being (cf. de Jong 2003, Biezeveld 2002). 
Finally, I would like to pinpoint to the importance of interrelationships of uses of kinship and 
citizenship, particularly to the possible linkages between governmental support and family sup-
port. Most interesting in this realm is a study by Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckman con-
ducted in Indonesia, but the findings may be applicable to other societies as well (F. and K. von 
Benda-Beckmann 1998). Civil servants who earn rather low salaries often use certain financial 
means from infrastructure projects conducted by the government to consolidate their own eco-
nomic and political position and to donate gifts to their kin in the village. Through these off-state 
activities the civil servants indirectly contribute to their social security in old age. When they 
resettle in the village, they will be dependent on kin who might then reciprocate their former 
gifts. From the perspective of the villagers, long-term security is based on kin relationships with 
civil servants. Therefore, they make investments in the education of their children in the hope 
that at least one family member achieves a civil servant position. This again weakens the social 
security networks among the villagers. These processes result in some mutual security provision 
of villagers and civil servants, but often the latter benefit more. The authors conclude that gov-
erning by means of projects in Indonesia has resulted in strong networks of patronage within and 
outside the state apparatus and to a merging of political and economic structures in that political 
and economic resources are exchanged through kinship links. 
Studying the micro-politics of social security  
Contrary to an institutional approach, a functional approach to social security leads to a compre-
hensive understanding of social security. Such an approach departs from the concept of security 
and insecurity and considers risk where aspects of calculable and collective economic insurance 
are concerned. A fruitful functional approach includes meanings and uses of the whole complex 
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of social relationships that serve social security of individuals and collectivities. It takes into 
account the conditions of social security, particularly the resources available and necessary. It 
further contextualises the ideas and practices of the actors concerning social security regarding 
economic and political structures of inequality and historical developments. As the examples 
presented suggested, social security conditions and mechanisms particularly differ with regard to 
gender. Therefore, it makes sense to depart from a functional approach that constructs all three 
layers of the model, the actor level, the structural level and the historical level, as gendered. Such 
a “difference model” of social security gives due weight to social and cultural dimensions next to 
economical dimensions. 
Individuals from the same social categories show similar social security arrangements with re-
gard to specific kinds of insecurities. In addition to their own material and social contributions, 
individuals mobilise social relationships with specific family members, neighbours and other 
locals, such as employers or patrons, as well as specific kinds of membership in local and possi-
bly translocal non-religious and religious associations and NGOs. Additionally, they create spe-
cific kinds of relationships with the state.  
Considered from a socio-centric perspective, it is important to study the interrelationships of 
these different social security efforts. In doing so, the question should also be tackled to what 
extent certain security efforts in the citizenship sphere weaken or strengthen security efforts in 
the kinship sphere. With regard to development issues, it should also be asked how these differ-
ent elements of the social security arrangement of a social category or social group can fruitfully 
be integrated and institutionalised.  
Whereas research on social security in a comprehensive sense has made advances since the end 
of the 1980s, we think that more fine-grained ethnographic studies which focus on individual and 
collective uses of kin and citizen relationships can help to understand social security networks 
more deeply. It also can lead to make “security” and “insecurity” as comparative analytical con-
cepts more subtle, and thus more useful cross-culturally and cross-nationally. New research on 
family and kinship, which considers the historicity and the ambivalence of these relationships, 
can contribute in a valuable way, to social security studies. Thereby it should also take into ac-
count possible insecurities of family support, due to different interests related to gender and age, 
extensions to neighbourhood, friendship and other local relations, as well as migration and trans-
local and transnational kin networks. New research about citizenship shows further fruitful ave-
nues for research and may further contribute to clarifications in the field of social security stud-
ies. In addition to national legal issues, other more or less gendered dimensions of membership 
in different sub- and transnational communities, in as far as they are related to social security, 
should be investigated. What is finally at stake from such an anthropological perspective on so-
cial security can be characterised as different micro-politics of multiple relations of kinship and 
citizenship under changing conditions of modernity. 
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Styles of Social Security:  
Livelihood and Insecurity in the Uplands of East Java, Indonesia 
Gerben Nooteboom 
Whereas individual strategies for survival, access, and the maintenance of access to resources 
(by risk avoidance, diversification, and insurance) are at the centre of attention in livelihood 
studies, social security studies have traditionally been much more oriented towards mechanisms 
and institutions which provide support, protection, and welfare (Kaag et al. 2004). In this work-
ing paper I shall argue that in order to understand how people manage insecurities in their day-
to-day existence, we need an understanding of the strategies of individuals and households and 
how they create access to resources such as land, labour and capital, while at the same time we 
need insight into the institutions and structural conditions. I shall introduce the concept of styles 
of social security to bridge this gap between actor oriented and institutional or structural analyses 
of insecurity.  
During my fieldwork on social security, from mid-1997 till mid-1999, in the village of Krajan, 
upland East Java4, I noticed that the vulnerability and resilience of a household cannot always be 
related to material aspects such as wealth, poverty, or access to resources alone. The question 
that arose was: why are some households less affected than others when confronted with adversi-
ties and is it possible to distinguish and compare patterns in the ways people are prepared for and 
are subject to insecurities? At a more theoretical level I was interested in the question of how to 
analyse social security in an integrated way taking into account both structural and actor notions 
of social and collective action (Giddens 1984). Can we combine these two rather contrasting 
perspectives: attention to actors’ and households’ strategies to obtain social security within the 
enabling and constraining structural context of social security institutions, power relations, and 
inequalities? Such an approach should comprise the study of provisions of care, support, and 
welfare to individuals and groups by social and individual means. Provision can thus be either 
achieved, by individual, social, and collective strategies, or provided by arrangements and insti-
tutions offering access to care, insurance, and general well-being to individuals, households, and 
specific categories of people.  
The crux of social security boils down to a few basic questions: how do people get direct or indi-
rect access to resources to secure basic needs, how is this access promoted or threatened by the 
structural conditions in society, and how do people themselves directly or indirectly protect, se-
cure, and maintain their livelihood? Such questions are relational since making a living necessar-
ily involves other people, such as partners, household members, relatives, the neighbourhood, the 
community, and possibly larger social groups or associations, to care for and to be cared by. 
They may be supportive and protective, but they may also demand support, extract resources or 
even be a threat to survival.  
                                                 
4 Krajan is a pseudonym. 
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In order to answer these questions, I first give a description of the village of Krajan followed by 
an evaluation of insecurities and the available social security arrangements and institutions. Sec-
ondly, I take some examples from the literature of other approaches to insecurity. Thirdly, I give 
an overview of the major social security styles I found in the research area and their distribution 
among the population by describing them in detail. This is followed by a few cases that show 
these styles within the complexities of everyday life and illustrate the different orientations, 
choices, and limitations of villagers. In the last section I make several concluding remarks. 
Krajan, an upland village 
The upland village of Krajan is located far from the large urban centres in Java, on the Northern 
slope of the Argopura volcano in East Java.5 The population of Krajan amounts to 3.400 people, 
almost all of them are Madurese speaking. Unlike many present day lowland Javanese and 
Madurese villages, the majority of the villagers engage in farming, often supplemented by one or 
more other income generating activities such as trade, handicraft production, and house construc-
tion. Migration rates are relatively low and so remittances from outside are not significant for 
most household incomes.  
Krajan is a relatively poor village compared to other villages in Java, as it lacks special resources 
such as extensive fertile rice fields (sawah), plots or plantations.6 Nevertheless, it is slightly bet-
ter off than other villages in the sub-district (kecamatan), which have even fewer resources, less 
fertile soils, and less rain. The local agricultural system consists mainly of maize, cassava, live-
stock, tobacco, and rice production. Land is scarce and not very fertile and yields tend to be inse-
cure. The distribution of resources in Krajan is very unequal. In the case of rice fields, the rich 
9% of total population own 53% of the total sawah, the poorest 32% of the population own only 
4% of all village sawah.7 
Conditions that add to the weak production base of Krajan are the insecurities in crop outputs 
due to infertile soils, malfunctioning irrigation canals, and climatic circumstances. For four to six 
months per year practically no crops can be grown due to shortages of rain and the lack of good 
irrigation systems.  
Although people in general are able to eke out at least a basic living in Krajan, this is not always 
a stable or secure affair. Setbacks and adversities such as harvest failure, death, illness, unem-
ployment, and sudden drops in income are recurring risks and threats to villagers’ livelihoods. 
All people run these risks in one way or another, but not all livelihoods are threatened in the 
same way, and not all people perceive risks similarly. Poor villagers are, generally speaking, 
more vulnerable than others (Blaikie et al. 1994; Chambers and Conway 1992: 2) as vulnerabil-
                                                 
5 Krajan is one of the eight villages of the kecamatan Pakem, kabupaten Bondowoso and lies at an alti-
tude of about one thousand metres above sea level. 
6 Krajan is a so-called IDT-village (Inpres Desa Tertingal). 
7 If quartiles are calculated, the richest 25% of the survey population own 74% of all village sawah. The 
poorest 25% virtually own no sawah (0.7 %). Of the 25% of the poorest households in the survey, only 
two had a tiny piece of sawah. Figures for dry land are comparable, although slightly less unequal 
(Nooteboom 2003: 134). 
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ity largely depends on limitations in sources of income, ways of access to resources, and the 
specific constitution of the livelihood itself (Ellis 2000: 58-62). 
From other contributions on social security in Indonesia, it has become clear that if people and 
families are confronted with an emergency or adversity, such as death, illness, fire, misfortune, 
or a loss of shelter or assets, most of them can fall back on village or neighbourhood (kampung) 
institutions and social or kinship relationships (Biezeveld 2002; Koning 2005; Marianti 2002). 
My study in Krajan shows that support by these institutions or networks, however, is rarely 
enough to cover all needs and to protect against all negative consequences of adversities. More-
over, those who cannot invest much in social relationships (the poor and destitute) cannot expect 
much from the different forms of social security in the village and are virtually excluded from 
most forms of social security. Local social security is basically a reciprocal system and forms of 
redistribution are not important enough to level incomes between rich and poor. Moreover, the 
poorest who need support most, receive least, as they are not able to invest in relationships of 
mutual help. 
Institutions, arrangements and social relations in rural areas are definitely not enough to over-
come the ‘insecurity trap’ of poorer families. In most cases in Krajan, people and households 
depend on their own assets and resources in times of need. From a financial point of view, local 
institutions and arrangements for social security are only supplementary and never free of 
charge. Thus, village institutions only work partially and are in general more important for 
richer, than for poorer categories of people. Selfless sharing and simple solidarity among the 
poor, or between social classes, is rare or non-existent, and the few saving groups (arisan) serve 
social rather than social security purposes. Institutions and arrangements such as kinship, foster-
age, neighbourly assistance, patronage, reciprocal gift-giving, and “mutual help” do exist and 
can be of importance, but, their scope depends on the individual investments in networks by vil-
lagers. These investments never guarantee significant welfare or social security in the long run. 
Under these circumstances, villagers are left - either partially or completely - to the households 
own investments in specific combinations of access to resources and social relationships for so-
cial support. In the next sections, I focus on how they do so by combining different resources and 
relationships, and on how they have their own social security style.  
Styles in Krajan: balancing livelihood and insecurity 
Many studies on these local arrangements, institutions and mechanisms of support and assistance 
to other community members in times of need, have a common perspective in that they are ori-
ented towards the supply-side of social security, and tend to focus on institutions of support.  
In earlier literature dealing with what we now would call social security (i.e. studies about peas-
ant societies dealing with issues of support, subsistence security, mutual help, reciprocity, and 
forms of exchange) already an important division exists between the assumptions held on the 
nature of the village and villagers’ actions.8 Key questions posed by these studies included: are 
                                                 
8 See Geertz (1963), Ingleson (1996), Little (1962), Mauss (1966), Sahlins (1965), Scott (1976). 
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villages and rural societies moral entities in which a minimum subsistence is secured for all 
members, or are households and individual villagers calculative and driven by individual motives 
of survival and profit maximising, searching for a balance between risks and stability in liveli-
hood out of self-interest? This difference in basic assumption about village and villagers’ behav-
iour still influences academic analyses and government policies on poverty and insecurity. The 
best expression of this debate, and still revealing for the current different views on social secu-
rity, has been that between moral and political economists, also known as the Scott - Popkin 
debate.9 
Social security can be viewed as a recurring dilemma between individual spending and collective 
investments. With regard to individual and household security, villagers have to make choices 
between potentially conflicting options such as investing labour, time, or capital in livelihood 
activities for direct consumption and personal accumulation or in communal activities and mu-
tual help. Investing in social relationships, arrangements, and village institutions requires trust, 
as the investments will only be returned if the majority of the members of the network are will-
ing to return the favour. Moreover, short-term interests and immediate needs contrast with long-
term concerns and less certain future needs. This, for instance, occurs when one can choose be-
tween wage labour with direct cash returns but with weak ties with the employer, or to take a 
share of the harvest, which is less certain, but involves a much closer tie with the landowner and 
as such enhances the opportunities for support. 
Investments against insecurity can be made in social relationships and networks (by gift giving, 
marriage, and making friends), by engaging in reciprocal relations of mutual help, or by individ-
ual and household accumulation and saving in cash, cattle or gold. Options for accumulation and 
investments, however, are confined to realistic financial and social limits and are not simply a 
matter of free choice. This wide range of options results in diverse, complex and, to a certain 
extent, unique sets of social security. Notwithstanding this diversity we can see patterns in this 
complexity of options, here referred to as ‘styles’. 
On the basis of local definitions and categorisations, I distinguish four major patterns, which I 
call styles of social security. A style is a coherent and distinctive manner of acting and doing 
things (Van der Ploeg 1999: 121; 1990: 11). It can be argued that social security styles reflect 
solutions for making a living, about a ‘good’ and secure living and about the best ways for peo-
ple and households to be prepared for the future. I define a style of social security as a general 
mode of ordering life; a more or less systematic and continuous attempt to create congruence in 
all the domains of everyday life. A social security style can thus be defined as an observable 
pattern in the actions and perceptions of people and households in making a living while dealing 
with insecurities, threats, and risks that endanger their livelihood.  
In the process of trying to obtain and maintain a secure and stable livelihood people have a spe-
cific style of doing things. These styles are the outcomes of dealing with tensions, i.e. contrasting 
orientations of people and actual behavioural alternatives. The first tension is between support, 
                                                 
9 For an overview of this debate see, for instance, Keyes (1983) and Platteau (1991). 
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mutual help, and cooperation as against self-insurance and individual accumulation. The second 
is the tension in economic activities between livelihood activities based on subsistence and local 
resources against an orientation towards the cash economy and the economic opportunities out-
side the village.  
Style is neither a synonym for strategies nor for structures. As mentioned styles refer to regular 
patterns of behaviour vis-à-vis adversities, threats, and insecurities because such behaviour is not 
always, or necessarily, the result of strategic action. Sometimes, clear strategic choices are made, 
but more often than not, people act according to fixed customary, habitual everyday practices 
when they are dealing with short-term and long-term needs and hopes and desires, constrained 
by social demands and expectations.  
The styles referred to here are based on specific knowledge and emic concepts used by local 
people. These folk concepts reflect categorisations and stereotypes that exist in local society. At 
the same time, however, this local knowledge, and its categorisations and stereotypes, are ab-
stractions that do not fully reflect the actual hustle of activities people employ. To order the di-
versity of threats and options, actors themselves make qualifications to indicate differences be-
tween others and themselves concerning orientations on livelihood, survival, and willingness to 
support.  
In Krajan, villagers often use nicknames and categorise fellow villagers on the basis of their val-
ues and orientations towards livelihood and social security. Examples of these locally-used cate-
gories are ‘enterprising people’ (orang bisnis), ‘money people’ (orang duit), ‘stingy people’ 
(orang pelit), and the ‘traditional people’ (orang asli or lugu). ‘Money people’, for instance, are 
those who prefer to earn cash and depend on the opportunities of the cash economy for securing 
their livelihood. ‘Stingy people’ are those who try to benefit from the support given through the 
old mutual exchange economy, minimise investments, and ignore the claims of others in recipro-
cal relationships as far as possible. 
These folk concepts are interesting, as they indicate the awareness of such differences in liveli-
hood orientations and attitudes. Moreover, they often carry a normative connotation. Being ‘tra-
ditional’ has both morally superior and developmentally backward connotations. Morally, they 
are seen as good people, who are believed to be the true followers of traditional values of sup-
port, exchange, and reciprocity. However, economically, orang lugu are seen as backward. 
Those who are oriented on wage labour, trade and beneficial economic opportunities are seen as 
much more successful. This successfulness, however, can change over time, depending on cli-
matic conditions, market prices, and political-economic developments. During the economic 
crisis, for instance, the orang lugu were less affected than the orang duit.  
The styles also reflect different value orientations. The following overview (table 1) combines 
value orientations in economic life with value orientations in social life.  
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Table 1: Styles and orientations 
   STYLES 
   Enterprising 
people 
(orang bisnis) 
Money people
(orang duit) 
stingy people 
(orang pelit) 
village people
(orang lugu) 
Money, wage, 
cash + + – – 
L
iv
el
i-
ho
od
 
Subsistence 
incomes – – + + 
      
Support and 
mutual help + – – + 
O
RI
EN
TA
TI
O
N
 
So
ci
al
 
Se
cu
ri
t
Self-insurance 
 – + + – 
 
 
Some of the very destitute and pitiful villagers are effectively excluded from any style, as they 
were so poor that they had little choice other than to adjust to their poverty. These orang kasihan 
live in a state of constant social insecurity and have few options left. They cannot invest in social 
relationships, are not acceptable as wage labourers, and do not own anything to be coveted upon. 
Although they are entitled to help, since they are to be pitied (kasihan), they are often not helped, 
do not have caring relatives or neighbours, and are often neglected by aid programmes. Among 
these people are commonly widows, the old and very poor, chronically ill, and other vulnerable 
people without caring relatives or productive assets. 
The most important feature of styles is that they are at odds with classifications as ‘wealthy’ or 
‘poor’. Both poor and rich villagers can share similar orientations towards livelihood and secu-
rity and have the same style. In all the styles identified both poor and richer villagers are present, 
although obviously not in similar numbers. In general, more upper and middle class villagers 
classify as orang pelit because one needs at least some assets, to be oriented towards self-support 
and greed. At the other extreme, most of the poorer, lower class, villagers are found among the 
duit and the lugu categories. The most common style in Krajan is that of the ‘village people’ 
(36%), followed by ‘money people’ (26%) and ‘enterprising people’ (25%). ‘Stingy people’ 
(13%) form the smallest category. A last remark concerns the fact that the orang lugu are more 
often found among the elderly. As one gets older, less can be expected from wage labour, or 
from being stingy. The characteristics of the orientations underlying the various styles are de-
scribed in more detail below. 
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Entrepreneurial people (orang bisnis)  
‘Entrepreneurs’ (orang bisnis) are oriented towards the cash economy and look for opportunities 
outside the village to make money. They focus on social relationships to maintain trading oppor-
tunities and protection in the long run. For their livelihood, they depend primarily on incomes 
from trade, peddling, cash crop production (i.e. tobacco) or running a small shop or coffee stall. 
For richer and poorer orang bisnis alike, incomes are not only generated by using local resources 
but also by using outside opportunities, such as government or bank-related credit facilities, con-
tacts with traders operating on a regional or national scale, and goods from markets and shops in 
nearby towns. Also in consumption patterns, they are oriented towards new goods and status 
products from outside the village such as radios, televisions, mobile phones, motorbikes and 
jeans. 
Social ties and social relationships are crucial for the orang bisnis. In order to be successful in 
business, they need to invest in, and maintain, reliable relationships with customers, traders, sup-
pliers, and politicians. This network of social relationships provides them with goods, credit, and 
information about good deals, prices, and the credit worthiness of suppliers and customers. 
These networks usually extend beyond the small world of the village. Access to information is 
very important, as the threats and risks in trading are manifold. Profits and prices can fluctuate, 
stocks can decay, crops can fail, and the risk of default by customers is substantial. For these 
reasons, they need these networks not only to generate profit, but also for their protection, sup-
port, and assistance in times of difficulty. Orang bisnis realise that these networks need to be 
maintained for the future. Difficulties in life and urgent cash shortages are often solved by taking 
loans (often from outside the village), by selling or pawning assets, or by asking for the support 
of friends, trading partners, or political patrons. Moreover, most of them say they are keen on 
maintaining a reputation as a good village member. They are frequent visitors to weddings, par-
ties, and funerals; ready to share and contribute in an attempt to bind people and maintain reputa-
tions. As most orang bisnis keep ties with the village, they often operate in groups, share profits, 
and are cooperative. Some small cattle traders, without sufficient trading capital, work together 
to buy and sell cattle. In this way, they are able to pool risks and accumulate cash. Others engage 
in alliances with retail traders from outside the village and obtain credit. It is especially the orang 
bisnis who tend to be the most active in mutual saving and credit groups. 
Poorer orang bisnis include small traders and peddlers selling chickens, eggs, dried fish, sugar, 
wood, local medication, and those who run small shops or coffee or food stalls from their homes. 
Among these people, daily incomes are just enough to make ends meet, and are spent immedi-
ately on basic needs. When things go wrong, they rely heavily on the social relationships built up 
previously. 
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Money people (orang duit) 
The orang duit (‘money people’) in Krajan are also oriented towards cash incomes, but differ 
from orang bisnis in their orientation towards social relationships, sharing, support, and coopera-
tion in that they exhibit a general reluctance to contribute to social village arrangements and in-
stitutions. As a consequence, they do not expect much help and support in times of need. They 
rely primarily on cash for survival and livelihood, and hope to be able to earn money until their 
children are old enough to support them. They try to be, and remain, independent and self-
prepared.  
Although, naturally, everybody in Krajan would like to have and earn cash, this group is specifi-
cally oriented towards fixed and direct incomes such as incomes from wage labour – sometimes 
outside the village – and they try to ensure a stable livelihood by investing and combining differ-
ent sources of cash incomes such as wage labour, political activities, and a profession. Their cash 
incomes, their untied labour relationships, and opportunities beyond the village economy make 
them flexible and relatively independent of village institutions.  
Until the end of 1997, this style was gaining popularity due to increasing work opportunities and 
because of changing consumption preferences. Wage labour opportunities in Krajan increased 
due to the intensification of commercial tobacco cultivation and an increase in construction ac-
tivities. Also, in the region of the Eastern Salient and Bali, more labour opportunities had be-
come available. Some of the villagers were able to obtain a paid job as a security agent in town 
or at the local telecommunication posts, or as a domestic helper, policeman, or in a shop in town. 
Others migrated to Bali and Madura on a seasonal basis, while others departed for Malaysia and 
Kalimantan in search of work. Items such as jeans, watches, radios, motorbikes, and ceramic 
floors in houses, slowly gained in importance at the expense of cattle, wood-carved houses, and 
sarong. 
The orang duit include many poor wage labourers who work in Krajan, or who are constantly in 
search of work in the East Java region, in agriculture on Madura, or as street peddlers in Bali. 
Their cash incomes are their main basis for coping with difficulties in life, and as long as cash 
incomes are relatively stable, regular, and reliable, they are doing well, meeting these wishes. 
Dissimilar to the ‘entrepreneurial people’ is that this group tries to earn money wherever possi-
ble, is not very inclined to invest in relationships of mutual help and exchange, and does not en-
gage in patron-client bonds in the village. They were doing relatively well during the second half 
of the New Order period and acquired higher esteem and status than the orang lugu, who de-
pended basically on wages in kind.  
Care and support for the orang duit is mainly organised within the household, the nuclear family, 
or within peer groups of fellow workers. Elderly, handicapped, and ill people are generally cared 
for by family members. Difficulties in life and urgent cash shortages are often solved by taking 
out loans, either from inside or outside the village, by selling or pawning assets, or by asking for 
support from fellow workers or within peer groups. Also, as part of this style, villagers having 
surplus money on a regular basis may engage in saving and credit arrangements. Examples of 
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richer orang duit in the village are relatively scarce. They include teachers living from their sala-
ries, certain village officials, and ‘rentenir’, i.e. people living from their pensions, or interests on 
property or loans. It should be mentioned, however, that the crisis did change the economic 
situation of this group quite substantially. 
‘Stingy people’ (orang pelit) 
‘Stingy people’ (orang pelit), conversely, are oriented towards the village economy and its re-
sources of land, cattle, and labour. They try to accumulate on the basis of local resources and 
make use of village institutions and arrangements, but try to avoid the social pressures of shar-
ing, redistribution, care, and mutual help, and so keep costs as low as possible. According to 
other villagers, ‘stingy people’ are those who want to profit as much as possible from the social 
security benefits of older cultural arrangements, but who do not want to invest much in them. In 
general, orang pelit share the opinion that not much can be expected from village institutions 
such as mutual help, and that it is better to insure and prepare oneself. In their view, ritual gift 
giving is often seen as a must, a money consuming necessity, rather than a way of improving 
future support, investment, or social capital.  
They are wary of redistributing their wealth, even if they have plenty of money, rice, or assets 
available. Family labour - and sometimes bonded labour - plays an important role in their way of 
making a living and they prefer to invest in their own assets such as cattle and land - not in other 
people.  
Although there have always been stingy villagers, this group includes many younger and richer 
families - or families on the way to becoming richer. Moreover, it seems this style has gained 
popularity in recent decades. It offers the opportunity to ignore the claims of others while still 
obtaining some benefits of the ritual exchange economy and related institutions and arrange-
ments of mutual help and exchange. Later, in old age, some of these people may shift their orien-
tation towards a more reciprocal attitude although they do try to prepare themselves for old age.  
The poorer stingy people combine wages in kind from harvest shares and cattle raising, with 
wage labour, making baskets and other handicrafts. They visit as many parties, funerals, and 
ceremonies as possible, as these occasions include free meals for low outgoings since poor vil-
lagers are not expected to contribute much to these parties. In times of need, they beg from richer 
villagers and cling to, and emphasise, traditional village values of sharing and redistribution in 
order to get some support. This support is often not that substantial, since they never contributed 
much to others, but they might receive a free meal, some rice, or a small gift of money. In this 
respect ‘stingy people’ are the free riders of the village social security system with their attitude 
of benefiting from, rather than investing in, reciprocity, sharing, cooperation, and the village 
community at large.  
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Village people (orang lugu) 
The ‘village’ people, or ‘traditional’ or ‘good’ people (orang lugu) are oriented towards tradi-
tional village values of exchange, and are active in (ritual) gift giving, ceremonies, rotating la-
bour arrangements, and mutual help. They clearly put their hopes on obtaining help and support 
from village institutions and in the form of mutual help if they are in need. Often, they have a 
strong orientation towards the local non-cash economy. If involved in cash-earning activities, 
they see this as subsidiary to their other activities. Work and care-taking activities are not only a 
way to earn an income or to obtain food, these are also ways to engage in and maintain a rela-
tionship.  
These villagers frequently have conservative ideas concerning out-marriage of children, the vil-
lage hierarchy, and norms and values of sharing, gift-giving, labour relationships and exchange. 
Giving large ceremonies, and owning land, traditional rice varieties, and cattle offers status and 
security (both spiritual and practical); and organising these activities demands extended relation-
ships.  
Using social relationships and mobilising networks of exchange in the first instance, constitute 
the livelihood of orang lugu. Poorer people who adopt this style try to gain access to work, 
status, and protection by engaging in social (patron-client) relationships. Richer people use their 
networks, land, and cattle to bind workers to them. The poor orang lugu anticipate mutual help, 
emotional support, and ritual gifts (sumbangan) from fellow ‘traditional’ people and the large 
landowner they work for. Increasingly, during recent decades, this style seems to have declined, 
and lost much of its previous status during the New Order regime, as newer forms of status and 
upward mobility than ceremonies, cows and land became available. Nowadays, a relatively large 
proportion of the people adopting this style are the poorer and older people of the village.  
Risk taking: a counter style 
Not all styles are oriented towards a sustainable livelihood or long-term social security. In Kra-
jan, there is a category of villagers who deliberately take and combine risks. Locally, the term 
‘orang nakal’ is used for these people, which means something along the lines of wayward, 
madcap, or naughty people. The orang nakal are people who do not follow the mainstream 
norms and values of society, are ignorant of livelihood security, and deliberately take huge risks. 
Wayward people are not specifically outcasts, but excessive risk-takers who live dangerously 
such as gamblers, womanisers, and vagabonds. Although many other villagers take risks in busi-
ness, agriculture, or in other spheres of life, usually these risks are taken within a context of se-
curity. These are seen as acceptable risks, which can be taken after a certain level of subsistence 
has been reached. The orientations of the orang nakal are different. They seem not to care about 
the risks of losing their livelihood and the things that they have, and are more interested in the 
chances of winning something and for the thrill of the day. I have described the orang nakal at 
length elsewhere.10  
                                                 
10 For a more detailed description see Nooteboom (2003: 221-245). 
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Deliberate risk taking is not an exception in peasant societies, but an attractive style for some 
villagers who search for an alternative to complying with the village norms and the social pres-
sure urging large investments in social security and reciprocal relationships. Probably, this life-
style is less risky than it appears since partners in the household and social relations in society 
can sometimes still offer a minimal safety net. Some of those who lost rice fields, cattle, and 
their family by heavy gambling, switched to another style and found a place in society by be-
coming a client, or a labourer, on their former land. Others continue to live dangerously and 
roam the region in search of work and fun, often joining theatre groups and only return to their 
houses, parents, or relatives when in need of a meal or a loan. Many of the orang nakal played 
an important role in demonstrations and political campaigns against the establishment and during 
the 1999 election campaigns. 
In the following I shall present a few examples of how these styles work out in day-to-day exis-
tence in Krajan. 
Styles in day-to-day life 
It was mentioned several times that securing livelihood and securing against insecurity leads to 
the recurring dilemma between individual spending and collective investments. In the following, 
I present two cases of how villagers deal with these dilemmas on a daily basis. 
The Norwana business family: ‘making money by way of people’ 
Fifteen years ago, when the Norwana couple married, they did not start out with much and were 
ranked as a poor household. The father of Norwana was a peddler, but he died young, and al-
though the family of Norwana’s wife were former members of the village administration, they 
fell into poverty after 1965. Except for a small piece of land, they did not inherit any land. 
Nowadays, they have two children and are ranked as having enough to be able to make ends 
meet. They can organise ceremonies if needed and contribute to those of others. Recently, they 
bought a small television set.  
Over the years, Norwana’s wife made small bamboo baskets and secured a minimal level of 
household means. In the early years, Norwana was involved in all kinds of agricultural work and 
took harvest shares on fields of large landowners. However, he is always looking for other op-
portunities to make money. He travelled a couple of times to Bali and Madura and became 
known as nakal. In Krajan, he tried to earn money by trading in baskets, by gambling, and by 
cutting wood illegally. When the new village road was opened and competition increased, he 
abandoned the basket trade and started to cut more wood. In 1995 he was caught by the forest 
police. Only after two days, a high fee, and mediation by the village head, was he freed. Nowa-
days, Norwana has abandoned his illegal activities and avoids risks. He earns a living as a car-
penter, cabinetmaker, speculator, trade-advisor, and go-between for large traders and the village 
head.  
Members of the Norwana family go to many ceremonies and assist at all possible mutual help 
activities. At these occasions, his wife donates small gifts of rice. She has got a good name for 
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not being greedy, and always willing to help. He now has a reputation as a clever and bold man 
in trade, having many valuable connections and good relationships. Villagers often seek Nor-
wana’s advice and ask him to accompany them to the village head, or to mediate help, a loan, or 
assistance. Also, in the event of conflict between families, people, or in marriages, he is often 
asked to mediate or settle a conflict. Over the last few years, he and his wife were able to give 
small loans to fellow villagers who were in need of some cash. In return, those people paid inter-
est or were ready to provide the family with firewood, lumber, or information on promising 
deals. 
When asked about his success and the rationale behind his life, he mentions his good relation-
ships, risk-spreading activities, and the wish to make money without working as a labourer or 
taking huge risks. By taking part in all the mutual help activities in the neighbourhood, and 
through his good relationships, he receives information on business opportunities and is never 
short of work. “If something happens to me or my house, those other villagers will help me with 
labour, food, and loans” he comments.  
Ever since Norwana has abandoned his risky activities, the family has primarily been oriented 
towards cash earnings and social relationships although they recently have gained access to more 
land by taking pawns of tegal and sawah. They are strongly oriented towards social relation-
ships, participation in village institutions and forms of mutual help. Social relationships are im-
portant according to the Norwana family: they yield earning opportunities and goodwill.  
Patik (‘scrooge’): rich and stingy 
Patik was born into a relatively poor family with many children, but has managed to become one 
of the ten richest villagers in Krajan. He has worked hard and managed to save and invest into 
local resources such as land, cattle, trees, and bamboo. Generally, he is called the ‘kreket’ 
(scrooge) of Krajan. It was once commented: “If we need help or loans, Pak Patik never has 
money, but if we have a cow, or land to sell, he is always willing to buy; ‘to solve our problems’ 
he hypocritically says.” 
In the perceptions of both Pak and Bu Patik and their two adult children, they acquired their 
wealth by working hard and spending little. “Especially in the first years of marriage, we tried to 
eat very carefully, live very simply, and spend as little as possible”. They never contributed 
much to ceremonies, funerals, or weddings – often Pak Patik did not go but he could sustain 
relationships by sending his wife who was clever at making cookies and gifts, thus saving costs. 
If he was explicitly invited and had to go he contributed as little as possible. “On the other hand, 
these occasions were moments when we and our children could have decent meals, and we al-
ways took our children along to ceremonies and weddings. In this way, we earned our contribu-
tion back right away.” Only in the case of close relatives, they needed to contribute more. 
The daughter of the Patiks recalls these ceremonies as big parties. “There was never something 
special at our home. For me, these ceremonies were great moments and I was nervous the whole 
day. When it was time to go, I could not eat much and never tried all the delicious food, as I was 
too afraid, nervous, and shy.” She continues on her upbringing: “My father was very hard and 
 37
strict not allowing anything to be wasted. We never ate white rice, never got money for sweets or 
snacks, and were never allowed to buy something nice for ourselves even when there was 
money.” Her mother always supported her husband in this and became well known for saying: 
‘Don’t spend; let’s buy a calf first.’ But even when they had acquired a lot of cattle, their simple 
lifestyle continued. Once, when the daughter was a few years old, she was so undernourished 
that she lost all her hair and people thought she was going to die. “Neighbours told me I was a 
very ugly child at that time and that my mother told others to take me for free, as she wanted to 
get rid of me.” Because of such statements, her grandfather got angry with Bu Patik and took the 
child to live with him and his wife. There, she slowly recovered. “Although I returned home 
when I recovered, I often went to my grandparents when I felt miserable, I helped them with 
small tasks and there I received care and attention.”  
Pak Patik thinks positively about the future, and sees himself living in clover now: "I own a 
number of bamboo bushes in various fields. I bought them cheap and have been harvesting a few 
stalks to keep the bushes strong and healthy. If I become old and have given away my land to my 
children, I will still be able to sell bamboo canes every now and then, and drink coffee from this 
money. I will not be dependent on anyone." His orientation on helping others is very clear, he 
says: “My poor friends and neighbours are often helped by my wife who offers them small loans 
of rice. To those who raise bullocks for me, I sometimes give a cash advance if needed. Other 
people have to work for themselves; they can never borrow any money from me.” 
The Patik family is one of the clearest examples of orang pelit in Krajan. They have an ex-
tremely cautious way of generating their own livelihood, and share and cooperate as little as 
possible with fellow villagers. They clearly try to save money and not contribute much to ar-
rangements of mutual help, and they are prepared for times when things go wrong. 
Concluding remarks 
The two contrasting views on local ways of dealing with insecurity are usually presented as mu-
tually exclusive: it is either communal institutions and village structures which provide support 
in times of need, based on long-term bonds of reciprocity, or it is individuals designing strategies 
to cover their own risks through maximising profit and sharing only among small groups of so-
cial equals. In actual practice, however, the structural and the strategic views can be highly com-
plementary because they address two sides of the same coin, albeit from different perspectives. 
Social structures do not determine individual behaviour, but they do set limits and shape it; indi-
viduals cannot act in a social void, they have to take contexts, structures, and institutions into 
account. Moreover, depending on the specific conditions, there may be more, or less, room for 
individual efforts and strategies to further one’s interests. In my fieldwork I have tried to ascer-
tain both what the role of communal institutions is in providing social security, and what room 
individuals have, and use, to achieve such security.  
The result thereof is that it pays to look at patterns of protection, coping, and security strategies. 
People do not randomly invest in reciprocal relationships or opportunities of social security, but 
make specific and meaningful combinations reflecting their orientations, perceptions, and as-
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sessments, as well as their capabilities and resources. However, not every combination is open to 
all. Wealthy people can predominately rely on their own resources and networks, while their less 
fortunate neighbours must invest heavily in mutual support and care in order to be eligible for 
social security when they are in need. These combinations can also be gender-specific since men 
and women can have different orientations and resources. Often, women are much more con-
cerned with household food security and livelihood protection than their husbands. At the house-
hold level, these differences are aggregated and may be smoothed, as most activities require the 
involvement of both husband and wife.  
At the village level, therefore, there is a large heterogeneity in strategies and arrangements for 
social security, stemming from the differential responses of actors to the ecological, economic, 
political, and social insecurities that they face and, the resources to which they have or can mobi-
lise access. In this heterogeneity, one can distinguish patterns or pathways, or, as I prefer to call 
them, styles of social security.  
In Krajan, this resulted in four main styles ‘enterprising people’ (orang bisnis), ‘money people’ 
(orang duit), ‘stingy people’ (orang pelit), and the ‘traditional people’ (orang asli or lugu). 
These styles all are a mixture of livelihood (cash or subsistence economy) and social security 
(mutual help or self-insurance) orientations. A style is to a large extent ‘inherited’, villagers may 
be caught in a social security style by being born into a family and acculturated with an orienta-
tion towards strong ties with neighbours, relatives, mutual help, and reciprocal relationships. 
Only slowly, someone can shift to another style. However, for social, cultural, and economic 
reasons, such a shift of style is not easy since styles carry a history and a legacy: if one is 
strongly involved in profit maximising and individual arrangements for social security, it is well-
nigh impossible to suddenly switch to a style based on strong ties with neighbours, relatives or 
patrons. There is, nevertheless, room for gradual shifts if one moves out of tight networks, or if 
one’s economic position changes dramatically. 
Obviously, poor villagers are often not in a position to choose from a wide range of options and 
their actual room for manoeuvre is very limited. Nevertheless, I observed that, even within the 
lower social classes, people follow different paths in creating a mix of social security arrange-
ments. This, however, should not be understood in a too rigid way. In Krajan, there are very few 
calculating citizens who deliberately and consciously make strategic, cognitive, and future-
oriented choices. Some people may do so, and sometimes strategically combine options, invest-
ing, and manipulating situations or people, but more often I witnessed villagers reacting to 
events in a habitual, customary, and pre-set pattern of reactions, closely watching and following 
what others did. They did not have to think about each minor decision in life, but could fall back 
on the repertoire offered by their particular style. The policy implications of a style perspective 
are important. Some styles are more vulnerable to risks and threats than others. During the 1997 
economic crisis, poor people with a style oriented towards reciprocity and mutual help, were 
much more resistant to the negative effects of the crisis than those poor dependent on cash in-
comes. Styles are dynamic; they are constantly reproduced and ‘restyled’ by the changing needs 
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and orientations of villagers. If we want to understand why some people and households cope 
better than others, indeed, social security turns out to be a matter of style. 
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“Why should I get help?” 
Inter- and intra-household relations in the context of crisis of smallholders in two 
tribal villages of Orissa (India) 
Nadja Ottiger 
In my research on economic, political and ecological aspects of land and forest use of small 
peasant households in two villages of Keonjhar District (Orissa), I explored economic strategies 
of 136 households with regard to agriculture, wage labour, and wood selling. The villages I had 
selected for my study are situated nearby the district capital at the fringe of a forest area. The sale 
of firewood and timber contributes considerably to the economy of these two villages. Paddy is 
produced on a variety of fields characterised by various cultivation techniques (shifting cultiva-
tion and wet rice cultivation on permanent rice fields) in two different natural environments 
(hilly forest and plain area). Property regimes also vary for the various fields: common property 
for forest land used for shifting cultivation, private property for permanently cultivated fields. 
In this paper I will focus on aspects of social security of small farm households linked to the 
control of land and the role kinship relations play in moments of crisis. As land problems are 
more pronounced in one of the two villages, only data from K. will be presented here. The vil-
lage consists of 116 households belonging to three tribal groups (Juang, Munda, Santal) and one 
caste (Gouda or milkmen). With 54.5%, the Juang, as the original inhabitants, form the majority 
of the village population, followed by the Munda (24%). The Santal only make up 6.3%; a fur-
ther 15.2% of the villagers belong to the milkmen caste.  
During my field research (November 1998 to July 1999 and September to October 2003) and 
based on the analysis of quantitative data, I came across a phenomenon well known in the litera-
ture about so-called “tribals”11 or “adivasi” in India: i.e. tribals losing access to their land. In the 
discourse on the situation of tribal people this process is most commonly called “tribal land 
alienation”.12 In the case of K., the Juang, as the original inhabitants of the area and as the largest 
group of the population under study, give away paddy land to immigrating Munda, Santal, and 
Gouda. In some cases they sell their land, in other cases they lease or mortgage it, mostly to 
households belonging to one of the other three groups. As one consequence of this loss of land, 
the Juang are more involved in selling wood and timber than any of the other groups. 
                                                 
11 Various ethnic groups are officially distinguished from the society of the national majority by culturally 
loaded terms like “scheduled tribes”, “adivasi”, “primitive tribal groups” (Colchester 1994:72). The 
commonly used terminology of “tribe”, “tribal people” is heavily debated in academic discourses due to 
difficulties to find adequate criteria to distinguish tribes from castes and due to the broad range of their 
economic, social, cultural, and political situation. Criteria like territorial control, political autonomy, and 
economic self-sufficiency in most cases do no longer apply to the reality of tribal societies in India. In 
many cases the term “tribe” is used as “a sort of shorthand expression with only an approximate meaning, 
not one implying a rigorous definition” (Parkin 1992:9). 
12 Common explanations of the fact of tribal land loss are poverty of tribal people, the dishonesty of mon-
eylenders, merchants, and rich peasants combined with the helplessness of illiterate peasants, who are 
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Reasons to give away land 
A comparison of the ownership of agricultural land with the area cultivated per household and 
per consumer indicates the gap between nominal land (as registered land with land title) and 
cultivated land (measured by quantity of paddy seeds used in 1999) for the various ethnic 
groups: 
Group Average nominal 
land in ha 
per household 
Average nominal 
land in ha 
per consumer 
Average cultivated 
land in ha per 
household 
Average cultivated 
land in ha 
per consumer 
Gouda 0.1869 0.0358 1.2995 0.2938 
Munda 0.3707 0.1110 0.9449 0.2859 
Santal 0.9892 0.2552 1.4333 0.2821 
Juang Kodipasa 0.9318 0.2545 0.7660 0.1923 
All Kodipasa 0.6966 0.1897 0.9173 0.2335 
 
The rate of nominal land to cultivated land for the ethnic groups in Kodipasa is as follows: 
Group Average rate of nominal 
to cultivated land 
Gouda 1 : 6.9 
Munda 1 : 2.5 
Santal 1 : 1.45 
Juang Kodipasa 1 : 0.82 
All Kodipasa 1 : 1.32 
 
Although the Gouda hardly own any agricultural land, the average cultivated area by household 
and consumer is higher than among any of the other groups. The Juang in contrast cultivate con-
siderably less land than they own. Part of the explanation for the discrepancy between nominal 
land and cultivated land of the various households and groups are land transfers.13 
When investigating the reasons for transfers of land from Juang households to other households, 
they turned out to be mostly related to some critical event in the household. Juang households 
rent out, mortgage or sell land due to the following reasons14: 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
cheated. Tribal people are perceived as passive and reactive victims rather than as rational actors follow-
ing strategies under given circumstances. 
13 Other reasons why households may cultivate more than they own as private agricultural land are 
encroachments on government land. 
14 The reason for land transactions could not be traced in all cases. Some informants did not know the 
reason of land transactions of their fathers or late husbands or they did not want to talk about it. In some 
cases I got information about land transactions only from the receivers. However, in many cases people 
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Reason Cases (n=98)
Death 14 
Sickness 12 
Food scarcity 5 
Marriage 5 
Alcohol 6 
Debts / to pay back loan 5 
Material needs 5 
 
1) Sickness and death are a serious burden for the families because money has to be spent 
on medical care and at the same time valuable family labour is lost. In case of death in 
the family, they have to perform the death ritual (sudho) linked with immediate expendi-
tures in kind, esp. rice and meat for the relatives, friends and neighbours. During the field 
research Juang households’ cash expenditures for death rituals varied between 500 and 
3000 Rs.15 If there is no or not enough paddy stock, rice has to be purchased, maybe also 
a goat. 
2) In particular, widows with small children or with no son at an age to plough the land as 
well as single old widows, are susceptible to being forced to give away land. For reli-
gious reasons women in India are not allowed to touch a plough. From the 13 non-
cultivating households, 8 are widow-headed Juang households. All of them have either 
sold, rented out or mortgaged their land after the death of their husbands, be it for per-
forming the death ritual and/or due to labour shortage in their household. 
3) Food scarcity due to bad harvest, or misfortune in the family mentioned above, force 
Juang households to give away land. 
4) Marriages are a rather expensive affair for a Juang household. They involve large 
amounts of paddy (400 to 500 kg) partially given as a gift to the family of the bride, par-
tially used to feed the guests. Furthermore, up to four goats, rice beer, and mahua, money 
to buy clothes for the bride and her kin (dhotis and sarees) and other resources to provide 
food for the guests are required. In the case of the marriage of Maheswar Juang (the son 
of a widow, with one brother and one sister) with a woman of Rodhuan in the year 2002, 
expenditures included the following items:  
- 7 pieces of cloth for approx. 650 Rs.  
- 10 bottles of liquor (mahuli) for 100 Rs.  
- 3 goats and 1 cock for approx. 1500 Rs.  
- 1 pig for 500 Rs.  
- 2 khandi paddy (40kg) for 280 Rs.  
                                                                                                                                                             
were willing to talk about the reason for giving away land. Cases refer to land transactions from one 
household to another. The same household may be involved in several transactions. 
15 In 1998/99 40 Rs. equalled 1 US$; 100 Rs. were 2.7SFr. Daily wage for unskilled wage labour was 
between 25 to 30 Rs. The price of 1 kg rice was 10 Rs. 
 43
- 300 kg rice for 3000 Rs.  
- 2 pots of rice beer for 150 Rs.  
Overall, these expenses amounted to more than 6000 Rs. in cash and kind.  
Although kin and neighbours usually cooperate and contribute to the expenditures for a 
marriage, the main burden in cash and kind lies on the core family of the bridegroom. 
Support received by close relatives in the form of cash or kind (rice, goats, pigs) is lim-
ited and based on rather strict and balanced reciprocity. The bridegroom’s paternal and 
maternal uncles, his mother’s and his father’s sisters, and his own married brothers and 
sisters are expected to contribute towards marriage expenses. However, their contribu-
tions may be very small and more of symbolic than substantial material value. Thus, in 
the above case, the main contribution were 3 khandi rice (approx. 520 Rs.) given by the 
maternal uncle of Maheswar, which the bridegroom will have to give back in the case of 
a marriage in his maternal uncle’s family.  
5) In at least 6 cases land has been mortgaged, rented out or sold by male members in order 
to get the means to buy alcoholic beverages. The need to buy alcohol may be the cause of 
land transactions in other cases as well, although not explicitly mentioned by the families 
concerned. Excessive consumption of alcohol is a problem mostly concerning the Juang 
and to some degree also the Munda, but not the Gouda. The higher-ranking Gouda do not 
drink alcohol at all and the Gouda graziers do it in a more controlled way. 
6) The necessity to repay debts or the need for money to satisfy material needs (e.g. to build 
a new roof, to obtain a plough, a bullock or a bicycle) are further situations in which 
Juang families give land to others.  
These are reasons why Juang households rent out, mortgage or sell their land. However, most of 
these circumstances resulting in giving away land do to some extent also apply to households of 
Munda, Gouda, and Santal. They are all facing sickness, death, marriage, crop failure or other 
risks and insecurities, they all have material needs and they all are in need of cash sometimes. 
Marriage expenditures, for example, are the same or even higher among the other groups. Thus, 
in the case of a Munda household, the total expenses expected for the marriage of a son amount 
to about 8‘000 Rs. and in the case of the richest Gouda household marriage expenditures for sons 
are calculated to be 10'000 - to 20‘000 Rs., for daughters even approximately 30'000 Rs. Of 
course, such expenditures correlate to some extent with the general economic situation of a 
household and a family. 
The hypothesis that the Juang are more vulnerable to crisis than other groups in the research area 
and thus under higher pressure to give away their land cannot be confirmed. These situations are 
typical for all small peasant households. The reasons mentioned above cannot sufficiently ex-
plain why the Juang are ready to give away land in such situations. That households of other 
groups do this very rarely can partly be ascribed to the fact that as immigrants they do own less 
land than the Juang – 78.4% of the private agricultural land belongs to the Juang, while the other 
three groups own only 21.6%. However, every household with private land has the option to 
keep it or to give it away. From the 37 non-Juang households with land titles only 8% (3 house-
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holds) had given away land, while 59% of Juang households with land titles were involved in 
some kind of land transfer in 1998/99. 
Thus, the following questions remain unanswered: why do non-Juang households not give away 
land to the same extent as Juang families? And why do non-Juang households with no or less 
land opt to get more land, thus giving the Juang the option, to give away their land? What strate-
gies and options do non-Juang households follow in order to cope with situations of crisis and 
are these options also available to the Juang? 
Reflecting on these questions I became interested in aspects of social security and the role of 
inter- and intra-household relations in the context of crisis of smallholders. 
Inter-household relations 
One possible hypothesis could be that social networks providing support in cash or kind to 
households which are facing economic pressure or emergencies are relieving the pressure that 
would otherwise force a family to forfeit its land. Thus, households with better social networks 
and enjoying a higher degree of solidarity, including economic support from outside the house-
hold, would be less vulnerable to temporary or permanent loss of land. Maybe such networks and 
forms of solidarity are weaker among the Juang than among the other groups? 
To answer these questions I analysed kinship relations among the households in the two villages. 
Furthermore, with members of several households of the various groups I discussed the help and 
support they may expect and get in times of crisis and need. 
Descent rules of all ethnic groups are patrilineal and patriclans are exogameous. In all four 
groups most households are linked to some other households in the village by affinal and/or con-
sanguineal ties. Thus, most household members do have relatives living in the same community. 
However, the results of this analysis show that relatives do not play the crucial role which I had 
expected them to play in critical situations.  
There were no substantial indications that in moments of crisis kinship rights and duties or forms 
of solidarity vary in a significant way for the various ethnic groups. On the contrary, in all ethnic 
groups, households as the main economic units are very much self-centred and they depend to a 
large degree on their own family members, resources, and capacities. In case of an emergency 
little or no support is received from others and even close kin do abstain from assisting. If a 
household is receiving support at all, this help is strictly based on reciprocity or on payment – 
e.g. labour for labour or labour for cash – also among close kin. However, the Gouda seem to 
have an advantage in comparison to the Juang and the Munda with regard to credit: they may get 
financial or material support from relatives, although they have to pay back these credits with 
interest. There seems to be enough trust among Gouda relatives that credits will be repaid. This 
is not self-evident for other groups. People say that it is difficult to obtain credits because credi-
tors are not sure to get back what they give, not even from relatives. The possibility to get credit 
without giving land as a security helps to stabilise the economic situation of a household in case 
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of emergency. Moreover, it enables a household to invest and improve its general situation by 
acquiring land and by paying for labour to cultivate more land. 
A further astonishing finding of my research was that in all ethnic groups, free support from kin 
is not expected. To be responsible for one’s own household and to cope with difficult situations 
is considered to be normal. When asking people, whose families were facing serious problems, 
whether they did get any support from their kin, they often reacted with a counter-question: 
“Why should I get help? They have their own families, they have to take care of themselves.” 
Thus, a household who suffers from misfortune has to deal with this situation on the basis of the 
resources and capacities of its family members. One might interpret this absence of support to be 
caused by a lack of means and possibilities – poor people do not have the means to support other 
poor people. However, there seems to be little cooperation and support between better-off 
households or between better-off households and poorer households as well.  
This is not to say that other households do not get involved when a household is facing a crisis: 
social and economic arrangements supporting a household in times of crisis are possible, but 
these arrangements are costly. For example, a widow with small children who is not able to cul-
tivate her paddy fields may get the possibility to work for a richer household in the village and 
earn her minimal daily food for her family. She may even find somebody willing to rent, hold in 
pledge or buy her land – but in return, she will temporarily or forever lose access to an important 
resource of her household. 
Within the limits of my analysis, kinship solidarity between households, at least on an economic 
level, turned out to be more of a myth or wishful thinking than reality.16 In the village under 
study, kinship ties beyond the household level are more important on symbolic and ritual levels 
than with regard to material and economic support. The fact that there are very few joint and 
extended families within all ethnic groups of K. confirms the general impression of a rather 
fragmented community, consisting of households with strong centrifugal forces within the 
household resulting in early separation of smaller family units. Once economically split up, the 
cooperation between brothers or fathers and sons is not guaranteed, and in some cases it is con-
sidered more appropriate to ask for assistance from non-relatives than from close kin.17 
That my research findings in the field are not exceptional for peasant households is confirmed – 
among others – by Netting (1995: 194) who analysed smallholder communities: 
Suprahousehold unilineal lineages or bilateral descent groups may indeed exist among intensive 
cultivators, and they may perform important corporate functions in regulating and organizing 
marriage, settling internal disputes, and handling external conflict by legal negotiation or armed 
                                                 
16 For a general view of family ideology and reality in India see Shah (1998). 
17 McDougal’s (1963) observations of early separating Juang households and Juang families were largely 
confirmed by my own field experience. It may well be that centrifugal forces are even stronger in villages 
like K.: situated nearby the district capital and close to areas of wet rice cultivation they offer more eco-
nomic opportunities (sale of firewood and timber / farm wage labour / off-farm wage labour) for house-
hold members than more isolated and interior villages – even without land or only little land households 
can manage to become economically independent. 
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combat. The kin group may be a political body and a religious congregation. But the constituent 
smallholder households do not produce or consume in common, and they do not redistribute their 
crops, livestock, or property to approximate some social ideal of equality. This does not imply 
either any lack of interhousehold cooperation or the presence of some atomistic, laissez-faire 
household independence. Indeed, smallholder communities, where labour demands are often 
heavy, where seasonal bottlenecks may be severe, and where certain tasks and projects may far 
exceed the capacity of any household work force, are rife with examples of voluntary labor 
groups. But these socially recognized forms of labour exchange are what Marshall Sahlins has 
called balanced rather than generalized reciprocity, and they produce goods and services that are 
by and large consumed or retained by individual households. Individuals or households who 
perform labour for others do not do so in an altruistic fashion, where “the material side of the 
transaction is repressed by the social,” where the counter obligation “is not stipulated by time, 
quantity, or quality,” or where “the expectation of reciprocity is indefinite” (Sahlins 1972: 194). 
Rather, the exchange transaction stipulates “returns of commensurate worth or utility within a 
finite and narrow period and is subject to a more or less precise reckoning” (ibid.: 195). Al-
though exchanges within the family household may emphasize sharing, and occasionally sus-
tained, one-way flows of resources, relations among households of smallholders are usually 
much more consciously and calculatedly balanced. 
Characteristic of a crisis is, however, the fact that it usually takes time and resources to over-
come it and that balanced reciprocity is not possible within a finite and narrow period. A widow, 
for example, may lack male labour for extended periods and, thus, may not be able to exchange 
the kind of labour she is in need of. Therefore, she will have to pay for male labour. If she lacks 
the means to do so, she is forced to reduce or even give up cultivation. A household losing one of 
its bullocks also faces serious problems because it will not be able to plough the fields unless it 
pays for the service of getting a bullock from another household or unless it can cooperate with 
another unlucky household also possessing only one bullock.  
Intra-household relations 
Given the fact that all households of all groups basically have to face their economic problems 
and constraints themselves, intra-household relations are of crucial importance to understand 
household strategies and reactions to crisis. There is a broad variety of household realities in the 
village under study with regard to intra-household relations. Neither the idea of a household as a 
cooperative unit based on altruism of individual household members pooling labour and income 
for the common wellbeing of everybody, nor the idea of a household as a unity held together by 
an authoritarian and powerful family head, fully cover household realities in the village. The idea 
of a household as composed of individual actors with their own preferences, interests and strate-
gies reflects the reality of many households more adequately. 
The degree of cooperation and conflicts among household members, the degree of power and 
authority a household head has, the bargaining power of men and women, of older and younger 
members varies between households, and it varies in the course of the household developmental 
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cycle. Aspects of sexual division of labour, ideas about who has to contribute what and how 
much at which age to the household income, the bargaining power between men and women, 
young and old influence economic strategies and behaviour of households and individuals. Intra-
household relations are structured by bargaining power and fall-back positions18 of individual 
members, by aspects of gender, age and marital status. These in turn are related to aspects of 
social status and identity (caste and tribe) and to gender ideologies that play an important role in 
the economic behaviour and strategies of the households of the various ethnic groups – also with 
regard to critical events. This is the field where I found major differences between the various 
ethnic groups. 
The following description of the situation of a Juang widow illustrates the mix of factors coming 
into play while handling a difficult household situation: 
Nila is a Juang woman at the age of about 50. She is the mother of two sons and two daughters, all of 
which are not yet married. Her daughters at the age of 14 and 20 are supporting the family. They sell 
wood, they work on the family’s own paddy fields and they also engage in farm and off-farm wage 
labour. Nila herself works on her own fields and if necessary she also sells wood. Two to three days a 
week she grazes her goats together with the goats of some neighbours, who in turn graze her goats on 
other days. Nila complains that her eldest son (now 24) does not plough her fields. He is lazy and he 
is always drinking, she says. He is angry with his mother because she has not yet arranged his mar-
riage, he says. But how can she find a girl for a boy like him who is lazy and drinks too much? How 
can such a boy become a husband taking care of a family? Where can she take the paddy from to give 
to the parents-in-law and to feed the guests during the marriage ceremony? Last year Nila tried to get 
him married, but he refused to contribute anything to his marriage. So she stopped looking for a bride. 
Now he refuses to plough the paddy fields and Nila has to organise paid labour to plough her farms. 
Sometimes she is not able to cultivate all her fields due to the lack of male labour in the family, due to 
the lack of means to pay wage labour or due to non-availability of male wage labour for ploughing. 
She does not get any free support from her brother-in-law living next door to her; and she does not 
expect any free support. He has his own fields to plough and his own family to take care of, she says. 
However, if ploughing is not done properly and at the right time, yields will be smaller. 
Actually, one man in the family would suffice for ploughing. This was the reason why Nila had sent 
her second son to do wage labour in a family living in another village. He is transferring part of his 
salary to his mother. Now, however, Nila thinks about calling him back to help her.  
Several times Nila had rented out or mortgaged parts of her land to other villagers. This occurred 
when she was in need of money for medical treatment for herself and for her children. Once she 
rented out land in order to contribute money to a marriage of a friend of hers, hoping that she will get 
this gift back in the form of a similar contribution from the family of her friend when her son gets 
married. Nila prefers to rent out land instead of mortgaging it, because renting entails a smaller risk of 
losing land: after it has been cultivated for a certain number of years she will get back her land with-
out having to repay any money for the land rented out. She could obtain more money by mortgaging 
land, but she may not be able to pay back larger amounts of cash. Thus, she may lose her land defi-
nitely. 
The less land Nila’s family cultivates, the more it depends on other sources of income. One important 
income-generating activity is the sale of firewood, mainly done by Nila’s two daughters. On the other 
hand, Nila cannot cultivate all her fields due to the lack of male labour and cooperation. Like other 
widows in the village, Nila lost land after the death of her husband because her sons were too small to 
plough for their mother. She managed to cultivate some of the fields by hiring male workers. Some of 
the family’s land, however, was lying fallow for several years. The Sarpanch of the village sold this 
                                                 
18 A person’s fall-back position is an important factor of his or her bargaining power; here the term refers 
to options he or she has if cooperation within the household ceases (see Agarwal 1998: 54). It is a concept 
elaborated by Amartya Sen to analyse conflicts and cooperative arrangements. 
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land to some Gouda families and they now claim this land to be theirs. To retrieve this land would be 
very difficult and would probably result in an open conflict between Nila and these families. Nila 
does not believe that she would be able to get back the land. What use is there in claiming her rights 
from the tahsildar (an official from the Revenue Department), if he is corrupt and being bribed by 
those who have taken away her land, she asks. 
In Nila’s family the eldest son is refusing to do his work at the expense of his mother and sisters. 
The fact that women in India are not allowed to touch the plough makes them dependent on male 
labour for cultivation. But there are no social barriers for Juang women to sell wood and engage 
in wage labour. Juang girls from the early age of about 12 years contribute considerably to the 
household income while Juang boys are expected to fully contribute their labour only after mar-
riage. But not only do Juang boys and men contribute less work to the household, they also 
spend larger sums of their income on personal needs, while women’s income is mainly spent on 
household needs.  
The fact that there is no rigid sexual division of labour between Juang men and women with re-
gard to available economic options (farming, wage labour, and wood selling) combined with a 
gender ideology ascribing far reaching responsibilities for the fulfilment of household needs to 
women while allowing men to pursue their individual interests, partly explains why the Juang are 
less involved in agriculture: Juang households give away paddy land because the burden to com-
pensate loss of land and consequently loss of paddy to feed the family can be shifted to Juang 
women who are heavily involved in selling wood and are engaged in wage labour in order to 
obtain rice. These two economic options are restricted for Gouda households. In contrast to 
many Juang households they follow the strategy of increasing access to land. 
Higher ranking Gouda families consider women’s work outside the household not appropriate – 
Gouda women work on the family’s paddy fields and better-off Gouda households even use 
wage labour for cultivating their paddy fields and restrict their women’s work to purely domestic 
duties. That Gouda women would sell wood is almost unthinkable. In these households men 
even provide firewood for household consumption. From time to time they collect it in large 
quantities, whereas in all other groups the collecting of firewood for own consumption is mainly 
women’s work. Wage labour for girls and women (even farm wage labour) is considered degrad-
ing – an exception being farm wage labour for other Gouda, preferably some kin. Instead, culti-
vating land and selling milk is considered to be the appropriate way of life for higher-ranking 
Gouda men. Even under critical economic circumstances selling wood is not a viable economic 
option for them. When asked, why they do not sell wood, they answer that they do not know this 
kind of work,19 that they would have to move with the Juang in the forest in order to learn it and 
that they do not want to mix with the Juang. Off-farm wage labour is only performed by men, 
only reluctantly and only if it is of utmost necessity. In 2003 some Gouda told me about a serious 
drought that occurred about 12 years ago. But even at that time the Gouda did not sell wood and 
the women did not engage in wage labour. Only men went for road construction, pond digging 
etc.  
                                                 
19 This argument however is a rather weak one since Gouda men do go into the forest to collect timber 
and firewood for own consumption. 
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Thus, it is a combination of caste, social status, and ideas about appropriate economic activities 
for Gouda women and men that results in an effort to keep or accumulate land for cultivation. Of 
all 16 Gouda households, 12 are landless on paper, but all of them cultivate land in Kodipasa - 
land that they mainly got from the Juang. 
When facing a crisis Gouda households will try to overcome it by other means than to abandon 
cultivation. They may send a male household member to engage in wage labour, a female house-
hold member may be hired to work on some relative’s fields, and they may sell a cow or some 
goats or they may seek a credit from some relatives.20 Moreover, intra-household relations 
among the higher-ranking Gouda are characterized by stronger structures of authority between 
parents and children that enforce cooperation of household members and the pooling of incomes. 
Gouda boys are expected to contribute to the household at an earlier age than Juang boys. A 
lower degree of individualism of household members further enhances the economic perform-
ance of Gouda households as economic units and renders them less vulnerable to crisis. 
Two conclusions are important: 
Social security in the two villages depends most of all on members from the own household. 
Kinship ties beyond the household level are more important on symbolic and ritual levels than 
with regard to material and economic support. Any misfortune is immediately reflected in the 
household situation and requires reactions based on the resources and capacities of its family 
members. Thus intra-household relations and dynamics are crucial in determining household 
strategies and reactions to crisis. 
The ecological problem of forest degradation (as a consequence of economic strategies of wood 
selling households) is in many ways related to all households in the villages: even if the Gouda 
do not sell timber and firewood themselves, they are part of the problem of forest degradation 
insofar as the Juang (and especially Juang women) compensate loss of land (given to the Gouda) 
by selling wood.  
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The Reemergence of Street Protests:  
State Workers Challenge the Chinese State 
Antoine Kernen 
Demonstrations by people working at, laid off or retired from China’s state enterprises have been 
steadily increasing in frequency since the mid 1990s. Despite some uncertainty over the pub-
lished figures, about 120,000 is the most frequently quoted annual total number of demonstra-
tions over these past few years21. Because of their brevity and the limited number of persons in-
volved, they do not rival the great mass movements that convulsed China in earlier years, but 
they do betray a quite new phenomenon: the recourse to street protests for the purpose of ex-
pressing worker discontent to the authorities. Yet, their very frequency should not mislead us 
into thinking that they have become an everyday means of protest. Gatherings in public spaces 
are still forbidden, as they are dependent on official authorization – which is extremely difficult 
to obtain.  
The multiplication of workers’ protests has occurred simultaneously with the speeding up of 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) Reforms since the beginning of the 1990s. The reinforcement 
of “budget constraints” was then combined with the granting of a greater leeway in personnel 
management and the laying-off of workers. Since then, the SOEs (and old collective enterprises 
as well) have regularly eliminated portions of the workforce through pre-retirement schemes and 
xiagang.22 This proceeds from the Chinese government’s policy of eliminating the redundant 
workforce from SOEs. As a result, many workers experienced a sharp reduction of income. This 
laying-off process should come along with the implementation of the new urban social safety 
net. But this has turned out to have more substance on paper than in reality. The xiagang work-
ers, the unemployed and the pre-retired receive their salaries or pensions only on a very irregular 
basis, or do not even get paid at all. In addition to the xiagang system, it should be stressed here 
that the pre-retirement scheme had been used extensively to lay off redundant workers from the 
SOEs. Other laying-off measures have been characterized by an immediate separation of the 
workers and their SOE, with a dismissal indemnity that can vary greatly. So workers’ protests 
take place in a context characterized by the loss of social benefits won under socialism, and also 
by the government’s difficulties to set up a new social welfare system in a climate of widespread 
corruption (Kernen and Rocca 1998 and 2000).  
                                                 
21 60,000 demonstrations in 1998, 100,000 in 1999, 137,000, in 2000 135,000 The figures given here 
appeared in the Far Eastern Economic Review (September 6, 2001). The South China Morning Post 
claims that there were 207,605 workers’ demonstrations in 2000, of which 135,000 were officially regis-
tered, (SCMP, October 3, 2001). For more information see the websites of the China Labour Bulletin 
(http://iso.china-labour.org.hk/iso/) or Lu Siqing at the Centre of Human Rights and Democratic Move-
ment in China website (http://www.89-64.com/english/indexen.html.  
22 Xiagang are workers who have been furloughed from state-owned enterprises with little chance of re-
call. Xiagang first began to appear in the middle 1990s, when party-state officials permitted managers to 
start shrinking their workforce at state-owned enterprises. The Chinese government does not consider 
these workers to be unemployed (at least till 2002), because state-owned enterprises are responsible for 
issuing stipends to their xiagang.  
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This context is very important to understand the multiplication and the banalization of the work-
ers’ mobilization. Indeed since special funds have been granted by the central government to 
secure the pensions and other unemployment allocations, the worker protest have become less 
frequent. Also, as is well known in the field of social movements, there is no automatism be-
tween economic hardship and social mobilization23. In China, workers laid-off from SOEs are 
not “objectively” the most disadvantaged or the less protected of social groups. Migrants work-
ers are surely facing a much harder economic and social situation, but it is more rare to see them 
protesting. We may notice also that inside the different kinds of laid off state workers; it’s the 
early-retired state workers that are the most prone to protest. So the questions are why and how 
those protests became possible, and what did they reveal in the transformation of the Chinese 
state.  
The actual worker protests are indeed quite different from popular protests that occurred earlier 
in the People’s Republic of China. The “novelty” of these worker protests is first due to the fact 
they do not take place in a situation where the regime is in crisis. The actual political situation is 
thus radically different with the one that prevailed at the time of the big demonstration of Spring 
1989. There is no perceptible division among the present leadership which entertains a collegial 
appearance. 
Nor can the worker protests take advantage of a “window of opportunity” similar to the one 
which opened in 1989 with the death of Hu Yaobang, a former Party Secretary who was then in 
“disgrace”24. Such a “window of opportunity” associated with mourning was in fact prolonged in 
1989 by the perceptible divisions within the leadership as well as by the historic visit by Mikhail 
Gorbachev25. This chain of events enabled the students to build a durable movement thus to ac-
quire a high profile, both nationally and internationally. 
We should also stress that the Chinese government has not lost its repressive capacity towards 
any social movement that it perceives as a threat to its authority. Anyone in doubt over this mat-
ter has only to recall how harshly it cracked down on Falungong and on the initiatives taken by 
dissident intellectuals. 
We will thus defend the hypothesis that the relative tolerance of the regime toward state worker 
protests reveals a new selective opening for a limited expression of contention. This new space 
for autonomy must be linked to the more open access to legal procedures, and the larger use, 
which is encouraged today, of the old complaints procedure. This renewed use of the “right to 
claim” takes place in a context where the State retreats from the direct management of the econ-
omy and tries to act as referee in the new social conflicts that are often linked to it. These partial 
transgressions that are being tolerated thus have a certain functionality for the State in a process 
                                                 
23 On this subject, I rejoin to critics sollicited by the work of Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (1970), on 
the social frustration of many social movements theorists.  
24 In China, as in other authoritarian countries, mourning for a great leader opens, briefly, a window for 
people to express dissent. In 1989, just as on Zhou Enlai’s death in 1976, the population had had time to 
publicly express its attachment to a great departed leader and, by contrast, to criticize those still in power. 
25 Gorbachev’s visit marked the reconciliation between China and Russia after 30 years of latent hostility. 
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recomposition following its shift to a market economy. In turning away from the complaints 
deposit repertoire, worker protests enlighten the day to day evolution of the Chinese political 
system itself, a situation which is very different from the immobilism that is so often depicted.  
As the state worker protests occur at a time of limited political opening, it is interesting to ana-
lyze them in terms of interaction, to understand how structural elements can influence the form 
taken by mobilization. To do this we will rely on the reformulation of the concept of “structure 
of political opportunity” as developed by Sidney Tarrow (1994). In order to avoid a too me-
chanical conception of labour protest, Sidney Tarrow (2001) insists on focusing on the interac-
tion between the different actors themselves and on the way in which they perceive, reinterpret 
and take advantage of it. 
In our present case, the state workers seem to have a clear perception of the implicit rules dic-
tated by the regime for the expression of contention. In order to legitimize their demands, they 
tend to lean on the laws and repeat publicly their own attachment to the regime, thus avoiding to 
inscribe their action in a logic of confrontation. On the other side, the authorities use different 
strategies to limit the development of the protest, trying to confine them within the complaint 
deposit framework. It is difficult indeed for them to enter into a logic of criminalization of these 
state worker movements as they haven’t yet officially declared the end of socialism. 
To describe how these original interactions between state workers and the authorities are taking 
place, I shall first of all show how they do fall in line, in some respects, with a legal and every-
day activity, the complaints procedure. This repertoire of contention had been formally institu-
tionalized before the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and relegalized again at the beginning of 
the Reforms in 1978, and finally explicitly encouraged, in recent years, concurrently with the 
development of the Chinese legal system. Following this, I will examine the process of trans-
gression of this “repertoire of action”, emphasizing the original forms that these movements 
adopted. I will then turn back to the sociological profiles of the demonstrators and the organiza-
tional structures of these movements, which are usually very atomized, and analyze the quite 
indirect linkages that sometimes unite them. 
The present study is based on several surveys which where conducted in the provinces of North-
East China from July 1997 to April 2003. Two types of interviews were carried out: one type 
with the authorities of Harbin and Shenyang; another with workers involved in small scale pro-
tests, done under difficult conditions with workers-claimants in front of complaint local govern-
ment offices, and later visiting them in their enterprise. During the last few years, I also dis-
cussed with several laid-off and retired workers from a few SOEs which had endured a number 
hardships. Apart from this field research, I also consulted of course different independent sources 
on the subject. Since the Chinese official press does not usually make any mention of social 
strife, most information on such conflicts is being channeled essentially through a number of 
newly established parallel information networks. The most important are the The China Labor 
Bulletin of Han Dongfang, and especially The Center of Human Rights and Democratic move-
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ment in China of Lu Siqing, both based in Hong Kong.26 Few social science articles have been 
written on workers’ protests, since they constitute as such a new phenomenon, although one may 
mention high quality papers including those by Trini W. Y. Leung (1998; 2002), Ching Kwan 
Lee (2000a, 2002b), and Cheng Feng (2000, 2003), William Hurst and Kevin O’Brian (2002). 
From a more historical perspective, works by A. Walder (1986, 1993) and E. Perry (1986, 2001) 
are certainly undisputable references. 
1. Demonstrations as a complaints procedure? 
The connection between street demonstrations by state sector workers and the practice of lodging 
complaints is explicit even if there is some incertitude in the terms used to designate the move-
ments. Local officials, when interviewed, generally use the term “collective complaint” or “col-
lective petition” (jiti shangfang), when they do not use vaguer, more pejorative phrases such as 
“disorder” (luan) or “unrest” (nao shi).  
True that in many respects, these demonstrations still fall within the procedure for administrative 
appeal which was adopted by the Chinese regime in its earliest days. The practice has been insti-
tutionalized by the Communists since the 1950s with the setting up of offices for lodging com-
plaints and petitions (xingfang bangongshi/ xingfang ke), but its origins go back much further; 
we will not however talk about this now (Bianco 2001; Perry 2001). The practice aims at giving 
people access to an appeals procedure when they perceive a decision affecting them to be unjust. 
Chinese people have used this tool more or less widely according to the times (Luchmann 2003). 
Sometimes the authorities have used it as an instrument for controlling how political compliance 
with the activities of local administrations is effective or for checking if new laws and regula-
tions have been properly implemented. To make the process easier, letterboxes were provided 
where complainants could deposit their complaints. Nowadays, these boxes have been super-
seded by open hotlines so that people may denounce cases of corruption. It can be seen from 
these few examples that lodging complaints is part of the normal functioning of the Chinese 
communist regime. In no way does the practice challenge the established order, since it is aimed 
at ensuring that laws are justly applied (Thireau and Hua 2003; O’Brien forthcoming). Workers 
in state enterprises are not, in any case, the only people to use this procedure; it is widely used by 
workers in the special economic zones (Thireau and Hua 2003), as well as by country people for 
tax and land problems (O’Brien and Li 2004) and by townspeople in cases of expropriation or 
house purchases27. We should note too that in recent years a new procedure of legal arbitration 
has been juxtaposed to the administrative one (Thireau and Hua 2003).  
The workers of any particular state enterprise who take to the street in any numbers are therefore 
acting within the complaint-lodging repertoire of contention. This is so, first of all, because such 
demonstrations bring together only those suffering precisely the same injustice – groups of 
workers all belonging to the same state enterprise. And secondly, it is because the demonstrators, 
                                                 
26 See http://www.china-labour.org.hk/; http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/; http://www.asianlabour.org/; 
http://www.89-64.com/english/indexen.html. 
27 South China Morning Post (May 3, 2003). 
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like complainants, are blaming the managing authorities of their enterprise for failing to provide 
the contractual social benefits to which they are entitled such as xiagang and unemployment 
allocations or pensions; sometimes they made a connection with corruption. Their claims are 
generally focused on payments – whether for pensions or allocations – that have remained un-
paid. The demonstrators deliver a petition to the authorities asking them politely to intercede on 
their behalf with the management of the enterprise to bring these irregularities to an end. After 
all, they are demanding nothing more than the exercise of something they consider, as do the 
authorities themselves, as an established right. And, when they condemn the leaders of their en-
terprise for corruption, they do so to expose irregularities in the process of transferring owner-
ship or in the procedure for closing down a failing enterprise (Kernen 2004). Not only are they 
wholly complying with the official discourse of the day on the struggle against corruption, by 
asking for the law to be justly applied, but also with the logic of the formal filing of a complaint. 
In other words, their claims remain centered on quite specific infractions of the law, and stay 
within the context of the enterprise. Seen from this angle, the demonstrators are taking on the 
role of complainants, limiting themselves to pointing out how a regulation is being badly imple-
mented. While today’s workers’ demonstrations are a totally new phenomenon since 1949, they 
widely used the existing repertoire of contention (Tilly 1986). Such an extensive reuse of the 
complaints procedure probably owes much to the fact that workers are cobbling together existing 
repertoires of protest, if not even more to the fact that their creative faculties are now being 
stimulated by the narrowness of their actual margin for manoeuvre. 
The transition to demonstrations: the weight of numbers 
Yet, by playing on the weight of their numbers and on their ever longer and ever more organized 
physical presence in public places, these movements are actually moving outside the complaint-
lodging field of activity. Such workers turn out in dozens, sometimes in their hundreds, in front 
of the city hall, chanting slogans and carrying banners and blocking the main entrance to the 
building.  
On a given day there are 300, perhaps 400 persons, who are demanding their pension. As with 
many other retirees and early retired from the same city, the payment of their pension benefits 
has been delayed. They claim that they have not received anything for the past eight months. 
And therefore, on that given day they have taken the decision to protest in front of the city coun-
cil and ask for an explanation. Nowadays this type of event is quite common: during my stays in 
Shenyang, the street protests happened on a more than daily basis. 
In order to monitor such a banal street protest the Shenyang authorities tried initially to channel 
the rioters towards the office of complaints. A few civil servants, who appeared on the street at 
the same time as the rioters, gently tried to guide them there. Of course, mediators will hardly 
criticize the validity of the protesters’ action, nor will they point out that they are gathering ille-
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gally on a public area. On the contrary, they listen to the workers’ stories, sympathize with them 
and explain their options.28 
That given day the retirees are stubborn, they ask for an immediate appointment with the mayor. 
The mediators, as the personnel in charge of the city hall, hesitate, then attempt a diversion by 
saying that a delegation could be received the next day but that today the person in charge of the 
pension funds is absent. The rioters refuse. They have waited long enough. They demand an 
appointment this very day, and make it clear that they will not budge form the entrance of the 
city hall otherwise. The authorities will not have any of this. That is when people start to get 
angry, rioters who up to then were quite calm start shouting slogans: “We want our pensions! We 
want our pensions!” At the same time the police starts to intensify its pressure, plainclothes po-
licemen with cameras appear on the scene, others set the rioters apart while preventing the pass-
ers-by to stop, and finally a hundred or so policemen in uniform take position around the city 
hall. However, near the police barrier next to the town hall entrance, discussions with the rioters 
continue. Soon they actually obtain the much hoped for appointment with a municipal official. 
While fifteen or so retirees enter the building, the chanting of slogans gets stronger. However, 
this appointment leads to nothing more than a few vague promises, and soon before midday the 
street riot is dispersed without any violence. And as the security forces go back to their quarters 
singing a patriotic tune, a few groups of rioters seethe and share their anger with the passers-by. 
They vow to return soon. 
In refusing to leave the entrance to the local government building, the rioters also relinquished 
the “petition deposit” repertoire to enter into a struggle with the authorities. They are inventing 
the “manif”, on the pattern developed in 19th century France as described by Michel Offerlé 
(1990). Through this collective dimension, the demonstrators attempt to exert pressure and force 
the authorities into a trial of strength. They are no longer simply presenting their grievances to 
those in charge, but publicizing them. 
In the context of a democratic system, social movements tend to capitalise on the impact of their 
mobilization, either through the media or at the polls. In the Chinese context, the transition to 
street demonstrations has no media impact. The rare article dealing with workers’ demonstra-
tions generally appears well after the event, once the conflict has been resolved. In the absence 
of any “sounding box” at the national level, demonstrators have begun wishing, on a very few 
occasions, to make the issues about which they are campaigning known at an international level. 
At Daqing, for example, at the time of the big demonstrations of 2002, right from the earliest 
days of the struggle some demonstrators attempted to block a train connecting Moscow with 
Peking, hoping to attract the attention of the foreign passengers on board.29 Quite regularly too, 
the union dissident based in Hong Kong, Han Dongfeng, receives phone calls informing him of 
                                                 
28 Investigation in Harbin and Shenyang. 
29 See, for example, the report by the NGO Human Rights Watch, Paying the Price: Worker Unrest in 
Northeast China, July 2002, vol 14, no 6. Available online on the website: 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/chinalbr02/ 
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the situation in such and such an enterprise in China30. It is the same with some foreign journal-
ists based in Peking. For the present, however, such actions are still rare, bearing in mind the 
numbers of such movements (Cai Yunshun 2002). It is true that they are risky and often rebound 
on those who attempt them. At Daqing and at Liaoyang, the contacts that were made with dissi-
dent organizations or the international press were added to the list of accusations facing the 
movement’s leaders. 
Since then, with no media coverage, the only way left for the demonstrators to force the local 
authorities into trials of strength is by making full use of their “nuisance value”. By this means, 
such movements attempt to acquire political visibility and, through it, hope to force the authori-
ties into taking their claims into consideration. They think that, by “creating a problem”, they 
will break the local understanding between the bosses of the enterprise and the political authori-
ties to “manage” as quietly as possible the social crisis arising from the privatization or collapse 
of state enterprises. Whether by gathering in front of the authorities’ headquarters, or by block-
ing an important highway, or a railway, the demonstrators seek to break the silence blanketing 
their campaign. The protestors verbalize this strategy as “disorder” (Cai Yunshun 2002).  
Thereafter, even while they continue to address themselves to the local political authorities, their 
goal in making use of their nuisance value is really to catch the attention of the higher authori-
ties. In this sense, they are playing – as with the filing of a formal complaint – on the diversity of 
those who make up the Chinese state. A practice that is not new as Laura Luehrmann (2003:846) 
points out: “During the period immediately following the 1959-1961 Great Leap Forward fam-
ine, many complainants bypassed locals bureaus, even dramatically presenting their pleas written 
in blood (xue shu) to central authorities.”  
For their part, the authorities do not immediately outlaw the demonstrations. On the contrary, the 
local authorities try their best to keep them within the existing structures for filing complaints 
thus preventing that the worker complain have an echo outside their fief. City governments in the 
North-East have thus moved their complaints’ bureaus closer to the seats of power (city halls or 
provincial government buildings). Several officials come hastily out in the role of mediators to 
greet any group of complainants, escorting them peacefully to their offices. In doing so, they are 
attempting to keep this new kind of protest within the legal bounds. In some cases, they have 
also used intimidation to prevent groups of workers to go directly up to Beijing or to the provin-
cial capital to raise their case.  
As is pointed out in a recent article by Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li (2004), this is where we 
reach the limits of the concept of “political opportunity structure”, which over-simplifies the 
characteristics of the state in its relations with social movements. Demonstrators in China do not 
find themselves in a relationship with the state as a unique entity; they come up against a plural-
ity of state actors some of whom may make ad hoc alliances with them. In his article, focusing 
on the countryside, O’Brien shows how the lodging of complaints offers the provincial or central 
                                                 
30 Han Dongfeng and the China Labour Bulletin published detailed information on different protests that 
occurred in China. The annual statistic or estimation on the number of protests that occurred in China 
usually comes out from the official Chinese union.  
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authorities a means of control over the local administration. Even though this same interplay 
exists between the different levels of State power, the cases of workers’ demonstrations are 
structured in a rather different way. The state is concerned, not with ensuring the proper imple-
mentation of a law, but with containing any threat to social stability. By taking to the streets, the 
workers are indirectly drawing attention to the local authorities’ failure to “manage” the transi-
tion without any trouble. The local authorities thus find themselves obliged to find a quick 
method of calming things down, by referring upwards to higher levels in the hierarchy31.  
As we know, the idea of social stability (shehui wending) is a very sensitive one in China, and 
particularly when it comes to workers’ disputes. The Chinese government becomes panic-
stricken at the prospect of an autonomous and organized workers’ movement analogous to the 
Polish Solidarnosc. This is why the impact of these small street demonstrations is quite often 
great enough for the demonstrators to win, if not their case, at least some small compensation to 
improve their everyday diet. Such little misdemeanors – the street demonstrations – accompany-
ing the normal procedure for filing complaints – have in fact a big political impact. The relative 
haste with which the authorities are prepared to compromise with the demonstrators clearly en-
courages the development of this type of campaign. 
Nevertheless, the demonstrations still fall within the repertoire of the filing of complaints. As we 
have said, in addition to the fact that their aim is to attract the higher authorities’ attention to a 
misapplication of the law, the complainants do not generally employ from the start such “ex-
treme” tactics. They usually resort to them only after having tried to make their case through the 
normal administrative or legal procedures32. The demonstration is thus understood, in most of the 
cases I study, to be a procedure of last resort. If most of the complainants transform themselves 
into demonstrators only after the institutionalized procedure has failed, it may be analyzed as a 
way not to break but to strike a deal with the system, as an attempting to exert pressure in order 
to make the system work better.  
New ideological approaches for legalizing illegality 
Even though these demonstrations, restricted to employees of the same enterprise and limited in 
their claims, are not outlawed at once, the fact of taking to the streets is still understood by the 
demonstrators as a challenge to the established order. They clearly perceive the risks incurred 
when they widen the complaint filing repertory; and so they attempt to justify their action by the 
urgency of the situation, while putting their claim into the language of socialism. Socialist dis-
course is present as well in the context of lodging complaints, but the bureaucratic character of 
this approach is more suited to a more legalist and argumentative expression of their grievances 
(Thireau and Hua 2003). 
                                                 
31 And it happens that, in their turn, the local authorities make use of the risk of instability to win subsi-
dies from central government. 
32 See, for example, on this subject, in the report by Human Rights Watch, Paying the Price: Worker 
Unrest in Northeast China, op cit. 
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During the demonstrations, the workers’ appeal unmistakably brings to bear the ideological arse-
nal of socialism (Lee Chingkwan 2000a; 2000b). They dress their claims up in terms like “work-
ing class”, “proletariat”, “socialism” – to the point that their slogans, such as “Long life to the 
working class!” or “No to capitalism, yes to socialism!”, convey at times a whiff of the Cultural 
Revolution33. When the demonstrators proclaim their loyalty to socialist values they are expiating 
the illegal act of taking to the streets. And one finds that a broadly similar strategy was adopted 
by the student demonstrators of 1989, just as a pre-emptive measure to forestall any labeling of 
the movement as “counter-revolutionary”(Zuo and Benford 1995). 
It is also true that, by quoting back at the authorities the discourse that is still the official ideol-
ogy, after twenty years of economic reforms, the demonstrators are exposing its contradictions. 
They succeed all the more skillfully in turning the Party discourse in their own favor because, for 
them, it still has some reality. Historically, workers in the state sector used to have a special 
status. They were made to believe that they were the avant-garde of socialism, and that they col-
lectively owned the enterprises where they worked. In “struggling against capitalism”, they are 
demanding that a whole world, with all the norms and standards to which they had become ac-
customed, should be preserved: they want to hold onto the “socialist” way of managing social 
relationships. That world, now passing into history, was paternalistic. It tied workers for life to 
their production unit; but, in exchange, it guaranteed them a job with certain material advantages. 
This type of organization still has meaning for workers, even now that they have lost their jobs 
and have barely enough to live on. In this sense, it is possible to draw a parallel with the concept 
of moral economy. James Scott (1985) defines this term as a pre-capitalist and agrarian form of 
organization in which the landowners swap a little of their wealth for some social recognition. 
Even if the Chinese workers go beyond Scott’s subtle forms of protest, in the case of urban 
China, the workers’ demonstrations are, like Scott’s agrarian revolts, a reaction aimed at restor-
ing an old order that has probably disappeared forever. One can imagine the authorities’ conde-
scending attitude to these workers, the last to dream of a socialist paradise. So the use to which 
the workers are putting the socialist discourse is not merely instrumental.  
In consequence, it is not surprising that their discourse should also refer to the role they once 
played in Chinese society. That was the case, for example, during a demonstration in front of the 
Harbin city hall where a group of retired people waved a placard saying, “I’ve given my youth to 
the Party. Today I’m old – but the Party doesn’t even give me any leftovers. I’ve asked my chil-
dren for money, but they’re all out of work.”34 More generally, many retired people feel nostalgia 
for the Mao era, when the city was prosperous. A former employee of a pharmaceutical factory 
in Shenyang says, “The reforms have done nothing but destroy the city’s enterprises. Before, we 
were rich; now we’re just about scraping a living.” These former heroes of the building of social-
ism are bitter. They think the government has deceived them, and that it no longer respects its 
workers or retired people. 
                                                 
33 FBIS-CHI-94-108, 19, 6 June 1994, Zheng Ming no 200, 1 June 1994. 
34 Interview Harbin (Oct 2001). 
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The urgency of the workers’ plight also serves to justify their resort to demonstrations and their 
short-circuiting of the official channels for complaint. We are obviously not suggesting that this 
urgency might be faked, but that it is put forward as a justification for demonstrating. This ur-
gency makes it easier for working-class mobilization to have a kind of legitimity. The revolts are 
presented as founded on despair, which implies that they are spontaneous: angry outbursts, with 
no ulterior political motives. In proclaiming their poverty, demonstrators are not defying author-
ity; they are merely expressing the fact that they are hungry. Faced with such a demand, of 
course, the authorities are embarrassed. Cheng Feng (2000) reports a comment from a Chinese 
union leader that amply reveals the dilemma in which they find themselves: “If they repress 
these demonstrations, the government would appear indifferent to the condition of the working 
class and would create even more resentment among the workers.”  
By playing on the official ideology, the urgency of the situation and the lack of formal organisa-
tion of their movements, the workers have not only managed to have small scale protest tolerated 
by a system hostile to mobilizations it doesn’t itself control, but sometimes they also succeed in 
forcing the authorities into negotiations, and win a few concessions. Confronted by this kind of 
workers’ demonstrations, the authorities find themselves trapped.  
2. Features of the groups mobilized: retired people out in strength 
Beside the repertoire used by the workers to express their claims, it is interesting to analyze the 
sociological profile of those who are mobilized. Several researchers have pointed out the high 
proportion of retired people in these movements, but there is no doubt that Hurst and O’Brien 
(2002) were the first to throw a clear light on this primary characteristic. They focused their 
analysis on what motivates retired people to demonstrate, advancing two significant factors. The 
first relates to the symbolic importance of breaking a pension agreement, while the second is 
based on the pattern of existence open to this fringe group within the urban population. I shall 
take up here both of these two elements, following them up and then bringing them into my cho-
sen perspective.  
Basing their study on interviews with unemployed and retired people, O’Brien and Hurst (2002) 
show the importance of how their interviewees perceive their pension agreements. For a number 
of them, any breaking of this contract legitimizes, or could legitimize, their taking to the streets 
to preserve their pension rights. It is true that, for those involved, and for a considerable propor-
tion of the urban population, non-payment of pensions is perceived, not just as illegal, but also as 
immoral. Urban dwellers’ sympathy with retired people’s demonstrations is manifest. Whereas 
there are many of them who would heed to the authorities’ advice on the necessity for unem-
ployed people to seek a new job, the battle of retired people is seen as a just cause. Even several 
heads of enterprises, during interviews conducted in the Northeast, told me firmly that paying 
out pensions was for them a priority, ahead of paying wages as a whole or paying taxes. It is of 
no consequence here whether such declarations of intent were actually put into practice. The city 
authorities in Shenyang, being very aware of the problem, have created jobs for retired people so 
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as to provide them with a small income. It must be said that demonstrations by retired people are 
a daily event in that city. 
Thanks to this wide public support, retired people’s claims are not perceived as aimed at main-
taining a few ancient corporatist privileges, but as just and morally right. Workers’ complaints 
have slipped into the field of social morality, and this is also noticeable with the demonstrations 
against corruption. These last are attended by people of more diversified social backgrounds, 
even though retired people still play a central role in them.  
Another very interesting argument advanced by O’Brien and Hurst (2002) relates to the life-style 
of the militants. Based on the work of Doug McAdam, in particular, it starts from the following 
premises: 1. - Demonstrating takes time, 2. - Those with some practical experience of demonstra-
tions are more ready to turn out again. In the Chinese context, it is the younger pensioners who 
combine both these characteristics. They have the time, and also the experience of workers’ mili-
tancy that they acquired during the Cultural Revolution (Perry and Li 1997). Unemployed peo-
ple, being younger, and having family responsibilities, cannot gamble on the unpredictable re-
sults of mobilization, which, moreover, in the Chinese context, is still a high-risk activity. To 
survive, they have no other choice but to find an income, being sometimes forced to migrate. 
The young retired people and the early retired, as well as having time and some experience of 
demonstrating, also enjoy political near-immunity by reason of their age, and because they em-
body, more than anyone else, the “reality” of the building of socialism. Knowing that the au-
thorities are uneasy about cracking down on this former avant-garde, which is still carrying the 
banners of socialism, it is easier for them to go out on demonstrations. It is hardly surprising then 
that, even in the largest demonstrations, there is always a strong contingent of retired people 
playing a leading role in the movements and their organization. Thus, the presence or the use of 
retired people takes on a strategic dimension. As with the huge demonstrations in Liaoyang, 
most of the leaders arrested were retired or nearing retirement. At Daqing, after the arrest of 
workers’ representatives, the responsibility for handing over a petition demanding their release 
fell to a pensioner in a wheel-chair. In the course of such demonstrations, old women play a dy-
namic role, chanting the most radical slogans or dramatising their plight by appealing on their 
knees to the authorities. In addition to this strategic use of retired people for their immunity to 
criticism, the demonstrators bring out the old and infirm to advertise the immoral attitudes of the 
authorities. In other words, it is the rank and file who put themselves forward in these demon-
strations, reminding people that they are acting, not in the field of political opposition, but sim-
ply in that of complaint. Those in power find themselves almost obliged to respond paternalisti-
cally to their demands, while controlling and preventing the development of autonomous organi-
zations.  
3. Movements without leaders? 
Workers in the state sector are not favorably placed for organizing their own movements. Even if 
the role of the official trade unions is changing a bit, they usually do not provide adequate com-
munication channels for workers’ demands (Feng Cheng 2003). Admittedly, this has not always 
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been the case: at the start of the reforms, in particular, after the unions were reinstated during the 
1980s, they were more outspoken in their criticism and their protests demanding greater auton-
omy from the Party (Perry 1995). In addition, during the 1989 upheavals, certain sections of the 
union movement also rallied to the students’ cause, but they have since then been brought back 
in line. Today, the unions only rarely support the demands made by state workers 35.  
Being unable to protest through the official channels, a few workers in Shenyang have tried to 
develop new organizational structures. As the crisis deepened within the state enterprises, these 
new organizations took the form of informal workers’ networks of mutual aid. Their stated ob-
jectives were minimalist, since their only aim was to collect donations to help out the most im-
poverished families. To make sure that no Polish-style situation could develop, the official union 
took care to take control of these self-help networks and to carry out their tasks themselves. To-
day, the central authorities will not allow any autonomous organization to develop in any sector, 
and most particularly not in the trade union field. They will crush any attempt at forming an 
autonomous union. 
The workers, being unable to rely on existing organizational structures, or to form new ones, 
have very narrow margins for manoeuvre in organizing their movements. Therefore, even though 
the demonstrations are widely tolerated, they have not led to new organizational structures, such 
as autonomous unions. It must be acknowledged that the people in power have succeeded in 
confining protest to the informal networks within enterprises. To be tolerated at all, a workers’ 
movement must appear to be spontaneous and limited to a single enterprise. With no visible or-
ganization or leadership, it thus falls within this margin for manoeuvre that the Party today 
leaves open to the state workers. 
Of course, such an appearance of spontaneity does not in itself explain how demonstrations come 
about, since any social movement, in order to exist at all, must have a certain level of organiza-
tion, social networks and a collective identity (Tilly 1976, 1986).  
Once these movements increase in size, however the Chinese government seeks out and arrests 
“leaders”. Is that the proof that these movements are better organized than they allow to appear? 
Cai Yongshun (2002), basing himself on a field study, takes the view that the leaders of these 
movements are generally minor officials who put their skills to the service of such movements. I 
would rather support the idea that these movements are still barely organized at all, and that they 
mainly rely on the significant networks that unite members of a single plant as well as on their 
strong group identity. This is all the more likely since today’s demonstrators are able to call upon 
the skills offered by new legal advice centers, usually largely independent or run by a few law-
yers involved in labor issues. It is true that all across China you now find in almost all provincial 
capitals centers, which are often opened by a Law School Professor sponsored by his university 
employer and the local authorities. Wuhan University thus has established a Center for Protec-
tion of Rights of Disadvantaged Citizens. Due to the presence of volunteers and the financial 
support of some foreign governmental cooperation agencies or NGOs involved in a Human 
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Rights programs in China36, the access to these centers is usually almost free. They are of course 
not directly involved in any worker protests but do sometimes help them to formulate their 
grievances in informing them of their rights. Also through meetings held both inside China and 
abroad, the main animators of these centers, often sponsored by the same foreign organization or 
agency, get to know each other and have the opportunity to share their experiences among them-
selves. I’m not saying that they add up to a new kind of dissident network. They are all acting 
strictly legally but are symptomatic of the political transformation that is affecting the Chinese 
regime from below. 
In the absence of leaders or sophistical formal organization in these movements, what should be 
emphasize is the strength of the group identity that has been able to develop in the confined loca-
tions of the Chinese work unit (danwei). It is known that in China, the role of the SOE was not 
(and still is not) limited to a given person’s type of work. Group identity was the basic politico-
social structure to be found in urban life, and it still performs a vital function in the cities. Work 
units or danwei, by regrouping in a single location both workshops and living quarters divided 
the city’s workforce into a great number of largely autonomous cells, thus contributing to a 
fragmentation of their social life. Today, this subdivision of urban areas has consequences on the 
structure of dissent. It may well contribute to fragment it, but paradoxically, it also favors its 
emergence (Lee 2000).  
The networks built within a danwei cut across the various social strata represented within it, be-
cause it is founded not only upon the horizontal solidarities forged on the shop floor but also up 
on loyalties associated with family, generation or patronage. People get married within their 
danwei, while the individuals in each age group once sat on the same school benches before their 
paths diverged. Without forgetting the very real oppositions that may exist between management 
and employees, we should also stress the vertical networks cutting across hierarchical structures.  
The existence of such vertical networks means that information travels very quickly; in such a 
place, nothing is really secret. In the case of many demonstrations, it has been noted that the 
workers or retired people were reacting to a piece of information that had reached them. In sev-
eral cases the spark had been ignited by the contents of a handwritten anonymous poster de-
nouncing some particular manoeuvre by the management. In addition there have been demon-
strations in response to concessions offered by the authorities themselves. Thus, shortly before 
the 1999 National Day, an article in the Shenyang newspaper announcing a special payment for 
the city’s unemployed and retired people triggered several demonstrations.  
The function of the social networks cutting across the danwei also helps us to understand the 
central role played by retired people in these mobilizations. Indeed, at the present time, with the 
danwei rapidly decomposing as economic and social organisms, the retired people act in some 
way as their life blood. For young people, forced into seeking redeployment outside its walls, the 
danwei has gradually lost any meaning; but things are different for those retired or forced into 
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eral relationships but I am particularly impressed by the work done by the three Scandinavian Countries 
in this field. 
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early retirement, who still spend most of their time drinking tea in the factory yard and chewing 
over their grievances. The danwei, their own danwei, had been and still is their whole life. 
Whereas, in most countries of the world, unemployed and retired people quickly lose contact 
with their workplaces and cannot use this type of network for mobilization, things in China are 
very different. The workers continue to live on the factory grounds; and unemployment or re-
tirement has virtually no consequence on their social roots. For those without work, the danwei 
remains a space for living and socializing. They do not need to form new networks to organized 
demonstration. The structure of the danwei thus explains how demonstrations have arisen in a 
political context where any autonomous organization is strictly forbidden. This is true at least in 
the relatively large and formerly well organized danwei. In many smaller enterprises, the com-
munity doesn’t have a high chance to survive long after the collapse37. 
We know that, in any social movement, someone must make the decision to write a petition, and 
someone must organize the gathering of signatures: these are not in any case illegal activities. 
Yet, to do these things, the workers in state enterprises may, even though the initiative is still 
clearly theirs, apply to these new legal advice centers that are springing up in many large Chi-
nese cities. In other words, the workers can rely on these new outside resources to draw up their 
list of complaints, help them compose letters, or organize their arguments. Thanks to the exis-
tence of these centers, the movements do not have to draw on their own resources for legal and 
procedural skills.  
Conclusion 
Apart from describing the mechanisms of mobilization and the form taken by these movements 
(operating within a restricted space that prevents them from challenging the regime’s authority or 
even its political thinking), how may we explain how state workers have come to this form of 
action? Before their “political” awakening, they were not unresponsive to change. By dint of 
their own resourcefulness and a few fiddles, they were developing redeployment strategies to 
bring in extra income. But, with the coming of “privatization” among the state enterprises, con-
straints, controls and redundancies were inflicted upon state employees, putting an end to their 
humble strategy for coping with the transition. Up until then, they had been relatively spared; 
now they have to confront a situation that is socially very difficult. 
However, the harshness of their plight cannot by itself account for the mobilizations. They are 
part of a wider context, the transformation of governance itself. The workers mobilize thanks to 
their widening access to legal procedures and possibilities. The complaints procedures, however 
inefficient, illustrate the willingness of the Chinese government to find new solutions to social 
conflict. Accordingly, the state’s relatively tolerant approach to these demonstrations indicates 
that it intends to invent a new and central role for itself, that of arbitrator in the struggles of a 
society in transition. 
                                                 
37 Thanks to D. Solinger who made me aware of this point. 
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The fact remains that this change has not been matched by the development of organizations 
sufficiently structured and autonomous to transmit social demands. The state, for security rea-
sons, has to cope with social conflict without the benefit of institutional mediation: it is still left 
trying to manage the relations between the government and the people on an individualized ba-
sis. When it comes to the workers’ struggles, this approach leads to the proliferation of demon-
strations, since no structure is in place to communicate people’s most basic demands. The au-
thorities are constantly being taken by surprise; they intervene as each emergency arises. It 
amounts, in the end, to nothing better than a system of crisis management. 
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Regulations of Abortion in Indonesia:  
Securing Whose Interest? 
Wening Udasmoro 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this article is to analyze the impact of the political transition on the regulation of 
abortion during three different eras in Indonesia. It also shows how abortion and women’s repro-
duction have always been objects of the State’s regulations without considering an appropriate 
social security system. In general, the government sees abortion, which is always viewed as a 
woman’s responsibility, as a moral problem that has to be controlled in order to construct what 
they call the “good social morality”. In reality, the regulation on abortion does not only refer to 
the moral questions but imply also other factors relating to the State’s objectives and priorities. 
The three political eras, in postcolonial Indonesia – the Soekarno, Soeharto and Reformasi eras –, 
have regulated abortion in different ways based on their power interests. They have had different 
objectives in their politics that affect regulations on abortion. The problems of economics, 
demographics, nation building and the relations with other powers, such as religious groups in-
side the country and the international world outside the country, have been the basis of the 
State’s consideration in regulating abortion. The interests of women, the most affected group by 
the regulation of abortion, are, however, not considered in those regulations. Based on the above 
situation, it is important to examine how the different priorities and objectives of the different 
eras have impacted on abortion regulation and how the lack of a social security system in those 
different regulations has affected women.  
1.2 Strict Prohibition of Abortion in the Pro-Natal Era  
Soekarno’s era (1945-1967), known also as Old Order era, was established in the post-colonial 
time just after Indonesian independence from the Dutch colonial regime (Ricklefs 1993). This 
era had its particularity in regulating women’s body and sexual reproduction. The regulation on 
abortion was one of the factors that show how the State controlled and organized the female 
body for certain interests. The Penal Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana or KUHP) 
stated that abortion was strictly prohibited. The women or the ones who help them performing 
abortion would be sent to court and punished. There was no tolerance, not even in emergency 
cases.  
The prohibition of abortion, on the one hand strongly referred to the moral and religious teach-
ings. The government and religious leaders were still preoccupied by maintaining the concept of 
sin and criminality of abortion. The important representation of religious leaders and political 
groups in the parliament ensured the respect of these concepts. On the other hand, however, the 
abortion prohibition was related to the State’s objective for national reproduction. Soekarno’s 
government was known as a regime that emphasized the spirit of nationalism (Anderson 1993) in 
order to maintain Indonesian independence in its discourses and politics. His government called 
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for ‘revolution’ which meant a struggle of all of Indonesian people against Western neo-
colonialism (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung 1959). Population growth was considered as a solu-
tion for ensuring the national defence (Koentjaraningrat 1994).  
In order for this pro-natal policy to succeed, the government supported by religious leaders and 
groups encouraged women to participate in nation building by giving birth to a lot of children. 
The government perpetuated the existing slogan, such as ‘a lot of children, a lot of fortune’. The 
aim was to emphasize that the participation of women in enlarging the population was not only 
useful for themselves and their families in ensuring their economic position in the future but also 
for helping the nation ensure its integrity. With the strong spirit of nationalism in this era, Indo-
nesian women, especially those who lived in Java, responded to the call and gave birth to an 
average of five to six children. As a result, the population increased rapidly. In 1950 the popula-
tion was estimated at 77.2 million; in 1955 at 85.4 million (Ricklefs 1993) and according to the 
National Census dated 31 October 1961 (United Nations 1966), the population was 96.3 million 
in Indonesia.  
This policy had an impact on the practices of family planning and abortion, which both 
Soekarno’s government and religious leaders rejected. The rejection was related to a cultural 
aspect, as discussing sexuality was a taboo at that time, but also contained political and ideologi-
cal aspects. Each of them had different discourses related to this interdiction but arrived at the 
same terminology about controlling women’s reproductive function. Soekarno and the national-
ists accused family planning programs as part of Western propaganda to limit the manpower of 
non-western countries. They stated that it was against the revolution of the nation. Religious 
leaders argued that according to Islamic teaching the modern method of contraception were seen 
as refusal of the natural obligation for reproduction and considered this as a threat for the regen-
eration of human beings. It was against religious rule and thus sinful (Hull 1974).  
In 1957, an organization named Indonesian Planned Parenthood Association (Perkumpulan Ke-
luarga Berencana Indonesia or PKBI) was founded. This organization is the offspring of the In-
ternational Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), which was concerned about the “population 
bomb” and pioneered family planning campaigns internationally. However, PKBI was not au-
thorized to actively promote the use of contraceptive methods (Koentjaraningrat 1994). It was 
only allowed to promote the health and hygienic systems in the society. Related to abortion, the 
Penal Code became not only the basis of consideration from a juridical point of view but also for 
reinforcing the idea of procreation. The Soekarno government saw women as a symbol of fertil-
ity and obliged them to continue the pregnancy in any circumstance. There was a common un-
derstanding in the society that the struggle of women to give birth to children was seen as natural 
and even a jihad (holy war). A woman who died due to her pregnancy was seen as sacrificing 
herself for the child. The law that did not give any tolerance even for sick women or the ones in 
the emergency cases shows how their struggle for procreation was an obligation that passes over 
their essential rights for life. As a result of such policy, there was no possible health system pro-
vided for those who needed abortion services. The State did not even assign any hospital to help 
women whose lives were in danger because of their pregnancy. On the contrary, women and 
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health providers performing abortion were becoming the victims of the law. Many of them were 
sent to court and jail. To avoid the juridical pursuit, the traditional medicines (jamu) and the help 
of secret traditional healers (dukun bayi) then became the solutions of women with unwanted 
pregnancy.  
Thus, during this era, women and their bodies were placed in the central of solution for national 
morality and integrity. Abortion long considered as a threat to religious teachings’ stability be-
came more taboo with this pro-natal policy. In other words, the religious teachings about sin and 
criminality of abortion supported the pro-natal policy and this policy reinforced the concept of 
sin and criminality of abortion. This policy resulted to the total absence of health system and 
protection for women who wanted or had already an abortion.  
1.3 Restrictive Abortion in the Era of Population Control  
Abortion was regulated differently during the Soeharto era (1967-1998), also known as the New 
Order era. Basically, the Penal Code was still applied as law to criminalize abortion. However, 
there were other regulations during Soeharto’s 32 years in power. Firstly, in 1992, the govern-
ment created the Health Law 1992, with article number 23 stating that “certain medical proce-
dures”, a term to replace the word abortion, were tolerated based on medical grounds (Hull et al. 
1993). Secondly, since the 1970s, the government informally tolerated menstrual regulation in 
certain clinics for married women in cases where contraceptive methods had failed. Menstrual 
regulation, known also as induced abortion, is a termination of pregnancy practiced before ten 
weeks of pregnancy (Moeloek et al. 1989). The Health Law and the Penal Code were applied 
together since 1992. Although different regulations existed the continued presence of the Penal 
Code implies the resistance of government to challenge the status quo whereby society and reli-
gious leaders and groups still believed in the criminality of abortion. On the other hand, the in-
formal menstrual regulation practices show how abortion was also utilized to solve another prob-
lem, namely population control. The political system adopted by Soeharto’s government had as 
its main objective accelerating the development of the nation. That era aimed to build Indonesia 
as a prosperous nation where economic improvement was considered of paramount importance 
and the focus of government’s policy.  
In the New Order era the huge population of the country was viewed as a hindrance for the de-
velopment plan. In order to reduce the population, the modern contraceptive for family planning 
was accepted. Unlike Soekarno, Soeharto’s government was known as pro-Western (Sundhaus-
sen 1997:466). With the cold war the ‘West’, especially the United States, had political interest 
in Indonesia as one of the important countries in Asia. To attract Indonesia’s attention, they pro-
posed development program assistances. The New Order received substantial financial and tech-
nical assistance, notably from the USAID (United States Agency for International Development) 
and also from other international institutions like the World Bank and the United Nations Fund 
for Population Activities (Chapman 1996:3; Hull & Hatmadji 1988). The government provided 
an annual budget of 153.3 million Rupiah and 1,131 million Rupiah for 5 years for family plan-
ning programs (Mochtar & Syarwani 1990). 
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In order to legitimate the population control policy, the Soeharto government convinced religious 
leaders and society in general with the famous slogan of having a “small happy and prosperous 
family”. The slogan referring to the good of the family engendered acceptance from religious 
leaders. It became a successful strategy because family happiness was part of the objectives of 
the society and also the general discourse in religious teachings. Besides, the small space given 
to religious leaders and groups in politics (Bourchier & Hadiz 2003) obliged them to follow gov-
ernment’s regulations. In 1970 the government established a new organization called National 
Family Planning Foundation to implement the national program of family planning in the coun-
try (Lembaga Keluarga Berencana Nasional or LKBN). In the early 1980s the organization 
changed its name to the National Family Planning Co-ordination Board (Badan Keluarga Beren-
cana Nasional or BKKBN). With the support of Golkar (the ruling party in the New Order), civil 
servants and also the presence of military forces that had the task to ensure the participation of 
women in family planning programs, and thus the number of family planning acceptors in-
creased. In 1973-1974 there were 14,037 adherent groups; there were 90,065 in 1978-79, and in 
1983-84 this number had doubled to reach 184,191 groups (BKKBN 1986). The total fertility 
rate between 1967 and 1970 was averaged at 5.6 births per woman; the estimated figure for early 
1990s has fallen to 2.99 (BKKBN 1992).  
However, because the number of women experiencing contraceptive failure was significant, the 
State practiced an informal regulation that allowed married women having this problem to un-
dergo menstrual regulation. Since 1973, the Raden Saleh clinic – a specialist clinic for training 
and research in family planning at the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Indonesia – intro-
duced this abortion method (Djohan et al. 1993). The Jakarta police informally authorized this 
practice. Other clinics, such as the clinics of Indonesian Planned Parenthood Association, named 
Panca Warga, also performed such a service (Djohan et al. 1993). The PKBI had several clinics 
all over Indonesia but notably in the big cities. The religious leaders did not have any complaint 
or comment about this service. The fact that this regulation was authorized informally made its 
practice discretionary and accessible only to certain women, such as the ones living in the cities 
or middle and upper class women (Udasmoro 2003). This non-transparency and the limited ser-
vice were intentionally directed at avoiding the widespread practice of abortion in society. Nei-
ther the Soeharto government nor religious leaders chose to openly debate about it. For the gov-
ernment, the success of family planning was essential because the budget provided for this pro-
gram was very high. It is possible that abortion was considered as one of the crucial ways for this 
program to succeed. For the religious leaders and groups, the limited service of abortion was 
acceptable, on the one hand as a solution to limit the access to abortion and avoid the understand-
ing in society that abortion for family planning was permitted, and on the other hand as a way to 
(discretely) support the government population control program. The government and the reli-
gious leaders legalized this kind of abortion as win-win solution.  
Restriction on the practice of abortion was used to minimize conflict within the society in gen-
eral and especially with the religious leaders and groups that still attached the idea of criminality 
to abortion. The special tolerance given aimed to ensure the success of national development and 
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population control program supported by the international organizations. However, this politics 
of compromise had failed to achieve the objectives. The particular clinics tolerated to offer the 
service were too small compared to the total number of abortion in Indonesia. The number of 
abortion was estimated at 1,5000,000 (Tjitarsa 1993) cases per year, whereas the majority was 
performed illegally against health and safety regulations, by traditional healers and unauthorized 
doctors. As a result of this policy, poor women, especially those who lived in the marginal re-
gions, and unmarried women were the most affected groups. Married women who were ignorant 
of the existence of the service became also victims of the regulation. Because of this lack of 
knowledge about the services they could not access safe abortion, while those who knew about 
its existence could not and afford the cost of it. This practice contributed to the deterioration of 
women’s health.  
1.4 Attempts to Redefinition of Abortion in the Era of Democratization 
The regulation of abortion is facing a new challenge in the era of reformasi (1998-present). The 
new political system in which democratization is the main objective of the nation brings the 
regulation of abortion to a new front. The authoritarian bureaucratic-military vision of the State 
and society that dominated the Soeharto era has been replaced by a greater emphasis on civil 
society and increased political parties’ participation as the primary focus of order and stability 
(Rabasa & Chalk 2001). The parliament in the democratic sense of the word is perceived as hav-
ing more power and legitimacy than any other time since the 1950s.  
The regulation of abortion in this period is not yet clear because the government is still relatively 
young and in the process of reconstructing many aspects of politics, including abortion. How-
ever, recently the parliament showed a more favourable and co-operative attitude towards the 
amendment of abortion law as advocated by women’s organizations under the umbrella of the 
Women’s Health Foundation (Yayasan Kesehatan Perempuan or YKP). This group and the par-
liament have prepared the draft of the new law on abortion to be inserted in the New Health Law. 
In this new draft law, abortion is perceived from the specific concern of the health of women. 
Health is defined in terms of the physical, psychological and also social health of the women. It 
means that pregnant women with psychological problem and in the case of rape should be given 
the choice of abortion. The draft was revised six times and in February 2004 before it was finally 
accepted by the factions in the parliament (Widyantoro 2004), including the Islamic parties’ fac-
tions who were convinced by the importance of women’s health and the argument that certain 
Islamic schools authorized abortion before 120 days of pregnancy. However, this draft of law 
still needs the approval from the government or and especially the Department of Health that still 
refuses abortion except on medical grounds.  
The regulation of abortion is more challenging for the government because there are different 
demands from many different groups and institutions. The fact that the government is trying to 
find an appropriate and reliable form of democracy that Indonesia should adopt allows different 
interest groups to insist on their demands. One of the important aspects of democratization un-
derstood by the Indonesians is to be free to express opinions. As a result, the government and 
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certain religious groups no longer monopolize the regulation of abortion but some other groups 
insist on their rights to express their arguments and representations. The birth of various 
women’s Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) marks the demands for the improvement of 
women’s position in many aspects, such as economics, social, politics and human rights, includ-
ing abortion. The government in its policies considers these NGOs, usually claiming they are in 
line with international institutions regulations, such as the WHO and other United Nations or-
ganizations. Besides these NGOs also religious figures that had small space during the Soeharto 
era are now reappearing and trying to regain their power and legitimacy. Various Islamic groups 
declared different perspectives about many issues, including abortion. Moreover, the fact that 
Indonesia is still economically dependant on the West, especially the United States, provokes 
more complicated political decisions that the government has to take.  
The issue of abortion is therefore placed in a problematic situation. First, inside the country, the 
parliament, women’s groups and certain religious groups and parties accepting the possibility in 
Islam to view pregnancy as beginning 120 days of pregnancy, attempt to legalize abortion in 
favour of women’s health. However, other conservative religious leaders, such as the Indonesian 
Muslim Leaders Assembly (Majelis Ulama Indonesia or MUI) are insisting on the criminaliza-
tion of abortion. Outside the country, the government is attempting to follow the recommenda-
tions of the International Conference on Development and Population in Cairo in 1994 and the 
Fourth Women Conference in Beijing in 1995, which both discuss women’s reproductive health 
rights and the safe motherhood, but feels at the same time uncomfortable accepting abortion be-
cause of George Bush’s policy on abortion. George Bush, with his re-installation of the Mexico 
City Policy or Gag Rule, clearly emphasized that US will stop all financial support to countries 
or organizations that legalize abortion. This statement worries the government. 
This problematic situation results to the non-acceptance of the Draft of Health Law sent by the 
parliament. There are no changes related to the regulations of abortion. Apart from that, the in-
formal practices of abortion by clinics that provide menstrual regulation continue in the big cit-
ies. The procedure involved becomes an obstacle for unmarried women to have safe abortion. 
Women, who can afford the cost of abortion financially, look for the possible services in secrecy. 
Being attracted by this business, the unauthorized doctors who perform abortion for high prices 
are more difficult to control. The absence of regulations on the sale of medicines at pharmacies 
obliges the poorer women to perform self, but unsafe, abortion. The rate of women’s mortality 
caused by unsafe abortion keeps on increasing. Women’s bodies are still in the battlefield and in 
the problematic situation where the State’s is trying to find a compromise that can fulfil the de-
mand of all of the groups concerned. Although democratization has been attempted, other inter-
ests are still the preoccupation of the State especially in the case of abortion. Finally, the interest 
of women, regarding questions of health and rights, are overpowered.  
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1.5 Conclusion 
From the above discussion, it can be deduced that women’s bodies and reproductive functions 
have been used by the State in the three different eras in order to fulfil its national objectives. 
The question is not only whether abortion is allowed or not in the Indonesian society but also if it 
is useful or not for the State’s interests. The significant changes of government regulations on 
abortion with the building of nation show how women’s bodies are staged as the property of 
power. The changes of the eras influence certain changes of regulations but primarily in the prac-
tice of abortion. The body of woman is used to fulfil the needs of each era in order to achieve 
their objectives without considering women’s essential and individual rights. The most important 
issue to emphasize is that State’s position regarding the regulation of abortion is influenced by 
various aspects, such as for minimizing the conflict with religious groups inside the country or 
pursuing good relations with the international community, but less so by for women’s interests. 
The position of women is marginal, which put them in the unfavourable place while ignoring 
their need for safe abortion. As a result, we can conclude that there is no era that focuses on the 
question of women’s health system for women’s individual interest and rights. Women with 
unwanted pregnancy still have to find the services of abortion - mostly in clandestine and unsafe 
ways - by themselves.  
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When Social Security Reaches its Limits.  
Long-Term Care of Elderly People in Urban Indonesia 
Peter van Eeuwijk 
Introduction 
For more than two decades, most countries in the South have undergone a fast and fundamental 
‘health transition’ (Caldwell 1993; Wilkinson 1994). In Indonesia, demographic change is very 
rapid, and the country can be classified as an exceptionally fast ageing society (Hugo 2000; 
Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta 2003). Epidemiological transformation leads to a new general 
health profile due to a distinct shift from acute infectious diseases to chronic non-infectious ill-
nesses and injuries (Departemen Kesehatan 2002; Koesoebjono and Sarwono 2003; van Eeuwijk 
2003c). Urbanisation along with migration processes is in full swing in Indonesia and will lead 
in a few years to a society whose majority will soon consist of urban citizens (WHO 1998; van 
Eeuwijk 2003b). Moreover, change of lifestyle goes along with these processes and leads to new 
socio-cultural forms such as altered nutritional habits, work patterns or household composition 
and living arrangements (van Eeuwijk 2003a). The dynamics of ‘health transition’ show two 
distinct characteristics in societies in the South such as Indonesia: firstly, they show an amaz-
ingly high temporal speed, and, secondly, they affect an extraordinarily high number of people 
(van Eeuwijk 2004).1 One has to wonder whether existing structures and current developments in 
Indonesia are still sustainable under the weight of these gigantic transformations. Furthermore, 
we should not forget the crucial fact that since 1997/8 Indonesia is still passing through a far-
reaching economic crisis, which has hit the hardest the urban masses.2 
The nature of care and long-term care 
Based on the dynamics of ‘health transition’ in Indonesia and with regard to wellbeing and social 
security of elderly Indonesians, Hugo (2000: 318) has referred to the growing social and eco-
nomic unreliability this age group is facing in contemporary Indonesia. Against the background 
of his assumption, van Eeuwijk (2002: 25) has formulated a ‘triangle of uncertainty’ for urban 
elderly in Province North Sulawesi, our research area3, which is made up of three corners: 
1. social uncertainty: filial piety and kinship obligations are no longer guaranteed; 
2. economic uncertainty: the material and financial support system is not reliable anymore; 
                                                 
1 In comparison with ‘health transition’ in Europe and North America, 100 to 150 years ago. 
2 See for example Koesoebjono and Sarwono (2003) for their analysis of how the economic crisis has 
affected elderly people in Indonesia. 
3 The research study ‘Growing Old in the City’ lasted 3 years (2000-2002, 2003) and consisted of an in-
ternational and interdisciplinary research team (6 members from Indonesia and Switzerland: 4 anthro-
pologists and 2 medical scientists). The principal research approaches came from Medical Anthropology 
and Public Health. The Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF) has co-financed this research project. 
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3. health uncertainty: apart from communicable diseases, urban elderly are increasingly vulner-
able to non-communicable diseases as a result of, for instance, expanding lifespan, changing 
lifestyle and altering socio-economic conditions. 
Care 
Both formal and informal care schemes for elderly people in urban environment are strongly 
influenced and shaped by this triangle. In fact, elderly care occurs mostly under these insecure 
conditions, even though we may not neglect and underestimate the resources, capabilities and 
resiliences of elderly people. Accordingly, Phillips (2000) has identified elderly care as one of 
the most urging problems of the ageing process in the Asia-Pacific area, and he clearly advises 
against ”the potential dangers of over-reliance on informal and family sources“ (2000: 5). Hel-
man, a British medical anthropologist, concludes that the rapid ageing resulting in an increasing 
number of chronically ill elderly ”will require a major shift in the medical paradigm […] – a shift 
from ‘cure’ to ‘care’“ (2000: 8). The main question that arises from this framework is: how can 
appropriate elder care be provided under the circumstances of unreliable social networks, eco-
nomic shortage, a rapidly growing number of elderly people – including a steady increase in 
number of chronically ill elderly – and of hardly existing formal welfare structures? 
Niehof describes ”care as both attitude and practice“ (2002: 181) that involves talking about and 
acting as well as intending to do it. As a consequence, she frames care as a process or dynamic 
that consists of four interconnected phases (Niehof 2002: 181):  
1. caring about: assessing need for care and calling for attention; 
2. taking care of: assuming responsibility for the need for care and assigning the kind of 
agency; 
3. care-giving: meeting the need for care and representing competence to give care; 
4. care-receiving: assessing the appropriateness of care and calling for responsiveness. 
Van der Geest (2002: 8) calls these phases a process ”moving from awareness and intention to 
actual practice and response“. Care is according to him a ”process that sustains life“ and which 
represents ”the moral quality of life“ (van der Geest 2002: 8): In other words, a society with a 
certain moral standard and claim has the obligation to provide adequate care for its members. 
In her framework of ‘care arrangements’ Niehof identifies five different levels where care takes 
place, namely on the individual, household, community, state and market level (Niehof 2002: 
184). The household – as core care provider in most societies – is in fact the main unit of analy-
sis. Nevertheless, every country or society reflects its own pattern of care arrangement depending 
on the flow of resources and contributions in care and on the corresponding level that receives or 
provides it. Finally, Phillips (2000) broadens the scope of what care encompasses. From his 
view, care is not only understood in the sense of covering health matters, but also social care, 
housing, material welfare and religious well-being.4 
                                                 
4 See for instance Keasberry (2002) and the many facets of elder care in rural Yogyakarta. 
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Long-term care 
Following the definition of Phillips and Chan (2002: 3), long-term care incorporates health mat-
ters, personal care and social services that are provided at home and in the community over a 
longer period for an adult who lacks or has lost his/her capability to care fully for him-/herself 
and to maintain his/her independence. Both authors underscore the heterogeneity of present-day 
elderly that results in very different long-term care needs, which can change abruptly and drasti-
cally. A second important point concerns the process of rapid feminisation of ageing (van Eeu-
wijk 2003a): A lot more old-aged women – and the majority of them are elderly widows – are 
and will be in need of long-term care than elderly men (Phillips and Chan 2002), and, on the 
other hand, women are highly dominant in care-giving practices including elderly women as 
main caregiver. Both aspects call for a gender-sensitive approach in long-term care research as 
well as in long-term care program implementation. Niehof succinctly concludes (2002: 181): 
”The whole [care] process is gendered.” 
In the past, family and kin units in Southeast Asia took generally care of elderly people with 
severe ill health, physical and mental disabilities and functional impairment and thus in need of 
long-term care and existential support; long-term care was provided by mostly younger family 
and kin members, and the majority of caregivers were women (Leung 2000). Filial piety, kinship 
obligation, responsibility and respect towards the elder family member were considered to be 
normative integral parts of informal, family- and kin-based care arrangements between children 
and their elderly parents (van Eeuwijk 2003a). With progressing ‘health transition’ leading, for 
instance, to new family structures, new household compositions, to women’s work outside the 
home and smaller numbers of children, the capacity of caring for frail elderly becomes increas-
ingly limited (Leung 2000), and attitude and engagement of children concerning their generous 
readiness of providing long-term care are in change (Keasberry 2002). Kreager (2003: 12) analy-
ses the present-day situation in Indonesia as follows: ”We should not succumb to the cosy as-
sumption that where there are children, they can be counted.” In this context, Niehof (1995: 434) 
introduces the important term ‘negotiation’. This means that particularly in bilateral kinship sys-
tems elder care and support were and are not per se assured and reliable: They have to be negoti-
ated and re-negotiated for every case and from time to time, which all the more applies to long-
term care where the position, capability and power of bargaining shape old-age vulnerability. But 
as Schröder-Butterfill (2003) and Marianti (2002) clearly show in their studies on Java (Indone-
sia), even under bad (health and socio-economic) conditions elderly still have care alternatives in 
their wider environment and ample scope in mobilising resources and capacities as social actors 
and not as victims of circumstance. 
Study area 
The Province North Sulawesi had a total population of 2.8 million inhabitants in 2000. The three 
selected urban locations reflect different degrees of ethnic and religious heterogeneity and vary-
ing stages of urbanism. Metropolitan Kota (Municipality) Manado (388.000 inhabitants) repre-
sents a very heterogeneous population regarding religious affiliation, ethnic diversity and socio-
economic distribution; provincial Kecamatan (District) Tahuna (29.000 inhabitants) shows a 
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rather homogeneous population (but spatially separated: Sangihe and allochthonous Tidore eth-
nic group) and semi-urban Kecamatan Tomohon (74.000 inhabitants) a very homogeneous com-
position (Minahasa ethnic group) (van Eeuwijk 2003b, 2005). 
In 2000, North Sulawesi Province has shown an average life expectancy at birth of 68.5 years 
(national: 67.97), and 7.7 per cent of its population (national: 7.6) have reached 60 years or more 
(Kantor Statistik 2001; Departemen Kesehatan 2002; Koesoebjono and Sarwono 2003).5 On 
political community (Kelurahan) level, our seven samples range from a very ‘young’ age struc-
ture (with 2.9 per cent of elderly citizens ≥60 years) up to communities with a markedly ‘aged’ 
population (13.4 per cent respectively). 
While there are old people’s homes in North Sulawesi, a stagnation of number of homes and to a 
certain extent of inmates could be observed between 1990 and 2000 (see Table 1) (Kantor Sta-
tistik 1991, 2001). In 2000, private providers run eight homes, the government provides only 
three houses. 
TABLE 1: Number of homes for elderly people (panti werda) and number of in-
mates in Province North Sulawesi, Indonesia 
 1990 1996 2000 
Number of homes 
for elderly 
10 homes: 
• 2 state owned 
• 8 private owned 
11 homes: 
• 2 state owned 
• 9 private owned 
11 homes: 
• 3 state owned 
• 8 private owned 
Number of in-
mates 
385 elderly: 
• 49 men 
• 336 women 
514 elderly: 
• 122 men 
• 392 women 
533 elderly: 
• 102 men 
• 431 women 
 source: Kantor Statistik, 1991, 1997, 2001 
There is a significantly high proportion of female inmates in these homes (on average 77 per cent 
between 1990 and 2000, see Table 1), which is a first strong indication that the absolute number 
of elderly women is increasing (in comparison with that of men) and that a certain number of 
aged women can no longer fully rely on their informal care networks. As a matter of fact, 98 per 
cent of our elderly respondents (men and women) were very reluctant to enter an old people’s 
home arguing that as long as they have children and own a house, they would never enter such 
an institution on their own free will. 
Urban elderly and long-term care in North Sulawesi Province 
The number of urban elderly people who are currently in need of any sort of long-term care is 
quite high: of totally 75 households (with at least one ill elderly) of our sample in three different 
cities, 40 households (or 53 per cent) have at least one elderly member who needs intensive care 
                                                 
5 According to Abikusno (2002), a proportion of older people (≥60 years) that exceeds 7% on province 
level in Indonesia indicates an ageing society, which applies also to the Province North Sulawesi. 
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over a period of more than one month (see Table 2). Ill elderly in the remaining 35 households 
did not suffer from chronic illnesses and were not in need of long-term care. There are no sig-
nificant variations in terms of urban locality. 
TABLE  2: Number of households with an elderly person who is currently in need of 
long-term care  
 
Total 
N=75 
Manado 
(N=25) 
Tahuna 
(N=25) 
Tomohon 
(N=25) 
Yes 53% (40) 44% (11) 64% (16) 52% (13) 
No 47% (35) 56% (14) 36% (9) 48% (12) 
 source: field research PvE 
 
Therefore, long-term care is not an uncommon and infrequent phenomenon in elder care in this 
urban environment. Beside other constraints of daily life in a town, a majority of these house-
holds have to bear this burden of long-term care and perform it in a mostly informal way that is 
without support or advice of professional caregivers. We may thus conclude that long-term care 
belongs for the most part to the lay realm of the family or household. 
Socio-demographic characteristics of long-term care receivers 
The urban elderly who are in need of long-term 
care (N=40) are characterised as follows (van 
Eeuwijk 2003b: 331). The average age was 69 
years.6 There was about an equal number of men 
and women, but three times as many widows as 
widowers. The respondents’ religious and ethnic 
affiliation reflects the overall distribution in the 
respective towns. In terms of economic means, 15 
aged persons had less than about 50.000 Rupiah7 
to spend per week, and six elderly had no money 
of their own and fully depended on their family or other relatives. 12 people had more than 
50.000 Rupiah and seven even more than 100.000 Rupiah per week to spend. 
Health profile of ill urban elderly 
The health profile of the ill elderly reflects the predominance of progressing chronic illnesses 
such as vision problems and rheumatism (see Table 3): They gradually lead the sufferer into 
long-term care. These disturbing and hindering illnesses have indeed a strong impact on mobility 
                                                 
6 The lower age limit for inclusion in the study was 60 years. This corresponds with the official definition 
by the Indonesian Department of Health of orang lansia (an acronym for orang lanjut usia, ‘people of 
advanced age’) (van Eeuwijk 2003c). 
7 1 US$ is equivalent to 9.500 Rupiah (in 2001/2). 
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and agility, autonomy and independence as well as on individual activity of the individual eld-
erly and they lead finally to a gradual loss of these important urban necessities (van Eeuwijk 
2003b, 2003c). With diminishing vision and limited body movement, for instance, caused by 
painful rheumatism or post-stroke paralysis, most activities of daily living (ADL) cannot be per-
formed any longer in a proper way and have to be carried out more and more by other persons: A 
first level of dependence is reached. 
TABLE 3: Kind of illness leading to long-term care for ill elderly (multiple mentioning)  
Illness Total N=40 
MANADO
(N=11) 
Tahuna 
(N=16) 
Tomohon 
(N=13) 
Eye complaints, vision problems 23 (57%) 8 7 8 
Rheumatism 17 (42%) 4 8 5 
Gastritis, stomach troubles 10 (25%) 2 6 2 
Bronchial asthma 8 (20%) 4 3 1 
Hypertension 7 (17%) 2 1 4 
Migraine 7 (17%) 2 4 1 
Post-stroke paralysis 6 (15%) 2 3 1 
Diabetes and obesity 6 (15%) 3 3 -- 
Dental problems 4 (10%) 1 2 1 
Physical weakness 3 (7%) 1 1 1 
Chronic cough 3 (7%) -- -- 3 
Other health disorders 7 (17%) 3 3 1 
 source: field research PvE 
Other degenerating illnesses such as hypertension, diabetes or gastritis are less bodily impeding, 
but demand for a strict care regime leading, for instance, to a change in nutritional behaviour and 
drug compliance. Chronic illnesses and 
infectious diseases with chronification are to a 
great extent responsible that elderly become 
dependent on long-term care (see Table 3) and 
by this increasing at the same time their social 
and economic dependencies. Besides, we may 
not forget that most elderly in our sample (32 
of 40 ill elderly) suffer from co-morbidity (i.e. 
suffering from more than one illness): Apart 
from chronic illnesses, they also suffer 
regularly from ‘common’ acute infectious 
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diseases such as malaria, dengue fever and diarrhoeal diseases.8 
Caregiver arrangements 
The most frequent caregiver type in our study sample is a combination consisting of a wife (of a 
male elderly) and a child (see Table 4). A child alone – in most cases a female one – takes care 
of the elderly in 15 households, and the wife alone provides intensive care in 10 cases; the ar-
rangement of husband and (female) child is also found in nine cases (see Table 4). Other care-
giver types encompass other kin members such a sister, grandchildren or daughter-in-law even 
though not very frequently found (see Table 4). This is due to the fact that long-term care is con-
sidered to be a very intimate process, and hence a certain social closeness is a prerequisite for 
effective long-term care. 
TABLE 4: Types of caregivers (per household with chronically ill elderly) providing main 
long-term care 
Type of Caregiver Total N=75 
Manado 
(N=25) 
Tahuna 
(N=25) 
Tomohon 
(N=25) 
Wife + child 17 3 7 7 
Child 15 7 6 2 
Wife 10 3 2 5 
Husband + child 9 2 5 2 
Sister 3 -- 2 1 
Child + grandchild 3 3 -- -- 
Husband 2 -- -- 2 
Child + daughter-in-law 2 1 -- 1 
Child + sister 1 1 -- -- 
Wife + sister 1 -- 1 -- 
Sister-in-law 1 -- -- 1 
Housemaid 1 1 -- -- 
Child + housemaid 1 1 -- -- 
Grandchild + housemaid 1 1 -- -- 
Wife + child + grandchild 1 1 -- -- 
Wife + child + niece 1 1 -- -- 
No caregiver at all 6 -- 2 4 
 source: field research PvE 
Hardly ever husbands alone take care of their own wife. Non-kin persons who are paid for their 
services such as a housemaid or a nurse are rather seldom until now but it may become a real 
                                                 
8 This phenomenon is called the ‚double burden of disease’ (van Eeuwijk 2003b, 2003c). Gwatkin, Guil-
lot and Heuveline (1999) consider this ‘double health challenge’ a distinct characteristic of impoverished 
segments of a population. 
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option for the future particularly for better-off elderly people. Six cases do not have any care-
giver due to deliberate alienation or exclusion from their families, or due to natural loss of all 
family members. These particular elderly had to cope alone with this situation 
In most households (69 per cent), a combination of inter- and intragenerational long-term care 
support (i.e. wife or husband and child) has become a new and frequent pattern of care giving 
(see Table 4). Many Minahasa and Sangihe elderly underline the normative adat customs9 by 
emphasising that until recently the child as symbol of filial piety and bearer of care obligations 
had the important role as single important caregiver; but today most elderly persons prefer to rely 
on both the children as well as on a member of the same age group when in need of long-term 
care. Therefore, we come across the fact that healthy elderly people become increasingly care-
givers for frail elderly of their same age (e.g. an elderly wife takes care of her old ill husband). A 
second matter concerns an obviously gendered long-term care: As Table 4 shows, the majority of 
the caregivers are female (including the ‘child’). We may thus conclude that long-term care does 
not only form a part of the realm of the household, but particularly also of the sphere of the 
women, no matter whether old or young. 
Provided activities in long-term care 
Several main activities of provided long-term care that are carried out by the above listed care-
givers can be classified as common activities of daily living (ADL) such as washing clothes, 
dressing and bathing the elderly and giving him/her food (see Table 5). For elderly people in 
need of long-term care these activities are of particular vital importance because it guarantees 
hygiene and cleanliness as well as bodily strengths of the weak elderly. Without maintaining 
these routine tasks by the caregivers, human ageing would become a process without dignity and 
hope. 
                                                 
9 The Indonesian adat means unwritten and mostly not codified rules, precepts, customs, and rules of 
conduct. Its broad scope includes local law as well as traditional ritual and ceremony (van Eeuwijk 1999: 
6). According to Minahasa adat, parents’ care obligations among siblings have to be ideally performed in 
a rotational cycle (paayoan) starting with the eldest married child. 
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TABLE 5: Main activities of long-term care (per household with at least one elderly person) 
provided by caregivers (multiple mentioning) 
Main Activities of Long-Term 
Care 
Total 
N=150 
MANADO
(N=50) 
Tahuna 
(N=50) 
Tomohon 
(N=50) 
To wash clothes 110 (73%) 37 37 36 
To give drugs 106 (71%) 39 34 33 
To give food and drink 103 (69%) 45 26 32 
To console and give recreation 98 (65%) 46 29 23 
To massage the body 84 (56%) 23 26 35 
To dress or change clothes 62 (41%) 24 14 24 
To accompany to toilet 59 (39%) 25 16 18 
To bath the elderly 58 (38%) 22 16 20 
To put the elderly to bed 42 (28%) 19 10 13 
 source: field research PvE 
Certain practices are directly interconnected with the illness episode, such as giving drugs and 
providing a massage10, and may not become a routine activity when the elderly has already re-
covered; but during long-term care, for instance, giving drugs is very crucial and manifests the 
moral responsibility of caregivers towards the recipients of care. Furthermore, the immaterial 
psychological activity of consoling and giving recreation is a very essential one, and 65 per cent 
of the caregivers are willing to provide this important emotional and mental support that has a 
great impact on perceived ‘quality of care’ and social inclusion. Table 5 also shows the follow-
ing pattern: The more intimate the activity is (e.g. going to the toilet or bathing), the less frequent 
the suffering elderly allows his/her caregivers to carry out this task. Culture-specific notions on 
gender-related behaviour and bodily proximity play an essential role. The elderly person tries to 
maintain the ability to carry out these very personal actions on his/her own as long as possible. 
Caregivers and the burden of long-term care 
The great majority of caregivers are willing to provide even intensive, stressful and laborious 
long-term care for their elderly family and kin members as Table 5 and the below-mentioned 
case reveal.  
The case of Ibu T., 71 years, Minahasa, Catholic, widow, hemiplegic: 
Ibu T. had already suffered two heart attacks in one year. After the second attack, her son 
brought her to the Catholic hospital but she was sent home after only two weeks. After long dis-
putes and harsh negotiations her three children had decided that the oldest child, her son, would 
                                                 
10 Body massage is a very popular preventive and curative practice in Indonesian households; it is defi-
nitely not found among Western routine care activities. 
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put her up. Her right body part was completely paralysed, from face to foot; she could not speak, 
eat, urinate nor move her body. Ibu T. had led until then a very active and independent life. Now 
she found herself suddenly struck down on a thin mattress in a dark stuffy and humid corner of 
the kitchen. Her daughter-in-law took care of her and had become accustomed to keeping an eye 
on her during her daily housework. In the beginning, Ibu T.’s two daughters, her grandchildren, 
sisters and also neighbours came for short visits, but after some weeks, only her daughter-in-law 
took care of her. Ibu T. was suffering soon from decubitus ulcer, she had water in her legs and 
arms and showed signs of depression. She could not eat properly nor sit up and speak anymore. 
On the other side, her daughter-in-law showed physical and mental fatigue and complained about 
the passiveness of Ibu T.’s own three children. Family life and harmony was severely disturbed 
and under permanent stress. After three months, Ibu T. started suffering from heavy pains in her 
legs and needed professional medications, but her son could not afford it because he had just lost 
his job. Ibu T. convulsing with pain was now crying a whole night long, and only her daughter-
in-law could comfort her. After four months, Ibu T. had another minor heart attack; three-quarter 
of her body were now paralysed and she was almost blind and dumb. It was a hopeless battle 
against the time of dying. Her daughter-in-law remained the only person to bring some water and 
rice gruel three times per day and to wash away the excretions in the evening. In immense agony 
Ibu T. passed away after five months of extremely severe sufferings. The family felt rather re-
lieved after this long time of continuing tensions and stress. 
As a matter of fact, not every long-term care case faces such extreme care situations such as bed-
ridden elderly hemiplegics (see above-mentioned case) or almost disabled and crippled elderly 
where the full range of long-term care activities (see Table 5) has to be carried out. Only five of 
40 elderly (12 per cent) in our sample present such very severe and wretched cases. The scope of 
provided elder care activities encompasses normally four or five of the listed daily actions (see 
Table 5). Nevertheless, lay caregivers have generally experienced the following main burdens 
while carrying out long-term care in their households. 
• Physical burden: the bodily fatigue of the mainly female caregivers (and often young girls) 
increases with the temporal length of provided long-term care. Physical efforts such as to 
dress or undress an elderly or massage his/her body are hard work beside daily routine work. 
In short, long-term care keeps caregivers running and busy in an already exhausting everyday 
life. 
• Economic burden: many caregivers complain about rising financial costs due to long-term 
care. This may include food (often special nutrition) and clothes, costs for medication and 
rehabilitation tools, consumables (e.g. cigarettes) and not to forget the loss of income be-
cause of staying at home. Sometimes, available housing space has to be expanded because of 
an additional person in the house. 
• Social burden: there are interpersonal tensions not only between caregiver and recipient of 
care due to divergent expectations and hopes, but also among the caregivers’ social unit such 
as family, household members and relatives as a result from failing renegotiations about dis-
tribution of obligations. Moreover, the person in need of long-term care may be considered 
 84 
as a foreign body and not accepted by some family members. Sometimes clashes arise be-
tween children and idle children-in-law, but also between a caring housewife and passive 
males (such as husband or son), or moral pressure of relatives on caregivers result in social 
stress through accusations and rumours. 
• Psychological burden: some caregivers are not up to maintaining long-term care when they 
take care of elderly with rapidly degenerating health condition. Hopelessness, despair, anger, 
and the feeling of not being able to cope with these sufferings of the elderly often result from 
it. But also pressure from other kinsmen to be responsible for the current health condition of 
the elderly makes caregivers mentally frail and unconfident. 
• Infrastructural burden: housing space in a crowded city is usually restricted. New housing 
arrangements and dispositions have to be made for an elderly person who needs long-term 
care to guarantee his/her intimacy, reclusiveness, and a certain degree of autonomy. Some-
times, modifications in the house have to be made such as toilet facilities for disabled people, 
ropes or grab handles in the house, or walls for a new compartment. In short, already narrow 
urban housing space is further constricted, and that creates usually tensions between family 
members. 
In fact, lay caregivers in our sample question their competence and capability to care for an eld-
erly sufferer. In most cases, family caregivers did not get any training on how to carry out this 
manifold task of long-term care. Moreover, numerous long-term care cases have happened all of 
a sudden and thus without any preparation of all involved parties. Many caregivers consider par-
ticular fields as ‘spheres of shortcomings’ due to lack of professional knowledge about, for in-
stance, nutritional and dietary matters, physiotherapeutic exercises, hygienic and sanitary meas-
ures, use of rehabilitation tools, and appropriate medication. These deficits in long-term care 
quality reduce the degree of caregivers’ competence and lead in many cases to self-doubts on 
their side. Lay caregivers are thus under strong moral pressure to provide care as satisfactorily as 
possible and to assume responsibility towards both the related social group as well as the health 
professionals. 
As a result of the above-mentioned deficits in lay long-term care and of rather low attendance of 
biomedicine in this domain of care – not cure! – in Indonesia, ”the urban elderly hope for an 
increasing commitment on the part of biomedicine to their persistent chronic illnesses“ (van 
Eeuwijk 2003c: 15). Suffering elderly in North Sulawesi have expressed their high hopes for 
illness recovery and mitigation of their chronic ailments due to an increased attention of bio-
medicine towards long-term care concerns. Indeed, as Lloyd-Sherlock (2002) shows, many 
health planers consider biomedical health services for older people as expensive and complex 
interventions, but for many chronic diseases affordable and satisfactory treatments are actually 
available and acceptable. For example, eye impairment of most elderly people in our sample may 
be cured in a cheap and efficient way (e.g. ambulant ophthalmic surgery) – or they would be 
simply provided with a pair of glasses. Moreover, some chronic illnesses of elderly people in 
North Sulawesi may be preventable in an earlier stage if biomedical services would provide in-
formation about adequate treatments for both recipients of care as well as caregivers and facili-
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tate access to it. But we should not succumb to the cosy assumption that biomedicine will fully 
replace existing social, economic and psychological lay care of elderly in North Sulawesi, but 
rather may act as proactive complementary health provider. 
Old-age vulnerability and long-term care 
When focusing on the term ‘vulnerability’, I agree with the following conceptual definition of 
Blum, McNeely and Nonnemaker (2002: 28): “[We] refer to ‘vulnerability’ as an interactive 
process between the social contexts in which a young person lives and a set of underlying fac-
tors, that, when present, place the young person ‘at risk’ for negative outcomes.”11 This defini-
tion advances Chambers’ basic concept of ‘vulnerability’ (1989: 1) by combining a negative 
event in someone’s environment with his capability to cope with it (or even not). Watts and 
Bohle (1993) further elaborate the vulnerability model that is based on the initial notion of ‘risk’; 
they define ‘vulnerability’ in terms of exposure to strains or crises, of capacity to cope with ad-
versity, and of potentiality of suffering serious consequences in an event of a crisis and recover 
from it (Watts and Bohle 1993: 118). This view rests upon the notion that someone may be ex-
posed to an unforeseen event, and that he has to react on it and may develop the possibility of a 
slow recovery with internal or external support. 
Moser (1998: 3), when describing ‘vulnerability’, talks of insecurity and sensitivity that encom-
passes also resilience and responsiveness to certain negative changes: Not everybody is affected 
by a negative event in the same way and to the same degree, and some will cope with these con-
ditions and reactivate resources in a positive way, while others will not. 
When talking about urban elderly in North Sulawesi, I understand the term ‘old-age vulnerabil-
ity’ in the context of long-term care as being exposed to uncertain outcomes of long-term care, 
that is to failing long-term care. Particularly vulnerable elderly urban Indonesians suffering from 
chronic illnesses and who are in need of long-term care may be described as individuals who 
may not be provided with adequate and appropriate long-term care, who share the risk of crisis in 
long-term care provision, and who may not recover from this crisis. 
According to our research findings, the scope of vulnerability to failing long-term care regarding 
ill elderly people in urban North Sulawesi is centred on the following domains. 
Marital Status 
Unmarried elderly people are vulnerable to failing long-term care due to the fact that they do not 
have children, children-in-law and grandchildren to provide long-term care: They are simply 
lacking the entire support network of the spouse’s family. Unmarried women are very much vul-
nerable to social exclusion and destitution by not complying with cultural norms (adat) thus re-
sulting in unreliable long-term care because of dependence on insecure intragenerational and 
mostly non-kin support. 
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Gender 
Older women are more vulnerable 
to failing long-term care than eld-
erly men due to their limited social 
power in bargaining the conditions 
for long-term care strategies (espe-
cially in patrilineal and bilineal 
societies) and by virtue of having 
few own material resources and 
human capital (e.g. education, in-
formation, knowledge). Elderly 
widows are most exposed to failing 
long-term care because of 
relatively unequal status in their 
family and among their spouse’s kin, and they do not feel empowered to challenge their caregiv-
ers. Many older widowers are strongly encouraged by family and kin members to remarry a, 
whenever possible, younger woman. 
Wealth/class 
Poor elderly people (women and 
men) are vulnerable regarding fail-
ing long-term care in terms of 
having only small financial re-
sources and material assets in a 
mostly impoverished environment 
that does not allow appropriate 
long-term care. They don’t feel in 
a position of power to ask for bet-
ter (and mostly more expensive) 
quality of long-term care from 
their caregivers, and access to pro-
fessional health support such as 
needed medication, physiotherapy, check-up or diet is not given due to lack of financial means. 
Bargaining power of poor elderly people is weak, as they cannot participate in relationship of 
reciprocity: They lack the resources and assets to restore and compensate financial burdens of 
caregivers. 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 This definition refers to a ‘young person’ due to the fact that many approaches on ‘vulnerability’ were 
first developed in studies on adolescents. Nevertheless, this definition applies implicitly also for elderly 
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Social capital12 
Elderly people (women and men) with a low degree of trust, reciprocity, information, and coop-
eration associated with social networks are more vulnerable than elderly with high social capital 
(e.g. performing mutual aid, collective actions, or solidarity support). Elderly who don’t develop 
bridging and bonding networks during their lifetime are likely to be excluded or omitted from 
existing informal vertical and horizontal social networks providing long-term care for them (such 
as family, relatives, neighbourhood, associations, or age groups). 
Caregivers 
Elderly people (women and men) suffering from long persisting chronic and multiple health dis-
orders are likely to be vulnerable to diminishing appropriate long-term care. Caregivers tend to 
reduce their long-term care efforts with increasing health deterioration of the elderly sufferer in 
connection with temporal length due to growing physical, economic, social, and psychological 
burden. With increasing severeness and duration of chronic illness frail recipients of care be-
come more dependent on caregivers, and accordingly long-term care becomes more uncertain 
and unreliable due to rising burdens for caregivers. 
Conclusions 
Sources of old-age vulnerability of failing long-term care encompass not only structural condi-
tions (such as marital status) and physical and material circumstances (for instance, illness sever-
eness and economic hardships), but also social realities such as gender and social capital. We 
may conclude that vulnerability regarding long-term care is based both on structural facts as well 
as on notions, attitudes, practices and modes of behaviour that may lead to increased or dimin-
ished vulnerability in old-age. 
The most vulnerable elder group or elderly individuals regarding failing adequate and appropri-
ate long-term care provision are needy unmarried women and impecunious widows. Where pro-
vision and implementation of long-term care for frail elderly is the outcome of pragmatic and 
harsh negotiation and regular re-negotiation among various family and kin members such as in 
bilaterally organized Minahasa and Sangihe society, old women, particularly elderly unmarried 
women and aged widows, share a weak position of bargaining power due to cultural attitudes 
(adat) regarding gender and marital status. With regard to the ‘triangle of uncertainty’ in North 
Sulawesi, the Minahasa and Sangihe household is not a ‘safe shelter’ for frail elderly females: 
Access to health as well as to adequate long-term care decreases with increasing age and accord-
ing to their sex (van Eeuwijk 1999, 2003a). 
In all but a tiny fraction of cases, long-term care and its activities are provided and performed in 
the realm of the family and household that is in the lay sector. In North Sulawesi, formal state-
run or private institutions provide only a very few professional long-term care options. Women 
                                                                                                                                                             
people. 
12 Putnam (1995) describes ‘social capital’ as parts of social organisations such as networks, norms or 
social trust, that enable coordination and cooperation among people for mutual benefit. 
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(adults and adolescents) are undoubtedly the main caregivers and thus the immediate bearers of 
most long-term care related burdens. This fact makes caregivers vulnerable to manifold con-
straints that may lead to failing long-term care. In short: recipients of care are vulnerable due to 
the vulnerability of their caregivers. This correlation between vulnerability of recipients of care 
and vulnerability of caregivers is seldom addressed in literature on elder care. 
The current context of a dynamic, but harsh urban environment shapes long-term care and its 
forms and degrees of vulnerability. Social and economic constraints are present in caregivers’ 
burdens, in provided long-term care activities as well as in bargaining power of frail elderly. 
Monetized city life makes long-term care a commodity and therefore impecunious elderly vul-
nerable to failing long-term care because of lack of financial bargaining power: Respect and 
reciprocity are interrelated in commoditized urban life. With rapidly changing social, economic 
and physical environment in urban areas of North Sulawesi resulting in a ‘triangle of uncer-
tainty’ old-age vulnerability is increasingly influenced by the monetary abilities of both recipi-
ents of care as well as caregivers. 
But urban environment creates also new forms of long-term care which may lead to a more re-
source and resilience oriented perspective in ‘old-age vulnerability’ discussion thus counterbal-
ancing the frailty of elderly people facing long-term care (Blum, McNeely and Nonnemaker 
2002: 28). As a matter of fact, resources of elderly (as receiver of long-term care) are not yet 
fully recognized and utilized by their caregivers and taken into consideration. Vulnerability of 
failing long-term care can be reduced by, for instance, supporting salutogenetic behaviour, in-
spiring abilities, activating ‘ageing spiritedness’, and networking in social matters. In the latter 
case, intragenerational support will gain importance as a future resource in old-age vulnerability: 
Elderly individuals or groups support other old individuals who are in need of long-term care – a 
phenomenon that has been rarely investigated. We have met this ‘elderly help elderly’ situation 
in urban areas of North Sulawesi where non-kin relation in elderly care becomes more and more 
essential. In times of changing support schemes, this ‘same age group’ network may reduce old-
age vulnerability by mobilizing resources of the elderly as caregiver. 
Acknowledgements 
I wish to thank Romana Büchel, Annuska Derks, Susanne Loosli and Sue Thüler for the perfect 
organisation of the Workshop ‘Social Security in Southeast Asia’ in Berne in November 2004. 
Many thanks go to the Institute of Ethnology (University of Berne) that has facilitated the reali-
sation of this Workshop. I am indebted to Romana Büchel for her skilful editing of this paper. 
  
89
References 
Abikusno, Nugroho 2002: Sociocultural Aspects of the Aged: a Case Study in Indonesia. Asia Pacific 
Journal of Clinical Nutrition 11 (3, Suppl.): 348-350. 
Blum, Robert William, Clea McNeely, and James Nonnemaker 2002: Vulnerability, Risk, and Protection. 
Journal of Adolescent Health 31 (15): 28-39. 
Caldwell, John C. 1993: Health Transition: the Cultural, Social and Behavioural Determinants of Health 
in the Third World. Social Science and Medicine 36 (2): 125-135. 
Chambers, Robert 1989: Vulnerability, Coping and Policy. IDS-Bulletin 20 (2): 1-7. 
Departemen Kesehatan 2002: Profil Kesehatan Indonesia 2001: Menuju Indonesia Sehat 2010. Jakarta: 
Departemen Kesehatan Republik Indonesia. 
Eeuwijk, Peter van 1999: ‚Diese Krankheit passt nicht zum Doktor’. Medizinethnologische 
Untersuchungen bei den Minahasa (Nord-Sulawesi, Indonesien). (Basler Beiträge zur Ethnologie Nr. 
41). Basel: Wepf. 
Eeuwijk, Peter van 2002: Ageing and Health in Urban Indonesia. Urban Health and Development Bulle-
tin 5 (3/4): 25-31. 
Eeuwijk, Peter van 2003a: Alter, Gesundheit und Health Transition in den Ländern des Südens. Eine 
ethnologische Perspektive. In: Lux, Thomas (ed.): Grundlagen der Ethnomedizin. Kulturelle 
Dimensionen von Medizin. Ethnomedizin – Medizinethnologie – Medical Anthropology. Berlin: 
Reimer. 228-250. 
Eeuwijk, Peter van 2003b. Urban Elderly with Chronic Illness: Local Understandings and Emerging Dis-
crepancies in North Sulawesi, Indonesia. Anthropology and Medicine 10 (3): 325-341. 
Eeuwijk, Peter van 2003c: Growing Old in the City. IIAS Newsletter 32: 15. 
Eeuwijk, Peter van 2004: Altern und Gesundheit in Städten Indonesiens. Medizinethnologische For-
schung zu ‘Health Transition’. Tsantsa 9: 123-126. 
Eeuwijk, Peter van 2005. Elderly People with Chronic Illnesses in Urban North Sulawesi (Indonesia). 
Media Kesehatan 1 (1): 17-23. 
Geest, Sjaak van der 2002: Respect and Reciprocity – Care of Elderly People in Rural Ghana. Journal of 
Cross-Cultural Gerontology 17: 3-31. 
Gwatkin, Davidson R., Michel Guillot, and Patrick Heuveline 1999: The Burden of Disease among the 
Global Poor. Lancet 354: 586-589. 
Helman, Cecil G. 2000: Culture, Health and Illness. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Hugo, Graeme 2000: Lansia – Elderly People in Indonesia at the Turn of the Century. In: Phillips, David 
R. (ed.): Ageing in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Policies and Future Trends. London: Routledge. 
299-321. 
Kantor Statistik 1991: Sulawesi Utara dalam Angka 1990. Manado: Kantor Statistik Propinsi Sulawesi 
Utara. 
Kantor Statistik 1997: Sulawesi Utara dalam Angka 1996. Manado: Kantor Statistik Propinsi Sulawesi 
Utara. 
Kantor Statistik 2001: Sulawesi Utara dalam Angka 2000. Manado: Kantor Statistik Propinsi Sulawesi 
Utara. 
Keasberry, Iris N. 2002: Elder Care, Old-Age Security and Social Change in Rural Yogyakarta, Indone-
sia. Wageningen: Wageningen University. 
Kleinman, Arthur 1980: Patients and Healers in the Context of Culture. An Exploration of the Borderland 
between Anthropology, Medicine, and Psychiatry (Comparative Studies of Health Systems and Medical 
Care Nr. 3). Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 90 
Koesoebjono, Santo and Solita Sarwono 2003: Managing the Elderly in a Crisis Situation. In: Ananta, 
Aris (ed.): The Indonesian Crisis: A Human Development Perspective. Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies. 382-416. 
Kreager, Philip 2003: Understanding Elderly Vulnerability in Indonesia. IIAS Newsletter 32: 12. 
Leung, Edward Man-Fuk 2000: Long-Term Care Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region. In: Phillips, David R. 
(ed.): Ageing in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Policies and Future Trends. London: Routledge. 82-
92. 
Lloyd-Sherlock, Peter 2002: Aging and Health Policy: Global Perspectives. In: Lee, Kelley, Kent Buse, 
and Suzanne Fustukian (eds.): Health Policy in a Globalising World. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 195-207. 
Marianti, Ruly 2002: Surviving Spouses: Support for Widows in Malang, East-Java. Amsterdam: Univer-
sity of Amsterdam. 
Moser, Caroline 1998: The Asset Vulnerability Framework: Reassessing Urban Poverty Reduction 
Strategies. World Development 26 (1): 1-19. 
Niehof, Anke 1995: Ageing and the Elderly in Indonesia: Identifying Key Issues. Bijdragen tot de Taal-, 
Land- en Volkenkunde 151 (3): 422-437. 
Niehof, Anke 2002: The Household Production of Care. In: Butijn, C. A. A., J. P. Groot-Marcus, M. van 
der Linden, L. P. A. Steenbekkers, and P. M. J. Terpstra (eds.): Changes at the Other End of the Chain: 
Everyday Consumption in a Multidisciplinary Perspective. Maastricht: Shaker Publishing. 179-188. 
Phillips, David R. 2000: Ageing in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Policies and Contexts. In: Phillips, 
David R. (ed.): Ageing in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Policies and Future Trends. London: 
Routledge. 1-34. 
Phillips, David R. and Alfred C. M. Chan 2002: National Policies on Ageing and Long-Term Care in the 
Asia-Pacific: Issues and Challenges. In: Phillips, David R. and Alfred C. M. Chan (eds.): Ageing and 
Long-Term Care: National Policies in the Asia-Pacific. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
1-22. 
Putnam, Robert D. 1995: Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital. Journal of Democracy 6 
(1): 65-78. 
Schröder-Butterfill, Elisabeth 2003: ‘Oh, it’s nothing, I’ve just cooked too much’. Patterns of Kin and 
Community Support. IIAS Newsletter 32: 13. 
Suryadinata, Leo, Evi Arifin, and Aris Ananta 2003: Indonesia’s Population: Ethnicity and Religion in a 
Changing Political Landscape. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Watts, Michael J. and Hans G. Bohle 1993: Hunger, Famine and the Space of Vulnerability. Geojournal 
30 (2): 117-125. 
WHO 1998: World Atlas of Aging. Kobe: World Health Organization, Centre for Health Development. 
Wilkinson, Richard G. 1994: The Epidemiological Transition: from Material Scarcity to Social Disadvan-
tage? Daedalus 123 (4): 61-77. 
List of plates 
Plate 1: An obese elderly lady with diabetes and hypertension is still carrying out daily work in her 
household (Tahuna). 
Plate 2: Suffering from severe rheumatism, arthritis and visual impairment, this lady (at the right side, 
with her granddaughter and a neighbour) just manages to guard her daughter’s kiosk (Tomohon). 
Plate 3: For weeks and months, this hemiplegic elderly lady (with water in her joints) is lying immobile 
on her mattress (Tomohon). She is not the described widow in the case study. 
Plate 4: In a market gardening project: life is work for this elderly widow who suffers from asthma, 
rheumatism and hearing impairment (Tahuna). 
Plate 5: Some income generating activities of an elderly couple (Manado): the husband (suffering from 
rheumatism and hypertension) works as tailor, and his wife sells plantains. 
  
91
"And I ended up in Switzerland” 
Biographies of Indonesian Migrant Women 
Anna Bally 
 “Some journeys had destinations of   
which the traveler was unaware...” 
(R. Hubank 2002: North, 208) 
 
 
”And I ended up in Switzerland”: This statement, which I chose out of a biographical interview 
with an Indonesian migrant woman, might seem rather vague.1 I found this quotation more and 
more apt though in describing some sort of emotional conclusion made by many of the migrants 
I spoke with. Indonesian women stranding here on this strange island called Swis in their mother-
tongue – how did this come about? At first sight, ”ending up in Switzerland” might sound like 
coming to Switzerland by pure chance or personal destiny but not really consciously or on pur-
pose. This woman whom I met twice spoke at great length about her childhood and youth in 
Indonesia (Riau), about her first years of adulthood in Singapore and her difficult marriage and 
migration experiences. When she finally enunciated the above cited words, the tone of her voice 
seemed to convey the ambivalent quality of her emotional journey from curiosity and ambition 
to fearful despair and back again to hope and cautious optimism. 
No (or little) research attention has been focused so far on these emotional journeys of so-called 
”marriage migrants” from Indonesian destinations to Europe, even though there is some research 
with similar topics and methodology on migrants from other Southeast Asian to European coun-
tries (cp. Lauser 2004, on Philippine marriage migrants to Germany). One of the central ques-
tions of my ongoing Ph.D. research project could be stated as follows: Which inner motivations 
in relation to which external conditions led to these adventurous journeys? From which places 
did the women start and at which places did they ”end up"? According to recent notions of 
places as socially constructed, gendered and contingent sites, home as a starting point of migra-
tion as well as abroad as its destination can be analyzed as complex constructions of social-
political and idiosyncratic meaning experienced through everyday practice. As I am most inter-
ested in the migrants own constructions and interpretations of their migration experience, I 
would like to add a more metaphorical quality to the concept of place in using it as an image of 
starting points and destinations, related to individual life histories, fantasies and identifications. 
Like Silvey, who conducted research in South Sulawesi, I am also interested ”in understanding 
how individual interpretations of women’s sexual morality interact with local, household and 
national gender discourses to shape mobility decisions and experiences in a changing economic 
context” (Silvey 2000: 145). 
                                                 
1 This interview was – untypically - conducted in English and not in German or Indonesian or a mixture 
of all three languages. 
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In the late 1980s I stayed in Indonesia for about two years doing field research in a small town in 
the highlands of southwest Sumatra. Today, the various insights resulting from this project (cp. 
Marschall 1995), allow me to identify elements of Indonesian national discourse on marriage, 
morality and gender roles in the Indonesian women migrants narratives. Even if it is impossible 
to conceive of Indonesia as a culturally homogeneous place of origin, we cannot deny that there 
are shared discourses, and traditions. In other words, while one cannot really speak of a common 
origin, there is at the same time a perception of something like common “roots”. Discursive ele-
ments of a collective quality may then be related to change and persistence of individual con-
cepts in the women’s construction of their migration biographies.  
Presently I am working at eight biographical case studies of Indonesian women living in Swit-
zerland. With a ninth woman I am engaged in a long-term psychoanalytically oriented case 
study. My focus lies on the particularities of each migration biography, in consideration of con-
scious and unconscious strategies and identifications. With each of these women I try to (re-
)construct her subjective narrative related to migration. In the interviews they are invited to look 
back as well as ahead. The cases are analyzed as exemplary patterns of marriage migration. Spe-
cial attention is concentrated on the phase from first meeting to finally marrying a Swiss man. 
The main part of the empirical data comprises interview transcripts / protocols of the intensive 
long term case history (around 50 meetings over a period of two years) and of biographical in-
terviews with eight women. Up to now I met these eight women once or twice, but I will meet 
them again for follow-up interviews one year later. In using different methodological ap-
proaches, that is long-term versus short-term and follow-up interviews, the deepened knowledge 
about psychodynamic and social processes shall be combined with a "thick description" of the 
diversity and situatedness of individual migration experiences. 
Being in the middle of my Ph.D. project, research results cannot be described in more detail yet. 
This article shall situate tentative findings from one of the interviews within a rough overview on 
Indonesian migration and mobility in general, as well as on migration of Indonesians to Europe 
and Switzerland. I will first begin with some figures that may embed the individual life histories 
of Indonesian migrant women in Switzerland within a larger context. I will then describe the 
research sample and close this article with a glimpse of one of the biographical interviews.  
The theoretical and methodological focus of my research project lies on the ”inner” experience 
of migration and on migrants as interpretative subjects of their own mobility. I also include as-
pects of social and economic structure, (post)colonial history, citizenship and population studies 
to situate the individual migration projects. Even if one is not inclined to explain individual mo-
bility exclusively according to economic rationalities, data for example on the patterns and direc-
tions of migration flows are helpful to better understand individual agency as related to eco-
nomic and cultural change. 
Today, so-called labour migrants, or more precisely, contract workers, account for the majority 
of Indonesian migration movement. This nation of more than 230 million people (est. 2000) is a 
quintessential labour surplus nation, and one of the world's major sources of unskilled interna-
tional migrant workers (together with Mexico and the Philippines). According to Hugo, a social 
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geographer from Australia, ”the legal labour migration has a number of distinctive characteris-
tics. It is overwhelmingly unskilled and, (…) it is dominated by women. These women are pre-
dominantly employed as domestic workers, with particularly large numbers deployed in Saudi 
Arabia, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore and Hong Kong” (Hugo 2002: 2) Between 1995 and 1999 
the recorded average annual labour migration from Indonesia comprises 288'000 men and 
women, the main destinations being Malaysia and the Gulf region (IOM 2003). ”Even in Malay-
sia, where males have traditionally dominated labour migration (...), females now outnumber 
males among official overseas migrant workers, although males still dominate the larger numeri-
cally undocumented workers” (Hugo 2000: 108). 
During the last decade, Indonesia has faced disruptive economic and political transitions, which 
led to a growing sense of insecurity for the majority of Indonesian citizens. This radical change 
led to some seemingly contradicting effects thereby "differentiating women's and men's crisis-era 
mobility pressures and experiences" (Silvey 2000: 143). Silvey states that in her research area "in 
the Makassar Industrial Zone (...) in Sulawesi, women migrants faced more intense pressures to 
return to their villages of origin, while male migrants were encouraged to remain in the zone" 
(ibid.). The Makassar Industrial Zone at the same time became "a stigmatized place where they 
believe prostitution has grown more widespread over time" (ibid.). 
But at the same time we have recent research that documents a "feminization" of worldwide 
transnational labour migration (cp. Lutz/Morokvasic-Müller 2002). In Indonesia too there is a 
growing number of girls and women every year who do not return to but rather leave their vil-
lages of origin for a workplace in another country. Female workforce seems to be "called back" 
or "sent out" according to complex intersecting reasons and local conditions. 
Perhaps indirectly due to the 1997 financial and economic crisis, international labour migration 
is receiving an unprecedented amount of government attention. This may be related to the fact 
that the crisis has drawn greater attention to the remittances brought in by migrant workers. 
Hugo (2002: 5) states that: 
International migration will increase in significance in Indonesia over the next decade. The con-
tinuing effects of the economic downturn after 1997 and the associated devaluation of Indonesian 
currency has made working overseas an even more attractive proposition to Indonesians. This is 
being recognized by the government, which is becoming more involved in deploying workers in 
other countries with the objective of increasing foreign exchange earnings, improving the skills of 
its workers, and reducing unemployment and underemployment at home. While several million In-
donesians have benefited, especially in a financial sense, from international labor migration, many 
others have been exploited and suffered abuse because of the lack of simplicity and high formal 
and informal costs of movement, inadequate preparation, and a lack of support in destination coun-
tries."  
Estimations of remittances sent to Indonesia by Indonesian migrant workers abroad range from 
1,29 billions to almost 2 billions of US dollars per year for the period of 1999-2002 (IOM 2003). 
A considerable part of these estimated remittances was brought in by women. These women 
often work under precarious conditions – first of all in Saudi Arabia. They work as domestic 
servants, domestic work being an area where labour legislation does not even considers work as 
subject to labour law protection. ”The 1988 and 1993 'Broad Outlines of State Policies' (Garis-
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garis Besar Haluan Negara: GBNH) refer to women as sumber (daya) insani (living resources) 
who will contribute to development in line with their essential nature” (Wagemann 2000: 312). 
So, on the one hand, ideas on the morality and nature of women are adaptable to a changing 
world when it seems necessary to the different social actors, male or female. On the other hand, 
strict moral rules are applied by communities and political actors in a selective way to control 
women and to reserve employment possibilities for the male, as shown in the example of domes-
tic work migration to and from the Makassar Industrial Zone.  
As already stated above contract workers main destinations outside Indonesia are Malaysia, 
Singapore and Hongkong and the Gulf states. If we now focus on more general migration 
patterns, including not only contract workers, but also more permanent forms of migration, what 
do we see here regarding favorite destinations? 
Table 1  
Indonesia-Born Migrants in Selected Nations 
Country Year Number Source 
New Zealand 1996 2'715 N.Z. Census of 1996 
Australia 2001 47'158 ABS 2001 Census 
USA 2001 72'000 US Census 
Bureau Current 
Pcp. Survey 
Canada* 
 
2001 10’455 Migration Policy Institute 
2004 
Japan 1999 16'400 OECD, 2001 
Korea 1999 13'600 OECD, 2001 
Netherlands 1999 168'000 OECD, 2001 
Germany* 2002 12'295 
("Foreigners" of Indone-
sian origin) 
Federal Statistical Office 
Migration Policy Institute 
2004 
Switzerland* 2000 2'410 Swiss Census 2000 
BfS Neuchâtel 2004 
 (Hugo 2002, 1) * Countries appended by author 
 
Australia and the US are the most favorite destinations for Indonesians outside Europe. ”The 
trajectory of growth of the Indonesia-born population of Australia (…) shows a doubling in the 
last decade (...) The flight of many Indonesians of Chinese origin following the crisis has been a 
factor in this movement” (Hugo 2000, 108). In Europe, the Netherlands as the former colonizer 
of the Indonesian archipelago, not surprisingly show by far the biggest population of Indonesian 
origin. Inflow of Indonesians to the Netherlands has decreased since the 1970s due to legal re-
strictions of immigration, but is still higher than for example to neighbouring Germany. There is, 
however, not much recent research on the topic of migration and integration of the Dutch popu-
lation with Indonesian origin (cp. Willems 2002). The Indonesian population is reputed to be 
fully integrated. This is reflected in the statistical classification of this population. In the Nether-
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lands ”persons with a Japanese and Indonesian background are classified as 'western' on the basis 
of their social and economic position in Dutch society” (Alders 2001, 3). 
Switzerland is not such a historically self-evident destination as the Netherlands; neither is it an 
"easy" destination for Indonesian immigrants. Swiss immigration law is very restrictive and In-
donesian citizen can reside in Switzerland almost exclusively as husbands or wives of Swiss 
citizen. Many of them go through the experience of a deevaluation of their education and of their 
professional and social status. We also do not have any informal sector worth mentioning in 
Switzerland. There are few "side streets" for migrants, and a lot of obstruction and discrimina-
tion. Indonesian migrants, of course, share most of these problems with migrants from other 
countries, who don't speak German or French fluently. Nonetheless, a small but growing group 
of people with Indonesian origin is living in this country. From the 1990s the increase of Indone-
sian immigrants has become significantly higher for women than for men. In the year 2000 there 
were 1,485 female and 925 male living in Switzerland whose citizenship at time of birth was 
Indonesian (BfS Neuchatel 2004). The increase of the female Indonesian population in Switzer-
land since about ten years is probably not (only) linked with crisis and social insecurity in Indo-
nesia; more likely it has to do with mobility and communication possibilities and with social 
change. From the heterogeneity of the Indonesian population in Switzerland we must assume 
that there are growing chances to meet Swiss travellers, anthropologists or business people al-
most anyplace in Indonesia.  
Indonesian migrant women quite often refer to being part of the group of ”Asian people” in 
Switzerland. As I was told many times, there is a sense of belonging to a somehow bigger Asian 
community of people with similar behaviour, sense of humour and cooking. However, the feel-
ing or wish to belong to this imagined Asian migrant community within Switzerland is depend-
ent on situative factors. There also can be emotional trouble linked to the possibility of being 
wrongly identified as an Asian sex worker or a "mail-ordered-bride". As one of my informants 
puts it: "We Indonesians are usually clothed more decently, a little bit more elegant. You can tell 
us apart from Thai women." Stereotypes and phantasies which associate Asian (mail-ordered) 
brides with night club dancers and prostitutes are widespread. Probably every woman of Asian 
looks has to cope with these stereotyping social constructions and/or racist treatment. Although 
my research focuses on women only, it can be assumed that men face stereotyping patterns too. 
Their positions might be different regarding the intersections of the discourses, though. 
An Indonesian women falling in love with or accepting the courtship of a white man usually has 
to go through the task of fighting against the suspicion of bad sexual morality at two places, pro-
vided that she does not want to break with her family. In Indonesia there is a contemptuous dis-
course on the loose or bad sexual morals of white people. White tourists are notorious for being 
clothed indecently, for consuming alcohol and drugs, and for being in search of sexual adven-
tures without any sense of responsibility. An Indonesian woman therefore has to defend and 
prove her own as well as her future husband’s virtue if she falls for a Westerner. Together they 
have to convince her family that he is not a bad person although he is white. After that, the ex-
perience of being confronted with seemingly similar stereotypes is awaiting them in their new 
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home if they migrate to Switzerland. These somehow corresponding discourses speak of con-
tempt or dread and at the same time of fascination, curiosity and desire. Here, we could follow 
the hypothesis of a structural connection between different forms of female mobility (marriage-
migration or love-migration, labour migration, trafficking) and hegemonic patriarchal discourse 
on gender roles (cp. Kappeler 2003). In accordance with this hypothesis, hegemonic post-
colonial discourse, which intersects hegemonic patriarchal discourse, forms a structurally related 
common ground of gendered Southeast-Asian migration. These thoughts will be picked up again 
when discussing one of the interviews. 
Before coming to this interview I will first briefly outline the research sample. The nine women 
were selected out of a sample of twenty women who answered a letter which I sent to 80 women 
married to a Swiss. I chose these 80 women from a list of more than 800 addresses of Indone-
sian-Swiss couples / families, kindly given to me by the Indonesian Embassy in Berne. The 
group of nine women do not constitute a random sample as one can see from the description of 
the procedure. When choosing this group I looked for maximum variance regarding the follow-
ing criteria: age, time of arrival in Switzerland, marital status, motherhood / without children, 
education, work, ethnicity, religion, region of origin in Indonesia, place of residence in Switzer-
land (urban or rural area), and the socio-economic situation. 
The nine women of my sample are between 27 and 46 years old. They stem from families with 
an average number of more than five children and they tend to be the younger ones in their fami-
lies. They come from Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Riau and Bali, two of them refer to themselves as 
being of "Chinese origin". Four of the women are Muslim, four are Catholic and one is a Protes-
tant. The decision to marry a Swiss took them between one and five years. They have lived in 
Switzerland between one and 12 years. One of the informants was brought to Switzerland when 
she was a small child. Today she is 25 years old, married to a Swiss and mother of one child. 
Two of the women remarried a Swiss after they got a divorce from their first husband. Four of 
the nine women do not (yet) have children (belum punya anak) out of different reasons, though. 
Every woman had at least some village-to-town or intra-insular migration experience, three of 
them had travelled to or lived in other countries before settling down in Switzerland. Even 
though the population with Indonesian origin in Switzerland has been qualified as ”mostly un-
educated” by a member of the local Indonesian embassy, census data suggests that the level of 
education and professional training is higher than in Indonesia on the average (BFS Neuchatel 
2004). This certainly is the case regarding my small sample of which only one woman went to 
school for just five years. All the other women finished school (tamat SMA) and have different 
sorts of professional training from university degrees to vocational training either absolved in 
Indonesia, Switzerland or a third country. 
I will now come to one of my case studies. Yati is one of the women of my sample, who comes 
from a neither poor nor wealthy family background. I chose Yati’s migration history because her 
case seemed to be so ”ordinary” at first sight. However, it was the encounter with Yati and her 
narrative which triggered the following thoughts on a psycho-economy of migration and a critical 
reflection of common categorization of migrants. 
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At the second floor of a chalet-like house, at a rather remote place somewhere in the Swiss Alps, 
I was welcomed by a delicate young woman, highly advanced in pregnancy. She was ready to 
talk about her life and stated at the beginning that she too had to do fieldwork during the years of 
her studies. Yati is 27 years old and comes from Sulawesi, where she grew up in a village as the 
youngest of three children. Both parents were teachers and she and her older sister went to uni-
versity in town to become teachers as well. This meant a considerable financial burden for their 
parents over many years. After finishing her studies Yati was waiting for her already assured 
permanent employment and worked on a temporary basis as an English teacher for civil servants. 
In the spring of 1999 she took the ferry boat to visit her uncle. On this ferry boat Yati met a 
white tourist. Apparently there are not so many tourists in this region of Sulawesi. Like all the 
other young Indonesians, Yati was eager to practise her English. Patrick was on a journey round 
the world and Sulawesi was his last destination. 
Yati didn’t let me know a lot about getting closer or becoming lovers. I didn’t expect her to, 
since this was our first conversation. At first, her parents were opposed to the idea of their 
daughter marrying a foreigner. But as Patrick agreed to convert to Islam and since he was such a 
friendly and disarming person, they finally gave the couple their blessings. The marriage took 
place one and a half years later in Switzerland. Yati is pregnant now with their second child and, 
at least to me, seemed happy. 
I admit this might be a projective impression. I experienced the ability and social norm to look 
happy and hide difficult feelings many times during field research in Indonesia. This norm to 
save face and not to burden other people with personal worries does not only apply towards 
strangers, but also towards parents and partners. But nevertheless, Yati talks rather convincingly 
about strategies to overcome (and not to just hide) sad feelings. She is actively engaged in the 
community of neighbors, and she has become a member of the local national costume group. 
When she gets homesick or feels lonely, she practices her religion, calls home or visits some 
Indonesian friends in the lowlands. 
Yati recalls that, with a considerable bureaucratic delay, her teacher's diploma from Indonesia 
was finally sent to her three months after getting married. Yati comments: ”The head teacher was 
still waiting for me [to take my job as a teacher in Indonesia]. He said: You can send a letter and 
say that you will be back within a year. I will be waiting for you!" Yati repeatedly refers to the 
very difficult decision she had to make. From her point of view there was a lot to be said against 
marrying at this particular time in her life. ”If you have a good education, the most important 
thing for us is to work and not to settle down with a family.” A good education is regarded as a 
privilege for most Indonesians. This leads to a sense of responsibility, which includes the wish to 
return what was given to them in the first place. This sense of responsibility fits well to the 
norms of female duties or to the sometimes latent obligations of children towards their families. 
With the respectable profession of a teacher, a woman in Indonesia has the opportunity to remain 
single for quite a long time without automatically risking her good reputation. With Yati’s family 
living at a distance in the village she could have led a less controlled life in the city and earn the 
fruits of her and her parents efforts. As a brilliant and hard-working student supported by a grant, 
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she even would have had the possibility of joining a students’ exchange program in the United 
States. Settling down could have been a prospective goal for somewhere along the way. But 
along came this Swiss tourist.  
Patrick invited Yati to Switzerland so she could give a try to living with him in this country: 
”Yeahh - - for myself, I don’t know, because – we met and fell in love and then I decided to 
come here, to leave.” Two different perspectives on one difficult decision: What did she come 
for and what did she leave? During our conversation I got the impression that she is here in her 
own home now, satisfied with bearing her second child, and at the same time she is still amazed 
at how she got here. 
Well, we know by now that Yati set her professional career aside and followed her husband. Ikut 
suami - following the husband – an accepted expression in Indonesia, quoting at the same time 
common gender roles, Indonesian nation state ideology, and more personal motives that may be 
smuggled into this motto without directly revealing them. 
Like many binational couples, Yati and Patrick decided to live in Switzerland and visit Indonesia 
once a year. Yati herself explained this to be a somehow logical consequence of the different 
economic conditions of the two countries. Yati’s argumentation is widespread and convincing. 
But there are other argumentations too, be it on the basis of economic reasoning, be it by the 
strategy of foregrounding emotional motivations and imaginary aims. Living in Switzerland can 
turn upside down the seemingly simple and logical choice of this country of residence for Indo-
nesian-Swiss couples, at least for some of the women I worked with. One of the women, for ex-
ample, would rather raise her daughters in Indonesia. She believes Indonesia to be the better 
place for her daughters to become ”good decent girls” and to prevent them from moral and 
physical danger. Another woman asks herself why her husband isn’t ready to run the risk of ac-
cepting a different, more unscripted lifestyle in Indonesia together with her and their baby son. 
Two of the women long for their partners to find a job in an Asian or English-speaking country, 
as they don’t see a professional future for themselves in Switzerland. 
It is commonly implied that, on one side, economically motivated migrants would rather follow 
rational strategies of securing a livelihood and that, on the other side, so-called ”love-migrants” 
would follow irrational emotions. What if we try for once to use these rules of differentiation 
when looking at our own strategies of choosing a partner, our own questing for security and 
emotional balance? In western society of today, instrumentality seems to mark bad taste in mani-
fest combination with love, though. We tend to project the more instrumental aspects of love 
onto the other. This other may be an underprivileged, "needy" marriage migrant.  
Even if the level of education in Switzerland on the average is not lower for women than for men 
anymore, there still are certain gendered patterns of choosing a partner. Women still tend to 
choose a partner ranking higher in job-related status and income prospects than themselves. This 
tendency has surely changed for the privileged, for example students, but not for the entire popu-
lation. ”Love” comprises many different wishes and fantasies at the same time. Even if denied or 
unconscious, love is never free of instrumental aspects. Economic goals on the other side are 
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always blended with emotional and symbolic meaning. Making decisions to secure one's liveli-
hood thus might at the same time cover other, namely phantasmagoric goals. We need to allow 
for the fact that fantasies matter and do have real consequences. Then we can no longer interpret 
the choice of a place of residence as just a logic, natural and neutral consequence of different 
economic situations or as based on an irrational concept of romantic love. If we only follow the 
image of either rational, for example economically motivated decision making on one side, irra-
tional and emotional decision making on the other side, we lose something crucial about the 
mysterious complexity of human strategies. In analyzing migrant women’s narratives, I will look 
for these complex and ambivalent entanglements of position / situatedness and desire. Psychic 
motivations, especially identifications and narcissistic goals are important to better understand 
women migrants "agency" in all its shades, be it that as a result this kind of agency seems rea-
sonable to the researcher or contradictory and even unintelligible. 
As a consequence of these thoughts, categorization of migrants become shakier. As a provisional 
result, I regard Yati as being a labor migrant, because childbearing, child raising, doing house-
work and loving is a lot of work. I also look at Yati as a love-migrant, because it somehow seems 
to be the mystery of ”falling in love” that finally led to the decision to leave her country and her 
career behind. I then focus on Yati as a marriage-migrant. At least Swiss immigration law, but 
also Indonesian norms and to some lesser degree Swiss norms forced her to marry. Then I am 
also looking at Yati as an economic migrant, because I believe that she followed her husband out 
of economic reasons too. Finally, I consider Yati as a woman who deliberately chose to migrate 
out of curiosity, with many conscious ideas and unconscious phantasies about her future life in a 
western country. She and her husband followed the deep rooted hegemonic patriarchal and colo-
nial discourse in deciding who has to give up what. So Yati conforms to gendered role patterns 
in following her husband. At the same time she undermines the norms in living another life and 
loving another love than she ever expected to. The follow-up interview in the spring of 2005 will 
show what further changes Yati has gone through. A more specific description of Yati’s life and 
migration history can be drawn only then. Yati, who also landed up in Switzerland, uses other 
words for her own (provisional) emotional conclusion: ”You can’t have everything you want.” I 
would interpret these words as her negation of the still vital wish to have access to all the things 
in which she already invested a lot of emotional, social und financial capital.  
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Migration and HIV Vulnerability in the Mekong Sub-Region1 
Vasoontara Yiengprugsawan 
The United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS in June 2001 states: “The 
[HIV/AIDS] epidemic thrives in settings already marked by high degrees of socioeconomic inse-
curity, social exclusion and political instability. Individuals subjected to those conditions – mi-
grant workers, displaced people, refugees and ostracized minorities worldwide – face much 
higher risks of infection” (United Nations 2001). 
During the past few decades, HIV/AIDS has increasingly become a major global health concern. 
In the globalization era where the notion of territoriality of the nation-state has been blurred, 
there is increasing recognition that population mobility has become one of the factors in the 
spread of HIV/AIDS. However, public perception that migrants constitute a health threat to their 
host communities could lead to discrimination and xenophobia, which in turn could bring about a 
false sense of insecurity to the local population (IOM 2004).  
This paper examines the linkages between migration and HIV vulnerability in the Mekong sub-
region, comprising Cambodia, Laos People's Democratic Republic (Laos PDR), Myanmar, Viet-
nam, Thailand, and the Yunnan Province of China – all of whom share water resources along the 
Mekong River. The unequal and asymmetric development in the sub-region is creating an un-
precedented flow of people, capital, and goods across borders. The Golden Triangle area, which 
connects Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Yunnan, has long been notorious for the production of 
opium poppies and is on one of the major trafficking routes The combination of transnational 
trade in drugs and trafficking in persons has resulted in many parts of the sub-region in becom-
ing flash points of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  
The paper focuses on the specific characteristics of the major migrants and mobile population 
groups. Mobile people are those who “move from one place to another temporarily, seasonally or 
permanently for a host of voluntary and/or involuntary reasons” (UNAIDS 2001: 3). Key mobile 
employment groups in the Mekong sub-region include commercial sex workers, cross-border 
migrants, seasonal workers, traders, uniformed officials, transport workers, fishermen, and sea-
farers. 
From a public health perspective, the key link between human mobility and the epidemiology of 
HIV is not the country of origin of the migrant but the conditions of life during the voyage and at 
the destination (Decosas and Adrien 1997). To understand the spread of HIV in the Mekong sub-
region, it is necessary to take into consideration the prevailing sexual values and the patriarchal 
nature of gender relations in the sub-region. Separation from family and socio-cultural norms, 
isolation and loneliness, as well as a sense of anonymity that offers more freedom make migrants 
                                                 
1 This paper is extracted from my Master’s thesis submitted in 2003 to the Maxwell School of Syracuse 
University, New York. It comprises a compilation and analysis of relevant academic research, including 
qualitative and quantitative studies, reports and publications from government ministries as well as inter-
national and non-governmental organizations. 
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more vulnerable to adopting high-risk behaviors such as engaging in unprotected casual or com-
mercial sex, drug use and heavy drinking.  
A great majority of the migrant workers in the Mekong sub-region are not registered, resulting in 
a lack of legal or social protection, which in turn determines their access to health care, legal 
support, and other forms of assistance. Insufficient language skills and different cultural prac-
tices are highlighted as additional obstacles to migrants’ access to health care services (Haour-
Knipe and Rector 1996). Such restrictions also make it difficult for HIV prevention and aware-
ness programs dealing with migrants and mobile populations to offer suitable services. Below 
follow some of the key findings of my thesis. 
Lack of access to information and health services including HIV/AIDS preventions 
While studies of certain highly mobile groups such as truck drivers, commercial sex workers, 
and traders have contributed to the understanding of migration as a factor in the spread of 
HIV/AIDS, more extensive studies are still required. They should include, for example, examin-
ing access to reproductive health care and services, available opportunities for HIV preventive 
interventions, existing barriers to seeking treatment, and cultural biases. Such studies would pro-
vide essential information for developing interventions that respond to these issues. 
Migrants participatory action methodologies  
It is essential that migrant workers be involved in planning and implementing strategies and ac-
tions as well as in the development of support networks and services in order to reduce the con-
ditions that increase the vulnerability to HIV. The long-term involvement and commitment of 
migrant workers is essential since individuals that are stigmatized and fear discrimination are 
less likely to be willing to share information with people from outside. While peer groups may 
sometimes foster sexual risk taking, they may also serve as reference groups for appropriate be-
havior and as important sources of information about condoms and sexuality. The chances of 
programs increase when the migrants are involved in the research and understand the importance 
for themselves (Wolffers and Bevers 1998). It is therefore of utmost importance to include mi-
grant and mobile populations into mainstream HIV/AIDS programming at the national level. 
HIV-related travel restrictions 
HIV-related restrictions to cross national borders can have negative consequences, such as dis-
criminatory denial of entry, deportation without legal procedures, and fostering racism and 
xenophobia. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have trenchantly argued that no discrimination should be 
made on the basis of HIV status. The International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, 
issued in 1998 by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and 
UNAIDS, state: “[T]here is no public health rationale for restricting liberty of movement or 
choice of residence on the grounds of HIV status. Where states prohibit people living with 
HIV/AIDS from longer term residence due to concerns about economic costs, states should not 
single out HIV/AIDS, as opposed to comparable conditions, for such treatment” (UNHCHR and 
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UNAIDS 1998). The creation of a blanket policy of mandatory testing for and deportation of 
migrants will only create a backlash to the control of HIV/AIDS. 
Intra-regional cooperation in Mekong sub-region 
The development of sustainable responses to the spread of HIV/AIDS requires national govern-
ments to act before HIV/AIDS becomes a high social and economic cost. In the sub-region, 
Thailand and Cambodia have shown that strong government commitment, early and adequately 
funded and targeted interventions can curtail the growth of the HIV epidemic. Addressing issues 
related to HIV/AIDS as it concerns mobile populations also involves co-operative action be-
tween countries, donors, organizations and local communities. Intra-regional planning and im-
plementation across the sub-region will respond more effectively to the challenges posed by the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in the Mekong sub-region.  
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Annex  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: www.magplane.com/html/pdf/6_18_01.pdf 
 
The table shows the estimated number of people living with HIV/AIDS, the percentage of women as 
well as the adult infection rate in the Mekong sub-region. The table aims at giving a comparison of 
the current HIV situations among the different countries in the sub-region.  
 
 Mode of 
Transmission  
Estimated  
number of people 
with HIV/AIDS 
 
Estimated number 
of women with HIV 
(Age15-49, in %)  
Adult 
infection 
rate (%) 
Estimated 
adult and  
children 
death 
Cambodia Heterosexual 170,000 51,000 (30%) 2.6 15,000 
Lao PDR Heterosexual 1,700 <500 (<29.41%) 0.1 <200 
Myanmar Heterosexual/ 
Injecting Drug Users 
330,000 97,000 (29.40%) 1.2 20,000 
Thailand Heterosexual/ 
Injecting Drug Users 
570,000 200,000 (35.09%) 1.5 58,000 
Vietnam Heterosexual/ 
Injecting Drug Users 
220,000 65,000 (29.54%) 0.4 9,000 
Yunnan  Heterosexual/ 
Injecting Drug Users 
840,000 (all PR China) 190,000 (22.62%) 0.1 44,000 
 
Source: Report on the global HIV/AIDS epidemic (UNAIDS 2004). 
Note: Percentage of women with HIV/AIDS is calculated on the estimated total number of people living with HIV. 
The below map demonstrates the geographic setting of the sub-region where six countries are sharing water 
resources of the Mekong river.  
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Securing a Livelihood in Hanoi 
Sandra Kürten 
Introduction 
Since the 1960s research on urbanization in Southeast Asia has focused mainly on the develop-
ment of mega-cities such as Bangkok, Jakarta and Manila. These cities expanded in line with 
national economic growth. Vietnam’s cities, in contrast, passed through a process of socialist 
urban development characterized by stages of “de-urbanization” and “zero urban growth”. 
Moreover the second Indochina War led to a tremendous movement out of the cities. These dif-
ferent pre-conditions make the urbanization process in Hanoi, as experienced in the last decade, 
a particularly interesting topic for research. Hanoi’s more recent urbanization process is closely 
linked to the passing of the Doi Moi policy in 1986. The Doi Moi policy set the stage for a tran-
sition from planned to market economy and led to socio-economic forces that had a great impact 
on the lives of the people of Hanoi. This became mostly visible during the 1990s.  
Within this paper I will describe how the economic liberalisation has affected the outlook and the 
livelihoods of people in three different districts of Hanoi. These districts are the Ancient Quarter, 
the French Colonial Quarter as well as the Squatter Area of Chuong Duong. The first two areas 
give a good example of the expansion of the private sector, whereas Chuong Duong can be con-
sidered as an outcome of rural-urban migration initiated through increasing disparities between 
rural and urban areas. These are also the areas that have so far been most researched and about 
which there exists a great deal of publications that provided the base of my M.A. thesis. Within 
this paper I will, however, also pay attention to the less researched areas around Hanoi, which 
will be the focus of my future research. 
Socio-economic transformation of the Ancient Quarter 
The first area of interest is the ‘Ancient Quarter’ of Hanoi. Since the legalization of private sec-
tor economy in the mid 1980s it has been redeveloped as commercial centre. As a consequence 
illegal private building activities in the quarter have increased. Logan (1994: 65) refers to this as 
“’do-it-yourself’ building boom”. This boom indicates that the people of Hanoi have started to 
improve their living conditions on their own, independently from the state. Most residents con-
vert the ground floors of their traditional ‘tunnel-houses’ into sales rooms. Some would, because 
of lack of space inside, even expand their sales- and living rooms onto the streets in front of their 
houses. 
In the ‘Ancient Quarter’ an expansion of formal economic activities as well as of informal activi-
ties can be noticed. The formal sector is made up of private retail trade. Attracted by the rising 
economic opportunities a lot of new traders have come from other parts of the city or even from 
other provinces. They opened up larger and more modern shops than the ones of the older resi-
dents. The rising competition results in the displacement of former residents that do not have the 
financial capacity to extend their businesses (Waibel 2002: 218 f.). Besides the formal retail sec-
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tor, an informal economic sector has developed. In Hanoi there is an increase in economic activi-
ties of street hawkers and petty traders on the streets. In addition to that, mostly female, door to 
door peddlers from the surrounding countryside sell agricultural products. Forbes (1996: 62) 
terms these informal activities Pavement Economy.  
Commercialization of the French Colonial Quarter 
Within the French Colonial Quarter one can note in recent years a transformation from a residen-
tial to a commercial area. Multinational enterprises, international organizations and local busi-
ness men show a growing interest in the villas in this area. The colonial-style houses are con-
verted into representative offices, embassies or large shops. This leads to the displacement or 
even eviction of former residents. 
The government owns a great part of the villas and seeks to gain profit by renting them to afflu-
ent people. As Koperdraat and Schenk (2000: 68 ff.) report, the former tenant then has three op-
tions. Firstly, the government offers a low financial compensation for leaving. Secondly, the 
tenant can receive accommodation in a newly built state apartment usually situated on the out-
skirts of the city. Thirdly, if a tenant refuses to vacate a villa the police might force him to leave.  
Since they belong to the low-income group, former tenants often find themselves in the so-called 
metropolitan dilemma. The concept of the metropolitan dilemma was developed by Berner and 
Korff (1995: 209 f.) and refers to the situation of low-income employees who have to live near 
the city centre because they do not have the time and money to commute daily. But in most cases 
it is their residential places that are threatened by eviction because they occupy highly valued 
land in the city centre. Most residents cannot afford to buy or build a new house elsewhere. That 
is why they have to agree in resettlement. As a result they loose their income opportunities in the 
city centre. 
Squatter areas as a consequence of rural-urban migration 
Another consequence of the Doi Moi reforms is the growth of rural-urban migration, especially 
to Hanoi. In the pre-Doi Moi era internal migration had been restricted by the household registra-
tion system. Without this registration people did not receive subsidized food or employment. 
Since the system has broken down rural urban migration has increased.  
Most of the migrants work in the informal sector as cyclo riders, garbage collectors or porters on 
the market. Many of these migrants live in squatter areas on the bank of the Red River, which are 
located near to the Ancient Quarter and to the French Colonial Quarter. They usually live in 
small shacks built on illegally occupied land, which means that they are in danger of eviction. It 
is therefore important for the residents to establish social relations which can help them secure 
their livelihood. 
Such social relations in the squatter areas often base on the rural-based networks through which 
migrants came to the city in the first place. Migrants of the same home town tend to move to the 
same district in Hanoi, a process also called chain migration (see, for example, Li Tana 1996). 
This has the advantage that newcomers can count on the assistance of fellow villagers when they 
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seek employment or housing. In the last years these social relations have led to the emergence of 
informal organizations named phuong hoi (guild), to or nhom (group) ( Li Tana 1996: 55).  
The Squatter Area of Chuong Duong 
An example of a squatter area is Chuong Duong, which is situated on the banks of the Red River. 
The authorities of Hanoi have already planned to tear down the squatter area in order to build a 
motorway or a port. They eventually decided against it, because it would mean that a great num-
ber of people needed to be resettled (Harnois 2000: 107). Residents of the squatter area have now 
taken action to improve their living conditions by themselves. This could result in the creation of 
a locality. With the term of the locality Korff (1991: 14 f.) refers to loosely structured relations 
of mutual assistance between people living in a spatially defined area. The locality develops 
from “social creativity”, the will to improve living standards on one’s own. 
Several initiatives such as the raising of money to solidify the banks of the Red River or the 
establishment of savings groups show that the foundation for social organization has already 
been laid (Harnois 2000: 106 f., 130). Moreover Berner and Korff (1995: 214) name social 
relations such as kinship, friendship and neighbourship as basis for social cohesion. The 
continuing existence of these relations is ensured by chain migration. 
Rural villages at the outskirts of Hanoi 
A fourth area, which I will discuss now, has thus far not yet been much researched. It concerns 
the rural villages surrounding Hanoi. The existence of the people living there is increasingly 
threatened by construction projects of multinational joint-ventures. With the expansion of the 
city, farmland belonging to the villages is becoming highly valued land. In recent years tradi-
tionally flower growing villages have been transformed to modern housing sites. In 1996 the 
government gave permission to the Citra Westlake Project in Phu Thuong ward which was to 
accommodate 50.000 people. For their farmland the residents were offered both financial com-
pensation and the possibility of employment within the project. The villagers accepted the offer 
because they were willing to integrate into the urban economy. But with the financial crisis in 
1997 the project was stopped and the joint-venture denied paying the reimbursement (Leaf 1999: 
313). 
In my future research I plan to focus exactly on these social and economical implications of the 
residents’ integration into the urban economy. This research would include a survey on changes 
of lifestyles in a selected village, taking into considerations various issues described above. Do 
the residents of this village commute into the city centre for work or do they find employment in 
a project nearby? How do these new employment opportunities affect their income? A further 
step would then be to examine indicators of social change. Based on the assumption that the 
adoption of an urban lifestyle usually affects traditional patterns of social organization two issues 
would be of interest: On the one hand the transformation of family relations and on the other 
changes in the relationship between man and woman. These issues relate to the question whether 
adolescents tend to leave their families to live on their own in the city. And if so, can this be 
 108
regarded an indicator for the loosening of traditionally strong family ties (e.g. child piety)? In 
this context it is also of importance to look at, for example, the age of marriage and the amount 
of females staying single. Through a study of such economic and social processes in the outskirts 
of Hanoi, I aim to contribute to a better understanding of Vietnam’s transformation from a rural 
society to an urban society. 
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Processes of Urbanisation and Transformation  
in Nam Dinh City, Vietnam 
Angelica Wehrli 
Within this paper I will explore the ongoing processes of urbanisation and transformation in 
Nam Dinh City, Vietnam. I will do so by first listing some facts concerning Vietnam. Then I will 
outline my research interest, and describe the location of my field research. To conclude, I will 
give two examples that highlight the actual transformation process in order to illustrate the vari-
ety of ways in which values and ideals are subject to change. Conflicts resulting from diverse 
ideals as well as first reflections on change came up during my explorative field visit, which I 
undertook in April and Mai 2004 to prepare my PhD research.1 
A Historic Transition 
Various studies about Vietnam have pointed out that there is a gap in employment opportunities 
and living standards between urban and rural areas on the one hand, and between southern and 
northern Vietnam on the other hand. Reasons for the latter can be found in history, and manifest 
themselves, amongst others, in considerable economic differences. These differences were even 
enhanced by the doi moi (renovation) policy, which had not the same impact on the predomi-
nantly rural areas as it had on the cities. The launching of doi moi by the Vietnamese Communist 
Party and the Vietnamese government in 1986 can be seen as a turning point in the recent history 
of Vietnam, as it implied major changes from the former centrally planned economy to a ‘market 
economy with socialist direction’.2 Some changes are quite obvious and directly influence the 
life of the Vietnamese people, while others tend to be more subtle. The impact of the transitional 
phase does, however, not have the same consequences for all individuals. 
Before going into detail about my research location and interest, I will provide some basic char-
acteristics of Vietnam. As can also be observed in other countries in Southeast Asia and in other 
parts of the world, Vietnam is marked by a transition towards urbanity3 and a rise in the urban 
population.4 The Vietnamese society is currently undergoing a radical change from a rural to an 
                                                 
1 At this stage of research I am not yet able to draw conclusions from intensive field work and collected 
data. 
2 It is amply discussed whether the process of reform was emerging from below rather than being directed 
top down by the central government (Gainsborough 2003; Fforde and de Vlyder 1996; Kerkvliet 1995).  
3 I have not yet found precise definitions for urban or rural areas in Vietnam that could serve as the basis 
for the statistic mentioned hereafter. Definitions for “urban” are numerous. In order not to exceed the 
space of this article I refer to Wirth, who names characteristics such as the size of the population, density, 
and heterogeneity (1938: 1-24).  
4 According to a UN “the world’s urban population is estimated at 3 billion in 2003 and is expected to rise 
to 5 billion by 2030”, thus representing 61 per cent. In contrast “the rural population is anticipated to 
decline slightly from 3.3 billion in 2003 to 3.2 billion in 2030.” (UN Press Release POP/899, 24 March 
2004. In: UN (ed.) 2004: Population and development in the United Nations system). 
<http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wup2003/pop899_English.doc>. 11.05.2005. 
 urban country. Not only is the population growth rate for urban areas much higher than the rate 
for rural ones, but also do more and more people live in urban areas. In 1990 the population 
growth rate for urban areas was 2.4% compared to 1.8% for rural areas. This tendency intensi-
fied even more in the last decade as in 2003 the urban population increased with an average of 
4.2% corresponding to 0.5% for rural areas.5 Although the estimates for the anticipated dimen-
sion of increase vary according to sources, there is no doubt that the rise will be a significant 
one, and thus represents a historic transition. Within my PhD research, I want to explore the con-
sequences of this transition on individuals living in Nam Dinh City. 
Research Location and Interest  
Nam Dinh City with its 232’000 citizens6 represents an average, middle-sized Vietnamese city. 
Although considered to be an urban place because of its high population rate and high density, it 
would make no sense to draw a sharp line between urban and rural areas. Nam Dinh City is situ-
ated in the Red River Delta about 90 km southeast of Ha Noi and is, unlike other places in the 
area, by no means a tourist site. In the past Nam Dinh City used to be the centre of Vietnam’s 
textile industry and was called the Manchester of ancient Indochina (Vu Can 1966: 204). Today 
most of the people in Nam Dinh province work in agriculture, forestry and fishery (44,7%), fol-
lowed by commerce and service (36,5%), industry (e.g. textile, garment, food processing, me-
chanical companies) (10,7%), and construction works (8.2%).7 The unemployment rate for the 
urban area of the Red River Delta is officially 6.4% and hence slightly higher than the national 
average of 5.8%.8 The rate in Nam Dinh City is – according to (official) sources – around 2-7%, 
but unofficial sources claim it to be as high as 20% (personal communication Mai 2004). 
During my latest visit to the Red River Delta I conducted an explorative field visit in order to 
prepare my PhD research. I observed an obvious contrast between the former way of life, and the 
actual hustle and bustle of a more ‘modern’ urban Vietnam. Despite the ongoing changes in 
every corner, continuity remains equally part of everyday life. The sometimes apparent contra-
diction, the merging of what seem to be two worlds getting in touch with each other, motivated 
me to acquire an in-depth understanding of the processes of socio-economic transformation.  
                                                 
5According to official statistics Vietnam had about 81 million inhabitants in 2003, whereof 21 million 
were living in urban, 60 million in rural areas. The data of 1990 illustrate the demographic shift; at that 
time the population was about 66 million: 53 million were living in rural and 13 million in urban areas. 
(Average population by sex and by urban, rural. In: GSO (ed.) 2005: Population and Employment).  
< http://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=467&idmid=3&ItemID=1523>. 11.05.2005 
6 (Urban population as of 1st April 1999 by province and by sex. In: GOS (ed.) 1999: Population and Em-
ployment. Population and Housing Census Vietnam 1999).  
<http://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=476&idmid=4&ItemID=1841>. 11.05.2005. 
7 The data base corresponds to the time span between 1991 and 1995. (Nam Dinh Provincial People’s 
Committee. Nam Dinh Provincial Department of Industry (ed.) 1999: Plan on Industrial Development of 
Nam Dinh Province by the year of 2010). At the moment I lack actual statistic material, but I will obtain 
it during the field research. 
8 (Unemployment rate in urban area. In: GOS (ed.) 2005: Population and Employment). 
<http://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=467&idmid=3&ItemID=1505>. 11.05.2005. 
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In order to find out more about these processes, I will conduct fieldwork in Nam Dinh City from 
September 2005 to March 2006 and from June to September 2006. The working title of my PhD 
study is “Household Livelihood Strategies in the Context of Socio-Economic Transformation in 
Nam Dinh City, Vietnam.” I am interested in analysing the livelihood of the inhabitants of Nam 
Dinh City,9 thereby I will attach equal importance to men and women. A gender-sensitive ap-
proach is fundamental to my research, as not only women’s but also men’s actions and ways of 
behaviour are subject to prevailing norms, traditions and new possibilities of ways of living. I 
will furthermore pay attention to migration transactions to and from Nam Dinh City. Related to 
this interest in migration patterns are the strategies of individuals embedded in households to 
secure their livelihood (in legal and/or illegal ways) in Nam Dinh City. 
Impressions during my field explorative visit to Nam Dinh City, based on numerous informal 
conversations, information broadcasted by mass media in Vietnam10 as well as further reading, 
have given rise to controversial reflections. In the following I will illustrate this by means of two 
examples: The first one deals with the prestige of trade, the second one concerns Confucian’s 
believes and resulting conflicts.  
1st Example: The Prestige of Trade  
Vietnam’s post doi moi policy and inherent ideological changes undoubtedly affected the out-
look of Vietnamese society. But how do new evolving values become apparent, for example, in 
the way people make their living? Is it true that ideals – that are said to have been fundamental 
and characteristic for Vietnam’s society – have changed radically in the last two decades? Can 
the processes of socio-economic transformation lead to the evolving of new ideals reflected in 
the prestige of occupations?  
Prestige and symbolic values which are ascribed to a certain profession are by no means stable, 
but dependent of time and context. Vietnam was an agrarian society for centuries, and thus the 
job of a farmer was highly valued. There were traditionally three classes in Vietnam, the scholars 
(sî), farmers (nông) and craftsmen (công). Outside of this social hierarchy were the traders 
(thuông) who were not granted high social prestige. In practice trade was left to the Chinese and 
almost all Vietnamese favoured a non-trade employment. This reinforced the cycle of ascribing 
low prestige to trade. Yet, it is interesting to see that since doi moi the state and even the Com-
munist party have given trade a positive mention. The encouragement is public; the praise of 
trade is diffused widely by mass media. Especially younger entrepreneurs are being extolled for 
their initiative and ability to build up private businesses or simply for being successful traders. In 
my opinion, this promotion of a positive connotation between trade and prestige should be re-
lated to both the supra local and the individual level. One reason on the supra-local level might 
                                                 
9 In my sample I will include both long term Nam Dinh citizens (i.e. people who have lived in Nam Dinh 
City for more than ten years as well as people who arrived less than ten years ago and either live or just 
work in Nam Dinh City). The aim of this sampling is to get insights into processes of migration and the 
dynamics of “city” development. 
10 At that time I was limited to reading Vietnamese newspapers in English due to my insufficient knowl-
edge of the Vietnamese language. 
 be the government’s post doi moi policy which aims, among other things, at rapid economic 
growth. Moreover there is an increase in the population, which means that jobs for millions have 
to be provided. All these factors encourage a promotion of private business,11 and a new set of 
professions in the domain of trade. On the local or individual level, the higher income of people 
working in private business compared to salaries of state employees enhances the attractiveness 
of trade or of having one’s own business. This example from the realm of trade suggests that 
ideological changes and corresponding occupational consequences mutually reinforce each 
other.  
2nd Example: Confucian’s Believes and Resulting Conflicts  
The second example I want to present here is related to religious values. In official statistics the 
majority of people stated that they do not belong to a religion,12 which is insofar of interest, as 
attributes referring to one or another religious practice can not be overlooked in daily life. This 
raises questions: Are some believes or daily performed rituals not considered as part of religion? 
Or is there no interest in pointing out one’s own religious believes? Is this attitude a relict of 
prevailing atheism, a product of former socialist state ideology?  
Furthermore, official statistics do not mention Confucian believes, but summarize these practises 
under “Buddhism”. This category however is not evident, as practices and believes of Buddhism 
vary not only between countries, but also between regions within a country. Despite this contro-
versial information, for which I still lack an explanation, it cannot be denied that, especially in 
North-Vietnam, Confucianism has exerted influence upon numerous individuals for centuries. 
To this day, Confucianism structures society as it virtually includes every member by placing 
him or her into a hierarchical web of mutual rights and duties. Therefore, it seems to me that 
Confucianism is not only a mirror of the moral order, but also of social integration.In spite of the 
ongoing changes on both the supra local and the local level in Nam Dinh City, traditional ideas 
and believes tend to be present and influence various aspects of daily life. Regardless of the on-
going processes ancestor worship, for example, is still practised in literally every Confucian 
household I visited during my field visit. The ornamenting of small ‘temples’, regular offerings 
and prayers are by no means limited to private houses, but can equally be found in hotels, restau-
rants, private shops or in a small internet café along a narrow street. Besides this obvious pres-
ence of ‘old’ Confucianist practices and values, many Vietnamese do now see themselves con-
fronted with possibilities to live their lives in a very different way. Let me illustrate how the 
presence of Confucian ideology and new policy ideals can result in conflicts.  
                                                 
11 Gainsborough for example notes that private firms are becoming more important, although the state’s 
business interest still predominates (2004: 50).  
12 According to statistics 1.4 million people out of the total 1.9 million living in Nam Dinh province, 
stated not to belong to a religion, while about 509’000 belong to a religion (382’000 people are Catholics, 
126’000 Buddhists, 580 Protestants, 10 Muslims, and 2 Hoa Hoa). (Population as of 1st April 1999 by 
province and by religion. In: GSO (ed.) 2005: Population and Employment. Population and Housing Cen-
sus Vietnam 1999).  
<http://www.gso.gov.vn/default_en.aspx?tabid=476&idmid=4&ItemID=1841>. 11.05.2005. 
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Due to the enormous population growth during the last years, the Vietnamese authorities pro-
claimed a new family policy calling for only one or two children. The present family ideal is in 
sharp contrast to the former – characterised in the predominant rural Vietnam by the dictum ‘the 
more children the better’ – which remained unchanged for decades. For parents striving to fulfil 
the Confucian ideal of having at least one son, a conflicting situation develops in case the first 
two children are girls. According to the new family ideal promoted and advertised throughout the 
country, they are meant to refrain from having another child.13 But according to Confucianism, 
their duty has not yet been accomplished since a son is required for the ancestor worship (Gam-
meltoft 1999: 70ff; Pham Van Bich 1999: 219ff). It is therefore interesting to look more closely 
at how the new family policy, also labelled in the official discourse as “happy family”, interacts 
with Confucians believes, and how parents deal with divergent demands. Throughout the country 
large colourful advertisement highlight the differences between small and “happy families” by 
contrasting them with “unhappy families” raising many children. Still, one can wonder whether 
official propaganda is valued more than Confucian tradition and the corresponding demand to 
have at least one son. This leads to the question raised in the literature, to what extent this con-
frontation of ideals emerges into conflicts (Gammeltoft 1999: 61ff) and how these are related to 
gender. 
To finish, I would like to give one personal anecdote of how it appeared to me that – despite 
ongoing changes – internalised Confucian tradition still dominates everyday life as some Viet-
namese continue considering a boy as being indispensable for the so called “family happiness”. 
One afternoon in May 2004 I had a lively conversation with a woman whom I had met for the 
first time. After having gone through the Vietnamese procedure of ‘entering questions’ (about 
my age, civil status and children)14 myself, Lan introduced herself as being thirty-four years old, 
married but unfortunately childless. After a while her desperate wish to give birth to a son in 
order to be recognised by friends and relatives as “a real woman” became evident. She connected 
this aspired shift in status with more respect increasing the quality of living. The dialogue con-
tinued until she suddenly sighed, cheered up and started to talk about her two daughters whom 
she formerly had not mentioned, because they were girls! 15 
The two examples relating to the prestige of trade and the differing family values emblematise 
how the interdependence of ongoing processes of urbanisation and transformation can result in 
dilemmas on both the society’s and the individual’s level. Vietnam is in a transitional phase 
which will shape and change the lives of many people. Former values and ideologies are still 
                                                 
13 Gammeltoft emphasises that the situation of Vietnam can by no means be compared to the Chinese 
‘one-child-policy’. Nevertheless, she judges the propaganda of the Vietnamese government and the pres-
sure mostly exercised on women to use contraceptive as considerably (Gammeltoft 1999: 57ff). 
14 In order to address a person properly and politely one has to know the age of the conversation partner 
because the Vietnamese language places every person into a virtual net of kinship relations. 
15 Although the birth of a son is ascribed high importance, this does not imply that girls are not valued. In 
fact the ideal – according to Confucianism – consists in a girl as the first born child (in order to help the 
mother in household task’s and with following children), and as I was told by informants, at least one son 
(personal communication April, May 2004).  
 forming part of daily life, but controversial values are evolving. In which way values will 
change, and how former and actual ideals will merge to create new ones will provide fascinating 
topics to analyse. 
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